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Abstract
This thesis investigates a few examples of customer-supplier and worker- 
employer relationships which are thought to be important to macroeconomic analysis.
Among the literature on sticky price, we suggest that the theory of mark-up 
pricing and the theory of customer-supplier relationships advocated by Okun (1981), 
deserve more attention. We also suggest that there are at least three hypotheses 
implicit in the mark-up equation:
(1) a sticky pricing response to demand shocks;
(2) a relatively fast pricing response to cost shocks; and
(3) 1 % change in average cost will cause an equiproportionate rise in price.
In Chapter 2, a reputation cost of changing price is used to summarize Okun's 
discussion on suppliers' tendency to pledge the constancy of price for some 
reasonably long period (a type of customer-supplier relationship). A microfoundation 
model is then built to investigate the three hypothesis in details.
With regard to the first hypothesis, it is shown that (a) the reputation cost of 
changing price; (b) uncertainties about the persistence and generality of an observed 
demand shock; and (c) their interactions can jointly account for an extensive degree of 
price stickiness. We also explain that such a modelling of price stickiness could be 
more convincing than that by the Menu Cost Hypothesis. With regard to the second 
and third hypotheses, our conclusion is positive in the sense that it is a good 
approximation, but negative in the sense that it is at most an approximation. We then 
specify the conditions under which the mark-up equation can be used in 
macroeconomic analysis. In our discussion of hypothesis 2, we also touched upon 
the evolution of the practice of cost-oriented, as opposed to demand-oriented, 
pricing.
In Chapter 3, we start with the justification of an implicit, non-binding 
guarantee of employment for those within the firms (a type of worker-employer 
relationship). A dynamic programming model is then built to investigate the 
employment response of the representative employer to demand shocks. It is found 
that:
(a) In the case of mild negative demand shock, the producer will hoard the 
excessive amount of labour, and production effort will be the variable of 
adjustment;
(b) In the case of adverse negative demand shock, the producer will break the 
implicit guarantee of employment and make considerable amount of layoffs.
From the point of view of maintaining employment, it is always better to stimulate the 
economy before, rather than after, the layoffs. Mild stimulation policies after the 
layoffs will have no effect on employment.
Chapter 4 attempts to provide an estimate of the cost of changing price. It was 
found that the cost is much larger than can be explained by the Menu Cost 
Hypothesis. The estimation also provides some evidence against the Normal Cost 
Hypothesis. Finally, Chapter 5 is a simulation exercise to check whether Caplin and 
Spulber's neutrality result, arising from the disappearance of price stickiness on 
aggregation, can be applied to some more general specifications.
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Chapter 1
1
1.1 Importance of Microfoundations to Macroeconomics
Much of the debate between the Keynesians and their opponents originates from, 
or is related to, differences in perceptions about the flexibility (or rigidity) of prices and 
wages. In the models of Keynes, Keynesians and post-Keynesians, prices and wages 
are often assumed to be rigid (or sluggish) downward so that a reduction in nominal 
aggregate demand will cause a reduction in output and employment. As quantity instead 
of price is assumed to play the (major) role of adjustment, excessive levels of 
unemployment and excessive fluctuations in real activity can result. This school of 
thought therefore proposes a role for the Government in fine-tuning the economy. On the 
other hand, the Classical and Neo-classical models usually assume flexible prices and 
wages so that markets usually clear with full employment. Involuntary unemployment 
can at best be short-lived and transitory. The New Classical models, with the same 
assumptions of flexible prices and wages and instantaneous market clearing, holds that 
fully recognized shifts in aggregate demand cannot cause fluctuations in real activities. 
The Government can only influence real activities by "fooling” individuals about relative 
prices. However, this kind of "fooling" cannot be long lasting because rational agents 
will soon learn about this and the Government policy will become fully recognized. 
Accordingly, there is a natural rate of unemployment and there is no room for systematic 
counter-cyclical monetary policy.
As we can see, the crucial point lies in the flexibility of prices and wages. If 
prices and wages are fully flexible, the Classical view of the world should be preferred. 
If any one of the prices and wages is rigid downward, the Keynesian viewpoint becomes 
relevant. Thus, an understanding of the microfoundations for prices, output, wages and
employment decisions is the key to the macroeconomic debate. The major aim of this 
thesis is to review and extend previous work on this topic.
It is interesting to note why the traditional Keynesians and the three Classical 
schools insist on their own assumptions and reject the others on methodological grounds. 
The traditional Keynesians think that wages (and sometimes prices) are structurally rigid 
because this is what they observe in this world. The Classical schools, who believe in 
the maximizing principle and the power of the invisible hand, think that prices and wages 
will always be adjusted to achieve full-employment equilibrium. As a result, traditional 
Keynesians are often criticized by their opponents for the lack of sufficient theoretical 
foundation for the assumption of rigid prices and wages, while the Classical schools are 
criticized by the Keynesians as unrealistic in neglecting the observed stickiness of prices 
and wages. Subsequent work on the microfoundations of sticky prices attempts to 
reconcile this by suggesting that the short run Keynesian stickiness of prices (or more 
correctly, stickiness of prices within bounds) can originate from long run Neo-Classical 
maximizing behaviour when there is a (menu and reputation) cost of changing price. The 
theory of implicit contracts also attempts to explain real wage rigidity by suggesting that 
an implicit guarantee of stable real wages will be beneficial to both the more risk-averse 
employees and the less risk-averse employers. The unsatisfactory fact is that there does 
not seem to be any apparent correspondence of methodology between the two separate 
sets of theories in the product and labour markets. Neither does the real wage rigidity of 
the implicit contract theory look comparable to the nominal stickiness of price in the 
product market. However, in the later part of the review, we will first argue that the 
implicit wage guarantee will be quoted in nominal terms with the understanding that the 
nominal wage will be occasionally adjusted to keep the variations of the real wage within 
some narrow bounds. We then argue that the breaking (or underfulfillment) of an implicit 
guarantee of employment and wage will imply a cost of layoff and a cost of cutting the 
wage (or a cost of having the wage below the agreed norm) which correspond to the cost
of changing price in the product market. This enables us to build a general model that is 
applicable to the price, output, wage and employment decisions. Besides, effort is made 
to combine the "good” elements and discard (or modify) the "bad" elements from the 
previous work on microfoundations to give a consistent framework which suit the 
observed facts.
Thus, excess capacity, cost-oriented pricing, sticky price with respect to demand 
shocks, long run Neoclassical maximization, customer-supplier relationships, employer- 
worker relationships, wage rigidity, involuntary unemployment, procyclical productivity, 
labour hoarding, cyclical variations of output and employment, implicit guarantee of 
employment and wages can all be made consistent with each other after refinement. Of 
course, the existence of the "bad" elements implies that some previous works have to be 
refined. For example, in the theory of implicit contracts, the prediction of real wage 
rigidity is discarded, and replaced by nominal wage rigidity with some limited 
fluctuations in the real wage. However, the spirit of implicit contract theory is conserved 
and used to back up the model in Chapter 3.
The aim of the thesis is not just to provide a justification of the Keynesian 
approach, it also aims to clear some of the misconceptions within the Keynesian 
framework. For example, in the macroeconomic debate, the Keynesian model is often 
interpreted as a theory of quantity adjustment and the Neoclassical school as a theory of 
price adjustment. Accordingly, if one variable does not adjust (or does not make the full 
adjustment), the other variable must, by definition, carry the full (or remaining) burden of 
adjustment:
"changes in the nominal aggregate demand fo r  goods and services have been 
accompanied by only a partial response o f aggregate price level. Because prices 
do not carry the full burden o f adjustment in the short run, quantities must by 
definition carry part o f the load"[Gordon(l981)]
4This type of dichotomy runs the danger of rejecting the possibility of a third variable of 
adjustment. A good example is related to the labour market. As explained in the later 
review and Chapter 3, the employer's implicit guarantee of wage and employment implies 
some stickiness of wages and employment. Thus, neither the wage (the price variable) 
nor employment (the quantity variable) will adjust to moderate demand shocks. Instead, 
we propose a third variable -- production effort — as the main variable of adjustment with 
respect to moderate or transitory demand shocks. Thus, neither the Keynesian, nor the 
three Classical schools, give the right picture about wage and employment response to 
moderate demand shocks* The trouble with the three Classical schools is that they assume 
both wages and employment are free to adjust. Traditional Keynesian models, while 
attempting to change the macroeconomic properties by introducing a wage floor, fall into 
the same trap as the three Classical schools in assuming employment is a free variable. 
Indeed, this is why the traditional Keynesian models give the embarrassing prediction of 
counter-cyclical productivity. In Chapter 3, we will develop a model in which 
employment, due to a cost of layoff, will be sticky with respect to a moderate reduction 
of demand. Such a result suggests that productivity per head will be procyclical, a 
phenomenon that is in accordance with observation and empirical findings.
Microfoundations are important because different definitions of stickiness may 
have different macroeconomic implications. For example, McCallum (1977) claims to 
have developed a model which preserves the Lucas-Sargent proposition of the 
infeasibility of counter-cyclical monetary policy even if prices are sticky. If McCallum is 
right, this will relieve the New Classical school from the criticism of paying insufficient 
care to the observed stickiness of price. However, a careful look reveals that the 
definition of "sticky price" in McCallum's paper is quite different from the usual 
definition. In the model of McCallum, stickiness of price is related to the gap between the
5market clearing level (Pt#) and the anticipated general price level (Pt*):
r Pt* if Pt* -5 i < Pt# < Pt* +52
Pt=  1 Pt# otherwise (1*1)
where S i, 82 are both greater than zero.
If the market clearing price Pt# is not too far away from the anticipated price Pt* (ie Pt# lies
within Pt*-5i and Pt*+52) it is not worth the cost to have the actual price different from the
anticipated level P*. On the other hand, if the gap Pt#-Pt* is sufficiently large in
magnitude (ie lies outside the range of [81,82]), it is worth the cost of adjusting the price
Pt to the market clearing level P t#. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any sound 
justification for McCallum's specification. McCallum did (informally) attempt to use 
Barro (1972) as the basis for the specification. However, as admitted by McCallum 
himself, the result of Barro (1972) would imply P t-i instead of Pt* will appear in the 
above specification. As will be explained in the thesis, we hold the same view as Barro 
that Pt-i instead of Pt* should be the reference point of price stickiness. If P* of equation 
(1.1) is replaced by Pt.i. McCallum will not be able to derive his result and price 
stickiness will be inconsistent with the Lucas-Sargent proposition 1.
1 To illustrate the inconsistency in McCallum's model, suppose the economy is at 
full employment at t-1. Let there be an anticipated reduction of aggregate demand at t 
which is small relative to the cost of changing price so that prices remain sticky. With 
Barro's definition of stickiness, we have Pt = Pt-i. Adding the assumption of rational 
expectation, we have Pt* = P t = Pt- i. Substituting into equation (1) of McCallum's paper 
implies that the notional aggregate supply is still at the full employment level 
ie yt = kt + ai (Pt - Pt*) + uu and Pt* = Pt = Pt_i
=> yt = kt +a i (P t -Pt . i )+ui t  
However, as price is now fixed at Pt_i and no longer fully flexible to achieve market 
clearing, the reduction of aggregate demand implies that the effective aggregate supply 
will be below the full employment level. There is thus a role for stabilization policy and 
the Lucas-Sargent proposition is no longer consistent with the proper definition of price 
stickiness.
In addition to the stickiness of prices and wages, we would like to emphasize the 
stickiness of relationships between the customers and suppliers; and between employers 
and employees. The details of such relationships have already been analyzed by Okun 
(1981). What we want to emphasize is the macroeconomic implications of these 
relationships. One of these is related to the recent emphasis of hysteresis effect in 
international trade theory [see Baldwin and Krugman (1986), and Bean (1987)]. The 
theory, in sharp contrast to the conventional economic wisdom, holds that large 
fluctuations of the exchange rate will lead to entry or exit decisions, thus leading to the 
breaking or making of customer-supplier relationships that are not reversed when the 
currency returns to its previous level. Thus, the extreme strength of the US dollar in the 
early 1980s has caused a permanent loss of market position by US-based firms. This is 
so because once foreign firms have invested in marketing, research and development, 
reputation, distribution networks, etc., they will find it profitable to remain in the market 
even at a lower exchange rate. Once US firms have abandoned markets, a mere return of 
the exchange rate to former levels will not be enough to make the expensive recapture of 
these markets worthwhile.
Another example is related to the "stickiness" of the employer-employee 
relationship which will be analyzed in Chapter 3. In the model, we hold that employers 
will keep the same amount of employees within a certain range of demand. If demand 
falls outside this range, employers will make considerable amount of layoffs. Thus, in 
case of recession it is always better, from the point of view of aggregate employment, to 
stimulate the economy before rather than after employers make the layoffs. This is so 
because once these employers, who start with labour hoarding, have cleared the 
excessive labour through layoffs, they will not re-hire this excessive labour even if 
demand returns to its original level. On the other hand, if the Government succeeds in 
stimulating demand before employers making the layoffs, labour that would otherwise 
have been laid off will remain employed.
1.2 Review of the Literature
1.2.1 Price and Output Decisions of Firms
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Traditional supply and demand analysis predicts that fluctuations of demand (and 
supply) will cause fluctuations in prices. However, as Okun(1981) has suggested, such 
kinds of fluctuations are limited to selected financial assets, agricultural products and 
primary metals. Observation tells us that the prices of most manufacturing and service 
outputs are rather sticky (or sluggish) to demand shocks. Given that manufactured and 
service output forms the major category of production value in our economy, the question 
of whether prices are sticky with respect to demand shocks is important. If prices are 
sticky with respect to demand shocks, quantity rather than price will bear the burden of 
adjustment. Cyclical fluctuations of output will be a usual phenomenon and there can be 
a role for stabilization policy even if expectations are rational. For this reason, we will 
first review some of the literature on sticky prices.
Four strands of thought are of particular relevance to our discussion of the price 
and output decisions of the firm. The first strand is the theory of mark-up pricing which 
provides a group of important hypotheses that we would like to either confirm or 
challenge. The second strand consists of theoretical models such as Barro(1972), 
Mussa(1981) and Rotemberg(1982), which illustrate that sticky prices can indeed result 
from the rational behaviour of the firm. While there are quite a lot of limitations 
associated with these models, they are contain some basic features, such as the 
methodology of Neoclassical maximization subjected to a cost of changing price, in 
common with our model. The third strand is due to the very persuasive discussion by 
Okun(1981) which provides the conceptual foundation of the customer-supplier 
relationships and the formulation of the cost of changing price in our model. Most of the 
features discussed in Okun's book, such as the shopping process, are taken to be 
complementary to the model we build in Chapter 2. The final strand is the current
research work on near-rationality by Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b), Mankiw (1985) and 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). In this part of the review, we hope to point out some of 
the inappropriately overemphasized features of this literature.
(A) Mark-up Pricing
In 1939, Hall and Hitch published an empirical paper casting doubt on the 
Neoclassical short run marginal cost pricing behaviour. Instead, they suggest that 
businessmen might be following a rule of thumb, which they called the "full cost 
principle", in their pricing decision process. They also suggest that once prices are fixed, 
"[they] will be changed if  there is a significant change in wage or raw 
material costs, but not in response to moderate or temporary shifts in 
demand"
Such an assertion represents an important departure form the Classical Supply-Demand 
Analysis and the Neoclassical framework which assume that prices will be fully flexible 
to achieve equilibrium. As another contribution, Hall and Hitch suggest that the pricing 
response with respect to cost shocks is qualitatively different from that with respect to 
demand shocks. Unfortunately, Hall and Hitch do not appear to recognize that the full 
cost principle can be derived from long run profit maximizing behaviour.
The work by Hall and Hitch was followed by a series of papers which brought 
both conceptual innovations and a much better understanding of the microfoundations of 
the Keynesian approach. Instead of going through the details of the debate, we will 
merely summarize the discussions by Koutsoyiannis (1979) and Morishima (1984) as 
follows:
(a) When a representative producer starts a business, he will try to have a rough estimate 
of the demand (De in diagram (1.1));
(b) He then builds the plant (or service lines) with a flat-bottomed average cost curve and
some kind of planned excess capacity. The reasons for the flat-bottomed AC curve 
and planned excess capacity, according to Koutsoyiannis are (i) to meet seasonal 
fluctuations of demand; (ii) to allow a smooth flow of production when break-down 
of some equipment occurs; (iii) to meet a growing demand until further expansion of 
scale is realized; and (iv) to allow for some flexibility for minor alterations of style of 
product in view of the changing tastes of customers. Excess capacity, according to 
Koutsoyiannis, also exists on the organizational and administrative level.
(c) The producer will charge the price (P) as a mark-up (m) of the average variable cost 
(AC) 2 so that
P = (1+m) AC (1.2)
In terms of Morishima’s diagram,
Price
(1+m) AC
AC
where De is the expected demand curve;
AC is the average cost curve; and 
m is the producer's ex ante profit mark-up plus a certain 
percentage associated with the ex ante average fixed cost.
diagnimXLll
2Within the theory of mark up pricing, there is a debate between proponents of 
total mark up (full cost principle) and proponents of variable mark up [eg. 
Kalecki(1939)]. The debate is centered around whether AC should be interpreted as 
the average total cost or average variable cost. To keep the fluency of presentation, 
we will only go into the details of such debate in Chapter 4.
1 0
the producer will charge the price P0 where the expected demand De cuts the curve 
(1+m) AC.
(d) Once the price is set, it will remain sticky even though actual demand turns out to be 
different from expected sales. The producer is reluctant to change price to the "short 
run" maximizing level because of the worry of losing goodwill which may seriously 
damage his sales in the future. Instead, the representative producer will adjust his 
production with respect to the demand shock. If the demand shock is persistent and 
larger than that allowed by the "planned excess capacity", the producer may still 
prefer expanding the capacity to raising price.
(e) Prices are more likely to change with cost shocks and the percentage change in price 
will be approximately equal to the percentage change in average cost.
Unlike Hall and Hitch, Koutsoyiannis (1979) and Morishima (1984) have 
recognized that the stickiness of prices with respect to demand shocks under the full cost 
principle may indeed be a result of long-run profit maximizing behaviour. Unfortunately, 
no explicit formulation about the cost and benefit of changing/keeping the price under 
these circumstances exists. Barro(1972), Mussa(1981) and Rotemberg(1982) 
[abbreviated as the B-M-R models] attempt instead to explain the stickiness by 
introducing an explicit cost of changing price.
(B) Price Stickiness with an explicit cost o f  changing price (the 
B-M -R m odels)
(1) Barro (1972)
The analytical tool used here is due to Miller and Orr(1966). Barro assumes that
(i) there is a fixed cost (A) for every change in price; and
(ii) the producer seeks to maximize profit
11
n = PY - C(Y) C(Y) > 0
subject to the demand constraint
Y = Yd = Q(P) + u Q'(P) < 0
where n is the profit, Y is the output, P is the price, Yd is the quantity demand, 
C(Y) is the cost function, Q(P) is the normal demand function, and u is a 
stochastic component of demand which is assumed to follow a random walk. 
After arguing that the "two-bins" policy will be the optimal solution of this 
problem,
sales
upper bin
optimal level
lover bin
time
diag|m_£li21
Barro then proceeds to find the optimal floor and ceiling within which the 
producer should not change the price and beyond which the producer should 
adjust the price so as to make the sales return to the "optimal level". The 
contribution of this exercise is that it explains price stickiness with respect to 
stochastic fluctuation of demand when there is a cost of changing price. The 
trouble with this stochastic analysis is that it tells us nothing about the optimal
1 2
pricing response in case of a permanent demand shock. If fluctuations of sales is 
a mixing result of permanent shifts and random fluctuations of demand and the 
producer cannot perfectly distinguish the two disturbances, the two bins policy 
may even fail to be the optimal solution of the problem.
(2) M ussa(1981)
By assuming
(i) the equilibrium price ( P * )  is growing at a constant rate;
(ii) the loss from not adjusting the price (Pt) to Pt* is a quadratic function of (In Pt - 
In P*); and
(iii) a fixed cost incurred with every change in price;
Mussa was able to guess that the optimal solution would be one with a periodic 
stepwise change of price for every fixed period T (he then proceed to solve for 
the optimal value of T). Thus, the optimal price path ( In Pt ) will be something as 
shown in diagram (1.3):
In P.
In P.
time
diagram (1.3)
1 3
where price will remain sticky in the horizontal section of In Pt (and make a 
discrete jump in the vertical section). It should be noted that while Barro(1972) 
attempts to explain price stickiness in a world with purely random fluctuation of 
demand around a fixed normal level, Mussa(1981) attempts to explain price 
stickiness in a world with a constantly rising mean equilibrium price (eg. rising 
cost). Thus, the work by Barro and Mussa can be regarded as complementary.
While Mussa's model is most suitable in explaining price stickiness in a 
world with constantly rising cost, it does not explain price sluggishness with 
respect to a large permanent demand shock which will cause a once-and-for-all 
rise in Pt*. If the once-and-for-all rise in Pt* is large enough to overcome the cost 
of changing price, Mussa's model will predict an immediate rise of P t to P t* and 
there will not be any price sluggishness, 
price
time
dmgnyn_£L41
However, as we will show in Chapter 2, price will still be sluggish in the face of 
such an event whenever there is a signal extraction problem between a persistent
1 4
and a transitory shock. This greatly enhances the extent of price sluggishness that 
can be explained by the recent literature.
(3) Rotemberg (1982 a.b)
With the assumption of a quadratic cost of changing price and some other 
simplifying assumptions, Rotemberg shows that the optimal pricing behaviour 
of his representative producer will be
where a,p,p,c are some constants specific to the firm with 
0 < a < l ; p > l ;  (l-a)(l-p ) = - 1/pc ; and
Pj/t+j* is the equilibrium price at t+j expected at t
The presence of aP t.i in (1.3), arise from the assumption of a quadratic cost of
changing price, implies an intertemporal linkage in the pricing decision between 
different periods (i.e. the price set this period will affect the optimal level of the
price chosen next period). The presence of txPt.i in (1.3) also implies a sluggish
pricing response with changes in the expected equilibrium price (P^+j*). For 
example, suppose there is a permanent shock in sales which changes the expected 
equilibrium price Pt/t+j* from P0 to P*, (1.3) can be reduced to
(1.3)
Pt = aP t.i + (l-a)P* (1.4)
Approximating the discrete time model by a continuous one, we have diagram
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(1.5):
puce
time
diagram (1.5)
in which Pt only adjusts gradually (sluggishly) towards the new equilibrium 
level. Thus, Rotemberg's paper can be regarded as a supplement of Barro(1972) 
and Mussa(1981) in suggesting a sluggish pricing response with respect to a 
permanent demand shock. It should be noted that the sole source of sluggishness 
here is the quadratic cost of changing price which naturally implies a gradual 
adjustment in all types of discrepancy between the actual and equilibrium price. 
Nevertheless, the overemphasis of a quadratic cost of changing price implies that 
the effects of all Pt/t+j* on P t (in equation (1.3)) do lead to some unconvincing 
predictions. For example, suppose the producer perfectly anticipates a 
disturbance in Pt/t+j* as that shown in diagram (1.6):
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The optimal price path P t, according to equation (1.3), will be as shown in the 
above diagram. This would mean a reduction of price between to and to+n during 
which demand is higher than usual. Such prediction does not appear to be what 
we observe in the real world. In Chapter 2, we will develop a model which will 
predict a more convincing pricing response than that of Rotemberg. It will also 
be clear that the effects of Pt/t+j* on Pt are not perfectly additive.
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(C) Further comments on the B-M-R models and the theory of mark 
u p  pricing
(1) The B-M-R models versus the theory of mark-up pricing
The contribution of the B-M-R models is that they illustrate how sluggish price 
adjustment can result from profit maximizing behaviour. In particular, Barro(1972) can be 
regarded as an important work in the refinement of the full-cost principle. Instead of 
interpreting the planned profit mark-up (m) of equation (1.2) as a "fair" mark-up the 
producer wants to stick with, Barro's work implies that m can be interpreted as the "long- 
run profit maximizing" mark-up with which the producer would like to stick with even in 
face of random fluctuations of demand 3.
The crucial assumption in the B-M-R models is the presence of a cost of changing 
price. As the derivation does not require any assumption of "planned excess capacity" or a 
"flat-bottomed average cost curve", the result of a sticky price can also be consistent with 
many models other than the theory of mark-up pricing. This greatly enhances their 
relevance and applicability in the macroeconomic literature. However, seen from another 
point of view, one should recognize that the theory of mark-up pricing is a far more general 
and influential theory than the B-M-R models. Beside being a theory of price decision, the 
modem version of mark-up pricing is also, as we have seen, a theory involving capacity, 
production and quality decisions. The appearance of the B-M-R models only implies 
further development along this line should be done about the joint decisions of price, 
capacity, production and quality to explain the observed behaviour of firms over these
3The interpretation of m as the "long-run profit maximizing" mark up (or more 
correctly, the expected net discounted profit maximizing mark up) has the advantage in 
explaining why the profit mark ups of some growing industries are so high while the profit 
mark ups of some declining industries can be close to zero or negative. On the other hand, 
the interpretation of m as a "fair" mark up can at most explain the difference in mark up by 
the difference in risk premium. Such interpretation has difficulty in explaining why some 
profit mark ups can be close to zero (or negative) and why the difference in mark ups can 
be so high across industries.
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areas of decisions. Even if one were only interested in the price decision, the theory of 
mark-up pricing does say quite a few things not recognized or properly tackled by the B-M- 
R models. Implicit in the formula of P=(l+m)AC, there are indeed three hypotheses
(1) the assumption of a fixed m which implies a sticky price with respect to demand 
shocks;
(ii) the separation of AC from m reveals the belief of an asymmetric pricing response 
with respect to cost shocks and demand shocks;
(iii) the unitary power index of AC implies that 1%  rise of average variable cost will cause 
1%  rise of price (i.e. average cost pricing is superior than the short run Neoclassical 
marginal cost pricing).
The B-M-R models have at most given an imperfect account of the first hypothesis. In 
particular, by assuming a certain equilibrium price, Mussa(1981) and Rotemberg(1982) did 
not distinguish whether the change in equilibrium price is due to cost changes, demand 
changes or a mixture of the two. Such a distinction is important because (i) the cost of 
changing price with respect to demand shocks may be different from that with respect to 
cost shocks; and (ii) the representative producer's expectation of his competitor's pricing 
response with respect to a cost shock may be different from that of a demand shock. In 
Chapter 2, we will use these to explain why the pricing response with respect to cost 
shocks will be different from that with respect to demand shocks.
(2) Signal Extraction Problem as an important source of price sluggishness
Returning to the first hypothesis, we would like to emphasize that the degree of 
price stickiness explained by the B-M-R models is rather limited. In Chapter 2, we will 
emphasize the signal extraction problem faced by the firm in distinguishing between 
persistent and transitory demand shocks as an important source of price sluggishness. The 
logic is as follows :
Suppose there is an observed rise in sales at t-1. The producer, with
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imperfect information will not be sure whether the sales at t-1 will persist in 
the future or not. Instead of raising the price immediately to the ’’short-run 
profit maximizing level" recommended by the sales at t-1, the producer will
(i) in the presence of a fixed cost of changing price, prefer to wait for more 
observations of sales. Only if he is relatively sure that the demand shock 
is persistent, will he start raising the price; or
(ii) in the absence of any cost of changing price, guess the probability that 
the shock at t-1 is persistent and raise the price to the level recommended 
by this probability. If the shock at t-1 is permanent, the probability (and 
hence the price) will be revised upward with more and more 
observations of sales.
Unlike the B-M-R models, the signal extraction hypothesis suggests that the usual 
reputation and menu cost of changing price is not a necessary condition for (though it 
remains an important source o f ) price sluggishness. Without such cost of changing price, 
price will still be sluggish to permanent demand shocks as long as there is a signal 
extraction problem. [Another source of sluggishness that does not require the assumption 
of a reputation and menu costs of changing price is the presence of information 
transmission lags within the economy. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.]
Of even greater importance, the signal extraction hypothesis, when combined with 
reputation and menu costs of changing price, can help to extend the degree of price 
stickiness that can be explained by the recent literature. The argument can be separated into 
two stages. The first stage arises from our dissatisfaction with the formulation of the cost 
of changing price in the B-M-R model. In Barro(1972) and Mussa(1981), the cost of 
changing price is assumed to be a fixed component, A. Rotemberg(1982), on the other
hand, assumed a quadratic cost of changing price (i.e. c(AP)2 where c is a constant). The 
trouble with these two types of assumptions is that they imply reducing price is as costly as
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raising price. If one believes that a permanent reduction of price is favourable to the 
reputation of firm, and the reputation cost is more important than the menu cost, the above 
specifications will be wrong. In Chapter 2, we will argue that a more convincing 
formulation should be the sum of
(i) a fixed component A 4 for any change of price. [This is intended to capture the menu 
cost and part of the reputation cost. It has the effect of penalizing too frequent changes 
in price.];
(ii) a significant linear component £(AP) 4 which is intended to capture most of the
reputation cost/gain of changing price. [The advantage of having a significant linear 
component is that it implies a reduction of price will represent a reputation gain (at least 
no reputation cost) to the firm.]; and possibly
(iii) a non-linear component, such as that in the Rotemberg model,which will penalize too 
shaip a change in price.
The presence of a significant linear component implies that the fixed cost or quadratic cost 
in the B-M-R models should be much smaller than we are used to expect. This, in turn, 
reduces the degree of price stickiness that can explained by the B-M-R models (see Chapter 
2 for the details).
The second stage of our argument concerns how the signal extraction problem can 
raise the degree of price stickiness. As we will show with the model of Chapter 2, a large 
enough permanent demand shock, in the absence of signal extraction problem, will cause 
an immediate jump in price form P0 to P* in diagram (1.7). With the presence of a signal 
extraction problem, but no cost of changing price, the price will be adjusted gradually 
towards P* along the a path CD. The addition of a fixed cost of changing price will raise 
the degree of price stickiness and the optimal pricing response will be that shown by the
4It is possible that the values A and £ of a rise in price will be different from that of 
a reduction in price.
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The interesting thing is that, without the signal extraction problem, a fixed cost of 
changing price alone will not cause any price stickiness with respect to the demand shock. 
The presence of a signal extraction problem, on the other hand, not only causes 
sluggishness as shown by the gap between P* and CD, but also allows the fixed cost of 
changing price to cause an additional stickiness as shown by the gap between AB and CD. 
[In Chapter 2, it will also become apparent how the signal extraction problem can raise the 
price stickiness with respect to large enough transitory demand shock.] That is why we 
claim that the signal extraction problem helps to extend the degree of price stickiness that 
can be explained by the recent literature.
(D) Customer-supplier relationships
While Barro, Mussa and Rotemberg were, in some degree, able to explain price 
sluggishness with the assumption of a cost of changing price, their discussion about the 
nature of the cost remained shallow. Barro(1972) and Mussa(1981) simply assumed the
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cost is fixed and made no explanation for the assumption. Rotemberg(1982a,b) only said 
that the cost includes the physical cost of changing the posted price (ie. the menu cost) and 
the reputation cost. Okun(1981), however, provides a much more extensive discussion of 
the cost by emphasizing the importance of repeated purchases in his category of customer 
market in which products are sold with price tags set by the seller. The idea itself 
originates in the search theory and implicit contract literatures.
(1) Okun's explanation of sticky price and welfare implication of the 
relationship
Okun first assumes that there is a shopping cost and limited information about the 
location of the lowest price in the market place so that buyers do not find it worthwhile to 
incur all the costs required to find the seller offering the lowest price. Instead, customers 
will adopt the strategy of setting an acceptance price, being ready to settle for any price at 
which the additional cost of more shopping outweighs its benefit. Okun then explained 
that customers are valuable to suppliers because of their potential for repeat business. 
Thus, suppliers have the incentive to discourage customers from shopping elsewhere by 
pledging continuity of firms's policy of price, services and the like. In other words, 
suppliers want to promote and condition customer's reliance on intertemporal comparison 
shopping. On the other hand, customers are attracted by continuity because it helps to 
minimize shopping costs. Such action in turn encourages and justifies the seller to 
maintain a stable pricing policy and willingness to accept greater variations in quantity. 
Such an account of customer relationship not only explains the stickiness of price, but also 
predicts the stability of quality, service and the like.
Okun also distinguishes his customer relationship from the theory of administered 
prices [Berle and Means(1932), Means(1935,1939) and Blair(1974)] as an alternative
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explanation of sticky prices 5. In sharp contrast to the theory of administered prices, the 
customer relationship model implies that inflexibility of price may have some socially 
desirable aspects. Although there is a social welfare loss associated with the persistent 
excess of price over marginal cost, the relationship does significantly reduce the transaction 
cost:
"T h e  c u s to m e r -m a rk e t a tta c h m e n ts  s a v e  a  h u g e  v o lu m e  o f  r e s o u rc e s  th a t  
c u s to m e r s  w o u ld  o th e rw is e  d e v o te  to  s h o p p in g  (a n d  tr y in g  o u t)  p r o d u c ts  
w ith  e v e r y  tr a n s a c t io n . T o  f i r m s , a n  e s ta b l i s h e d  c l ie n te le  in c r e a s e s  
p re d ic ta b ili t ie s  o f  sa les , p e rm itt in g  im p o r ta n t sa v in g s  in  in v e n to ry  c o s ts  a n d  
p r o d u c tio n  sc h e d u lin g  [O k u n ( 1981 ) J 3.1 5 5 ]  ".
No matter whether the benefit falls short or outweighs the loss, the relationship suggests 
"diagnosis does not point to antitrust measures [as implied by the theory of administered 
price] as a likely remedy for chronic inflation or macroeconomic stability."
(2) Scone of the relationship
(a) "Big-ticket" items
In the explanation quoted in section (1), the possibility of repeated business is the 
crucial reason for suppliers to maintain the relationship. Nevertheless, Okun holds that 
such relationship also exists in markets of "big-ticket" items that are bought infrequently by 
consumers:
"In c a se  o f  b ig - t ic k e t ite m s  th a t a re  b o u g h t  in fr e q u e n tly  b y  c o n su m e rs , like  
a u to m o b ile s  a n d  h o u s e h o ld  a p p lia n c e s , r e p a ir  s e r v ic e s  a r e  a  m e a n s  o f  
m a in ta in in g  re la tio n sh ip s . M o r e  g e n e ra lly , f i r m s  s e e k  to  e s ta b l ish  b ra n d -  
n a m e  re lia b ili ty  in  a  w a y  th a t c o u n ts  o n  r e p u ta t io n  (a  f l o w  o f  in fo rm a tio n  
f r o m  o n e  c o n su m e r  to  th e  n e x t)  to  s u b s titu te  f o r  r e p e tit io n  o f  e x p e r ie n c e  b y
5Okun also suggests, in the absence of customer relations, the theory of 
administered price itself is insufficient in explaining why price remains sticky with a rise in 
demand. Interested readers should refer to Okun's book.
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th e  sa m e  c o n su m e r ."  [O k u n (1 9 8 1 ) ,P 1 5 1 ]
Despite the continuing high cost in providing repair services and making advertisements, 
most of the suppliers in these markets still find it worthwhile to take the cost in promoting 
the brand-name reputation which will in turn raise demand significantly. As the cost of 
promotion is huge in absolute size, the cost of dis-investment in reputation (such as having 
an erratic policy in pricing and the like) will also be high. This explains why suppliers of 
these markets dislike changing price frequently to capture small and short term fluctuations 
of demand.
(b ) Within the production and distribution hierarchy
While Okun's attention was focused on the shopping process (ie. the relationship 
between the producers and the final consumers), a customer relationship also exists 
between the various participants of the production and distribution hierarchy 6 (i.e. between 
the secondary producer(s) and the tertiary producer(s); between wholesaler(s) and 
retailers) etc.). To borrow the terminology of Schultz(1985) concerning the employer- 
worker relationship, there exists large returns to maintaining the continuity of association 
between the customer and supplier. Customers prefer the relationship because, after a 
reasonably long period of trading,
(i) their specific demand about the product in various quality dimension become well 
understood by their supplier(s) and less mistakes (which can be costly) are expected;
(ii) they know that the suppliers have indicated by their previous trading that they prefer 
long-term business to short-term cheating;
(iii) they know about the speed and reliability of delivery of the suppliers;
(iv) credit and discount can be obtained; and
(v) bargaining costs over price and the like are significantly reduced;
6As the number of participants are much smaller here, the shopping process 
described by Okun may not apply in some cases. Nevertheless, customer relationship still 
exists between the buyer(s) and seller(s).
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All these may not be available, or costly to acquire, if they were to change to a new 
supplier.
Suppliers (or subcontractors) also prefer the relationship because, after a reasonably 
long period of trading,
(i) they know more about the customer's creditability and financial ability in honouring 
the payment;
(ii) the possibility of repeated business gives them greater guarantee of future demand and 
hence important savings in inventory costs and in production scheduling;
(iii) as in the case of customers, they acquire non-transferable knowledge about the 
customer's specific demand in various quality dimensions and hence avoid some very 
costly mistakes; and
(iv) bargaining costs over the price and the like is significantly reduced.
As the initiating costs and risk premiums of trying out new suppliers (or customers) here 
are much higher than that in the shopping process, the relationship here is necessarily more 
sticky. This provides an explanation for the existence of "hysteresis effect" in the 
international trade theory mentioned in section (1.1).
(3) Cost-oriented pricing
In the previous sections, we have seen that suppliers have incentives to maintain 
and pledge constancy of the pricing policy. However, because suppliers are subjected to 
cost increases that they cannot control, it will be impossible (and not worthwhile) to 
maintain the same price over an infinite horizon. They can nonetheless establish some 
practices designed to build the confidence of their customers in their dependability and 
reliability. One important practice 7, according to Okun, is cost-oriented pricing :
7The other cost reducing practices, according to Okun, are the promise to meet 
competition, fixed time scheduling and prenotification of price revision. The use of these 
practices in some industries, however, does not deny the applicability of cost-oriented 
pricing. For example, fixed time scheduling of price revision can be combined with cost-
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"F irm s  n o t o n ly  b eh a ve  th a t w ay, b u t a lso  c o n d itio n  th e ir  c u s to m e rs  to  e x p e c t th e m  
to  b e h a v e  th a t  w a y . I t  is  e a sy  f o r  a n y o n e  to  u n d e r s ta n d  th a t  c o s t  in c re a s e s  c a n  
f o r c e  th e  f i r m  to  b r e a k  th e  c o n tin u ity  o f  its  o ffe r . H ig h e r  c o s ts  a r e  a n  a c c e p te d
ra tio n a le  f o r  ra is in g  p r i c e s  P ric e  in c re a se s  th a t a r e  b a s e d  o n  c o s t  in c re a se s
a r e  f a i r ,  w h ile  th o s e  b a s e d  o n  d e m a n d  in c r e a s e s  o f te n  a r e  v ie w e d  a s  u n fa ir  
[  O k u n ( 1 9 8 1 J 3153]
In the terminology of the B-M-R models, Okun's explanation is equivalent to saying that 
the cost of raising price based on cost increases is much lower than that based on demand 
shocks. Such difference in the cost of changing price, according to Okun, explains why 
suppliers adjust price more promptly and more reliably in response to changes in cost. 
Unfortunately, no explicit model of this argument has been constructed. This creates some 
ambiguities. For example, the verbal analysis does not make it clear whether the cost 
refers to full cost or variable cost Neither does it make it clear whether the price should be 
changed by the same absolute amount, or by the same percentage, of the change in cost8. 
Besides, the competitor’s pricing response does not appear to enter the above explanation. 
If competitors were to maintain their prices in the face of cost shocks, it is doubtful 
whether a representative supplier could persuade his customer to perceive his cost-oriented 
pricing as natural and "fair". To explain the evolution of cost-oriented pricing as a 
common practice, one also has to explain why all, or at least the majority, of the suppliers
(i) "agree" to raise price with respect to moderate cost shocks; and
(ii) do not "agree" to raise price with respect to moderate demand shocks.
To tackle these problems, an explicit model incorporating the competitor's pricing response 
will be built in Chapter 2. Two additional reasons, along with the difference in cost of 
changing price, were found to explain the observed asymmetric pricing response to cost
oriented pricing to give a loose version of cost-oriented pricing such as that mentioned in 
the last paragraph of the section.
8 Okun did mention that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. It should 
nevertheless, be noted that no theoretical explanation has been given to his belief.
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shocks and demand shocks. That is, a cost shock is likely to be more general and 
persistent than that of a demand shock. The former makes all, or most, of the suppliers 
expect (and expect each other to expect) the other to be affected by the cost shock and raise 
the price sooner or later. This will not happen to a demand shock as there is great 
uncertainty (specifically a signal extraction problem) as to whether an observed demand 
change is due to a general or specific demand shock. The latter makes the gain in 
discounted stream of profit from a prompt revision of price to the ’'optimal'’ level much 
higher than that of transitory (demand) shock, and hence make it more likely that the gain 
from changing price (to the "optimal" level) to be greater than the cost
Indeed, it is interesting to ask why cost-oriented pricing seems to be widespread while 
demand-oriented pricing seems to be relatively rare in reality. In Okun's description, price 
increases based on cost increases are considered (by the customers) to be "fair" while those 
based on demand increases are viewed as "unfair", and hence the cost of raising price with 
respect to cost shocks will be much lower than that with respect to demand shocks. But 
why? If demand-oriented pricing instead of cost-oriented pricing had come to be the usual 
practice of this world, price increases based on demand increases would be considered as 
"usual" (if not "fair"), and the cost of raising price with respect to cost shocks will be much 
lower than that with respect to demand shocks. Hence, we propose that the difference in 
cost of changing price is unlikely to be the original reason for the evolution of cost-oriented 
pricing 9. Nonetheless, once the practice of cost-oriented pricing is established for some 
reasons, it does imply that the cost of raising price with respect to cost shocks will be 
lower. This in turn becomes an additional justification (though not the original driving 
force) for the cost-oriented pricing.
^Instead, the worry of potential entry with price increases w.r.t. demand shocks 
(not a problem in case of cost shocks); the generality and persistence of cost shocks; and 
(if one starts to consider the continuing inflation in our world) the necessity to raise price 
sooner or later with the gradually rising cost are some of the potential explanations for the 
evolution of cost-oriented pricing.
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Last but not least, it should be noted that cost-oriented pricing is only an approximation 
to the observed behaviour of most suppliers. There are at least two reasons for this. 
Firstly, a straight pursuit of cost-oriented pricing by suppliers requires the price to be 
adjusted with every change (no matter how small and frequent) in costs. As mentioned 
earlier, suppliers need to maintain and pledge constancy of price for a reasonably long 
period so as to encourage customers to rely on inter-temporal comparison and return to 
shop. Such need to maintain the price for some period implies that it is not worth the 
supplier adjusting price in response to very small change in costs. Instead, a change of 
price (by the same percentage change in costs) will only occur when the changes in costs 
have accumulated to some level or when time has come to the revision period 10. Secondly, 
as mentioned by Okun, customers have little information about the actual change in costs: 
" c o s t-o r ie n te d  p r ic in g  is  a  d e fic ie n t  p r ic e  s ta n d a r d  b e c a u s e  its  o p e ra tio n  is  n o t  
rea d ily  o b serv a b le  b y  b u y e r s . T h e y  c a n n o t m o n ito r  th e  f i r m 's  d ilig e n c e  in  ca rry in g  
o u t a n  im p lic it c o n tra c t th a t lin ks  p r ic e  to  co sts"[O ku n ( 1981 ), P 1 5 4 ]
Given such asymmetric information, suppliers have incentives to change the price, in 
addition to the same percentage rise in costs, by another amount that reflects the 
perceived long term change in demand. It appears to the writer that many suppliers do 
behave like that. Thus cost-oriented pricing is only, on the average, a good 
approximation to observed behaviour.
(4) Im plications for the specification of the cost of changing price: 
distinction between different types of price changes 
One important contribution of Okun's discussion of customer-supplier 
relationships is that it emphasizes the additional loss of present and future business that
lOIf the supplier has set up the practice of fixed time scheduling of price revision.
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arises from customer’s adverse response as the main source of price adjustment cost**. 
According to Okun, frequent (and irregular) changes of price will make it difficult for 
customers to guess the present price from that of last purchase, and hence destroy their 
incentive to return to shop. Such an explanation provides a deeper foundation of the 
cost of changing price than that of the B-M-R models. In Chapter 2, we will use 
Okun's idea as a guideline for a refined specification of the cost. Here, we will use 
Okun's idea to distinguish and compare the cost of some different types of price 
changes 12.
(al Regular Price Changes Versus Irregular Price Changes
Regular price changes should be distinguished from irregular price changes 
because the latter is usually more costly than the former. Examples of regular and 
predictable price changes include
(i) Cinemas, car parks, restaurants have a higher charge during the peak hours; and
(ii) Air, coach and ship companies have seasonal price changes between the high and 
low seasons.
According to Okun, frequent changes of price are costly mainly because it raises 
customer's uncertainty about the price that the supplier will be offering. However, if 
the supplier were to print both the peak and off-peak price in the same price list and 
stick with what they have promised in the price list, the customer will be clear about 
the price pattern and there will be little cost of changing price in the Okun sense. 
Besides, as both the peak and off-peak prices are included in the same price list, there 
will be no additional menu cost for such regular price changes. These explain
(i) why some suppliers can have as frequent (regular) price changes such as having 
one price during the daytime and having another in the evening; and
11 Menu cost is another, smaller but important cost.
i2The distinction between the price changes with respect to cost shocks and that 
with respect to demand shocks have been discussed in the previous section.
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(ii) these suppliers will usually print a price list that includes both the peak and off 
peak prices.
The evolution of regular (seasonal) price changes and printing all seasonal or off-peak 
prices in the same list provide further supporting examples to the hypothesis that some 
practices, institutional arrangements, and rules of thumb are indeed evolved from 
maximizing behaviour.
Not all industries have seasonal or off-peak pricing even though the costs of such 
regular price changes are negligible. This happens whenever the possible benefit from 
such regular price changes are negligible or negative. For example, supermarkets 
seldom raise their prices during peak hours. If they do, customers can buy the product 
during the slack hours and hoard the product until they use it. Thus, the possible 
benefit is significantly reduced. More importantly, if some competitors decide to keep 
a low price during the peak hours, those supermarkets who charge a higher price 
during the peak hours may suffer a loss. In general, seasonal pricing only occurs in 
industries where
(i) customers have difficulties in hoarding the product; and
(ii) the threat of competitors maintaining a low price during the peak season is small.
(b) Sales versus its alternative
Suppose a supplier finds it worthwhile to reduce the price temporarily. Instead 
of announcing a price reduction with another announcement (at a later date) of a rise in 
price, the supplier will usually choose to announce a sale which can be considered as 3 
package of announcements in which customers are informed at the very beginning that 
the price will be reduced temporarily and eventually raised back to the original level. 
The advantage of the announcement of sales over two temporally-separated 
announcements is that customers are well informed about the price pattern at the very 
beginning. The two temporally-separated announcements, on the other hand, may
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give the customer an impression that the supplier has an erratic pricing policy which is 
harmful to the customer's attachment for recurrent purchases. Thus, "sales” can be 
considered as a new practice by the supplier to minimize the cost of changing price in 
the Okun sense.
(E) N ear-R a tio n a lity
With a somewhat different emphasis, Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b), 
Mankiw(1985) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki(1987) have drawn attention to cases in 
which inertial price-wage behaviour with respect to an aggregate demand shock will 
cause only a second-order welfare loss to near-rational agents, but first order effects on 
real variables such as output, employment and welfare. The inertial (or "near- 
rational”) behaviour is rational because of the presence of a small menu cost of 
changing price and wage. The contribution of these papers is that it highlights the 
possibility that a second order menu cost is sufficient to account for large business 
cycles. However, the mere existence of this possibility does not imply this is what 
happens in the world. Our position is that the producer’s cost of changing price with 
respect to a demand shock, due to the customer-supplier relationships suggested by 
Okun, are much larger than the menu cost. We believe that a successful 
microfoundation for business cycles does not lie in a second order menu cost causing a 
first order loss in real variables, but in the signal extraction problem coupled with a 
large cost of changing prices and wages that prevents prompt adjustments to 
reasonably large demand shocks.
Moreover, whether the loss of a "non-maximizer" with respect to a demand 
shock is small or not will depend on the size of the demand shock, the shape of the 
profit function, how the profit function shifts with the demand shock and the starting 
position of the non-maximizer. In particular, the greater the demand shock and/or the 
steeper the profit function, the less likely is the loss to be small. This can be illustrated
with the following diagrams :
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profit
profit
loss
N'-*
iiagram (1.8b
where Qo,Qi,Q2 are the demand, and Qo>Qi >Q2 
f(*) or f(*) is the profit function of firm
Suppose demand falls from Qo to Q i . If the profit function is as shown in diagram 
(1.8a), the loss from not adjusting the price form xo to xi is quite small. However, if 
the profit function is as steep as that shown in diagram (1.8b), the loss is no longer of 
small. For a large demand shock such as that from Qo to Q2, the loss will be MN and 
M'N' respectively. Even in case of diagram (1.8a), one will hesitate to declare the loss 
MN to be of second order. If the loss is not small, a small menu cost of changing 
price will not be sufficient to justify inertial behaviour 13. This highlights the
I31f the producers do change their price, real balance effect in the four papers of 
near-rationality implies that the social loss in output will be less. This creates the 
following embarrassing result: a just large enough aggregate demand shrink has little 
or no social loss but a just not large enough aggregate demand shrink will have a first 
order social loss in output. It is hard to imagine a smaller exogenous demand shrink to 
be more costly than a larger shrink. In the models we develop later, we will attempt to 
correct this.
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limitations of near-rationality as an explanation of large business cycles.
Next, we would like to emphasize two theoretical problems inherent in this 
near-rationality literature. Both of these are associated with the attempt to avoid an 
explicit incorporation of the cost of changing price into the models. The first problem 
is that all the models are single period analyses. While the cost of changing price may 
be once-and-for-all for every change, the loss in profit may endure for more than one 
period. Suppose the reduction of demand from Qo to Qi is permanent, the loss of
profit over the future will be [f(Qo)-f(Qi)]/[l-y] instead of f(Qo)-f(Qi)» where y is the
discount rate. Suppose y=0^9 (ie interest rate = 11.1%), the slope of the sum of
discounted profit function will be 10 times as steep as that shown in diagram (1.8a) 
and (1.8b). This further weakens the likeliness of near-rationality as a good 
explanation of large persistent business cycles. Seen from another point of view, one 
can state that the existing papers on near rationality fail to distinguish between the 
effect of persistent and transitory demand shocks. The second problem is that there is 
nothing to guarantee the "near-rational" agent starts at the optimum. If the agent is not 
choosing the optimum this period, how can we assume that the agent chose the 
optimum last period? If the agent does not start at the optimum of the last period, loss 
from inertial behaviour may or may not be of second order.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we will develop models that include inertia through near- 
rational behaviour as a special case, but do not necessarily require this to explain large 
business cycles.
1.2.2 Wage and Employment Decisions
(A) Implicit Contract
The early version of Implicit Contract theory [Bailey(1974), D.F.Gordon(1974) 
and Azariadis(1975)] attempts to explain observed real wage rigidity as a result of 
(implicit) contractual arrangements between risk averse employees and less risk averse 
employers. According to the theory, it pays both parties if the employers "insure" their 
employees with small variations in wage rate over the various possible states of nature; 
and in return the employers are compensated by risk premia in the form of lower average 
wages which workers are implicitly willing to pay for such wage insurance. The result 
of such insured (sticky) wages were then used by some macro-economists [such as 
Gray(1976,1978), Poole(1976) and Fischer(1977)] to account for non-neutrality of 
monetary policies on aggregate output and employment. Akerlof and Miyazaki(1980), 
however, challenge such an explanation of Keynesian unemployment by extending the 
Azariadis-Bailey result of insured wage to the implicit contract of insured employment. 
The logic, which they called the Wage Bill Argument, is as follows :
"S u p p o se  th e re  is  a n  im p lic it  c o n tra c t w h e re b y  in  a  s ta te  o f  th e  w o r ld  s  a  
f i r m  e m p lo y s  n j  w o rk e r s  a t  a  w a g e  w  b u t  la y s  o f f  n 2 w o rk e r s , e a c h  
w o r k e r  r a n d o m ly  b e in g  la id  o f f  w ith  th e  s a m e  p r o b a b il i ty  n ^ i m  + n 2 ).
F ir s t  o b serv e  th a t a  r is k  a verse  e m p lo ye e  w o u ld  p re fe r , e x  a n te , a  c o n tra c t  
w h ic h  g u a r a n te e d  h im  e m p lo y m e n t in  s ta te  s  a t  th e  w a g e  w n j l ( n j  + ^2) to  
th e  lo t te r y  o f  r e c e iv in g  w  w ith  p r o b a b i l i ty  n i / ( n j  + n 2 ) a n d  0  w ith  
p ro b a b ility  n2 l(n j + n2 ). S e co n d ly , n o te  th a t th e  f i r m  w o u ld  b e  in d iffe r e n t  
b e tw e e n  th is  e m p lo y m e n t-g u a ra n te e in g  c o n tra c t a n d  th e  la y o f f  c o n tra c t  
s in c e  its  w a g e  b ill  is  u n c h a n g ed  a t  w n j . T h e se  tw o  o b se rv a tio n s  (to g e th e r  
w ith  th e  a s s u m e d  c o n tin u i ty  o f  th e  w o r k e r 's  p r e fe r e n c e s ) im p ly  th e  
e x is te n c e  o f  a  w a g e  ra te  w *  s u c h  th a t (i)  w * < w n jl(n j  + >12) a n d  ( ii)  th e
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w o r k e r  s tr ic tly  p r e fe r s  g u a r a n te e d  e m p lo y m e n t a t  w * . L ik e w ise  a  p r o fi t-  
m a x im iz in g  f i r m  w o u ld  b e  w illin g  to  o ffe r  a  f u l l  e m p lo y m e n t g u a ra n te e  a t  
w *  b e c a u se  i t  c a n  re d u c e  its  w a g e  b i l l  f o r m  w n j  to  w * (n j + f y )  w ith o u t  
s a c r i f ic in g  i ts  o u tp u t. B e c a u s e  b o th  f i r m s  a n d  w o r k e r s  p r e fe r  f u l l -  
e m p lo y m e n t  to  la y o ffs  in  a n y  g iv e n  s ta te , i t  fo l lo w s  th a t  u n e m p lo y m e n t  
c a n n o t o c cu r  in  a n  equ ilib rium  w ith  ra tio n a lly  n e g o tia ted  co n tra c ts ."
While Akerlof and Miyazaki are right in pointing out the limitation of using the real wage 
rigidity arising from implicit contracts as an explanation of Keynesian unemployment, 
there are at least two important lines of criticism that help to explain involuntary 
unemployment despite the existence of insured employment. The first is due to the 
possibility of involuntary unemployment in efficiency wage models of the shirking and 
turnover cost variety that will be mentioned in the next section. Thus, even if employers 
find it beneficial to provide income insurance to those they employ, they might not 
reduce the wage to the full employment level (i.e. the second logic of the above quotation 
does not follow) as such a reduction in the wage may reduce production effort, raise 
shirking and increase turnover cost In such a case, an guarantee of employment to those 
employed may co-exist with a pool of involuntary unemployment
The second is related to the relative degree of risk aversion between employees 
and employers at various states of economic conditions. Charles Schultz(1985) has 
argued that employers may indeed be more risk averse in the case of a large and climatic 
reduction in demand. While it open to question whether such risk reversals do actually 
occur, the difference in risk aversion will in no doubt be small for the state of very 
adverse demand shocks. This makes the potential gain from insured employment against 
adverse demand shocks rather small. Because of their preference for flexibility, 
employers may not -  at the very beginning -  find the small reduction of wage 
worthwhile for the promise of fully insured employment including the case of very 
adverse demand shocks. Even if they do, they might find it worthwhile to break the
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promise in the case of a general adverse demand shock because he (rightly) expects many 
other employers will do the same thing as he does. Workers, seeing this kind of 
possibility, will not accept much wage cuts even if some employers "claim" to provide 
the insured employment against very adverse cyclical demand shocks. In other words, it 
is not the risk reversal between workers and employers, but (i) the worker's distrust that 
employers will honour the guarantee of employment, (ii) the employer's preference on 
flexibility, and (iii) the small potential gain from insured employment against adverse 
demand shocks that make the scheme of insured employment only partial 13 instead of 
full. Thus, in the case of a moderate reduction in demand, employment of individual 
firm will remain unchanged. On the other hand, if the reduction of demand is large and 
climatic, the employer will consider laying off some workers 14, introducing a part-time 
work-schedule, or overall dismissal subjected to recall15. In Chapter 3, we will build a 
model of employment containing such features. Some other interesting results are also 
obtained.
(B) Effic iency wages: traditional, shirking and labour turnover  
models
Efficiency wage models were first developed in the context of Less Developed 
Countries by Stiglitz(1976) and then applied to developed economies by Solow(1979). 
In the simplest form presented in Yellen(1984), each employer is assumed to have a 
production function of the form Q = F[e(w)N], where N is the number of employees, e 
is the effort per worker and w is the real wage. The representative employer is assumed
13That is, employers may only have incentive to guarantee employment up to a 
certain adversity of demand. It will be interesting to include such possibility into the 
model of Akerlof & Miyazaki and show that (usually) there exists one such scheme that 
is superior than a fully insured implicit contract.
14If workers' ability differ, employers might prefer retrenching the least
productive worker.
i5See Okun(1981).
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to choose w and N to maximize the profit (7t):
n  = F[e(w)N] - wN
Writing w* and N* as the optimal value, the first order conditions imply
(1.5)
w* = e(w*) F[e(w*)N*] (1.6)
Equation (1.5) implies that employers should offer a wage at which elasticity of effort is 
unity. Given the w* determined in equation (1.5), equation (1.6) states that employers 
should hire labour until the marginal product of labour, e(w*)F[e(w*)N], equal to the 
real wage, w*. Thus, aggregation of (1.6) over all firms will give the aggregate demand 
for labour. As Yellen(1984) has stated, "as b n g  a s  th e  a g g re g a te  d e m a n d fo r  la b o u r  fa l l s  
s h o r t  o f  th e  a g g r e g a te  s u p p ly  a n d  w* e x c e e d s  th e  la b o u r 's  r e s e rv a tio n  w a g e , th e  f i r m  
w il l  b e  u n c o n s tr a in e d  b y  th e  la b o u r  m a r k e t  c o n d itio n  in  p u r s u in g  its  o p tim a l p o l ic y  so  
th a t e q u ilib r iu m  w ill b e  c h a ra c te rized  b y  invo lu n ta ry  u n e m p lo y m e n t."
It must be noted, however, this model only demonstrates the possibility of 
involuntary unemployment, not its necessity. If the aggregate supply of labour turns out 
to be smaller than the aggregate demand for labour, the model will predict full 
employment instead of involuntary unemployment.
The shirking model in Shapiro and Stiglitz(1984), on the other hand, predicts that 
involuntary unemployment would be a certain event if
(i) shirking by employees implies a cost (such as lower productivity) to the employer;
(ii) employers can only imperfectly detect whether a worker is shirking or not; and
(iii) employers have difficulties in using employment fees, performance bonds or 
seniority wage schemes as a penalty for shirking [see Yellen(1984)].
The intuition of their result is as follows :
"To in d u ce  its  w o rkers  n o t to sh irk , the  f i r m  a tte m p ts  to  p a y  m o re  th a n  th e
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g o in g  w a g e , th e n  i f  a  w o rk e r  is  c a u g h t s h irk in g  a n d  is  f i r e d ,  h e  w il l  p a y  a  
p e n a l ty .  I f  i t  p a y s  o n e  f i r m  to  r a ise  th e  w a g e , h o w e v e r , i t  w il l  p a y  a l l  
f i r m s  to  ra ise  th e ir  w a g es , th e  in cen tive  n o t to  sh irk  a g a in  d isa p p e a rs . B u t  
a s  a l l  f i r m s  r a is e  th e ir  w a g e s , th e ir  d e m a n d  f o r  la b o u r  d e c r e a se s , a n d  
u n e m p lo y m e n t  r e s u lts . W ith  u n e m p lo y m e n t, e v e n  i f  a l l  f i r m s  p a y  th e  
s a m e  w a g e , a  w o rk e r  h a s  a n  in c e n tiv e  n o t  to  sh irk . F o r , i f  h e  is  f i r e d ,  a n  
in d iv id u a l  w i l l  n o t  im m e d ia te ly  o b ta in  a n o th e r  j o b .  T h e  e q u il ib r iu m  
u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te  m u s t b e  su ffic ie n tly  la rg e  th a t i t  p a y s  w o rk e rs  to  w o rk  
r a th e r  th a n  to  ta k e  th e  r is k  o f  b e in g  c a u g h t  s h ir k in g ." [ S h a p ir o  a n d  
S tig litz (1 9 8 4 )]
The turnover cost models, such as Stiglitz(1974), Schlicht(1978) and 
Salop(1979), give another possible explanation of involuntary unemployment. In these 
models, the representative employer has an incentive to economize on turnover costs by 
offering higher relative wages. As every employer attempts to do so, the aggregate 
demand for labour decreases. According to Salop(1979), if:
(i) search while unemployed is more efficient so that not all workers prefer on-the-job 
searching16; and
(ii) employers have difficulties in charging employment fees and having a sufficiently 
low wage for the new hires,
we might have an equilibrium with involuntary unemployment which will in turn justify 
(at least in some degree) the employers’ attempt to reduce turnover costs 17. Just as in 
the simple efficiency wage model, involuntary unemployment in this model is, again, 
merely a possibility instead of necessity.
i^Even if all workers prefer on-the-job searching, the result will still hold if 
employers believe higher wage will reduce on-the-job searching.
17In case of full employment equilibrium, only these employers with higher 
relative wage will succeed in reducing turnover cost, and the success is at the cost of 
higher turnover for those employers with lower relative wage.
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In all of the above models, the existence of involuntary unemployment is due to 
the high wage policy of every employer who initially attempts to offer a higher relative 
wage to encourage high production effort, discourage shirking and reduce turnover 
which are in fact achieved by the pool of involuntary unemployment associated with the 
high wage policy of all employers. Although schemes such as employment fees, 
performance bonds or seniority wages can theoretically eliminate the unemployment, 
Salop(1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz( 1984) and Yellen(1984) have convincingly reviewed 
the difficulties or limitations in such use of the schemes in practice 18. Nevertheless, the 
explanation of involuntary unemployment by the above types of models will be 
weakened or destroyed if there exists sufficient amount of jobs in which:
(i) employers have little cost in monitoring the production effort of workers;
(ii) employers have little turnover cost; and
(iii) the required production effort is fixed.
Examples of these include those in the category of causal labour market described in 
Okun(1981). As employers in this market have little or no problem in reducing the wage 
towards the reservation wage of the representative worker, involuntary unemployment 
can be greatly or totally eliminated if there exists a sufficient amount of these jobs. Of 
course, involuntary unemployment still exists if the relative amount of these jobs is small 
in comparison with the types of jobs described in the efficiency wage models, shirking 
models and labour turnover models. [Besides, the former case may still imply a large 
pool of search (instead of involuntary) unemployment if the wage gap between the two 
types of jobs is large.] Whatever the case is, the above discussion implies a dual labour 
market economy in which the career labour market is characterized by high wage, little 
turnover and long queue of applicants; and the causal labour market is characterized by
i8SeeOkun(1981)
i9SeeOkun(1981).
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low wage and high turnover.
In addition, the three types of models suggest that workers with identical 
characteristics can receive different wages at different firms as the effort functions, 
shirking, monitoring, and turnover costs of firms may differ from each other2®.
One criticism of these models is that they do not explain the cyclical 
unemployment arise from aggregate demand shocks and nominal wage rigidity 21. In 
these models, there is only real wage rigidity. No discussion has been provided about 
how the nominal wage behaves in face of aggregate demand shocks. Thus, the models 
can at best provide a static explanation of unemployment (such as the efficiency, shirking 
and turnover considerations), and fail to give a proper account of the cyclical variations 
in unemployment. For this reason, we will turn to the discussion by Okun(1981) and 
Schultz(1985) in the next section. The difference in the source of the unemployment is 
important. In the models described in this section, the pool of unemployed workers has 
some desirable aspects, such as discouraging shirking and turnover, and the Government 
is incapable of removing the unemployment by means of macroeconomic policy 22. On 
the other hand, unemployment arising from the combination of nominal wage rigidity 
and negative aggregate demand shocks is likely to be undesirable, and it may pay the 
Government to use stabilization policies to eliminate such cyclical variations in 
unemployment.
2°Yellen(1984) also uses the efficiency wage model to explain employer's 
preference or discrimination in the recruitment of observationally distinct groups.
2iEven if the initial wage is low enough with full employment, (sufficient) 
reduction in aggregate demand combined with nominal wage rigidity will cause 
involuntary unemployment. We add the work "sufficient" because of the guarantee of 
employment explained in the last section. See the next section for further explanation.
^Nevertheless, the involuntary unemployment suggested by the models can co­
exist with that arises in the usual theory of business cycle.
41
(C) Okun(1981) and Schultz(19851
In the previous sections, we have seen some outstanding models which attempt to 
highlight and explain some of the very important features of the labour market, such as 
wage rigidity, employment insurance and the presence of unemployment. 
Unfortunately, reality appears to be even more complicated than that postulated by the 
models. Because of this, Okun(1981) and Schultz(1985) eschew formal modelling and 
content themselves with a verbal analysis. The attractiveness of this verbal approach is 
that they can attempt a much richer analysis than is permitted by formal modelling, and 
thus hopefully get closer to reality. Okun gives a balanced view of both the wage and 
employment decisions of employers. Schultz, on the other hand, concentrates on the 
wage decision in face of Knightian uncertainty. This Section summarizes their ideas.
In the early version of implicit contract theory, the association between employers 
and workers is due to the difference in their risk aversion, and realized in the form of the 
employer’s guarantee of wages and employment to the workers. Okun(1981) and 
Schultz(1985), however, emphasize another important incentive for the association. 
According to them, employees acquire non-transferable, firm specific knowledge or skill 
through on-the-job training. As long as the employee stays with the same employer, the 
knowledge or skill will be useful and productive to the firm. The employer, in return for 
higher productivity, will be willing to pay higher wages to the experienced employee. 
On the other hand, if the employment relationship is ever broken, there will be significant 
search and initiation costs for both parties until the (new) worker acquires the "non- 
transferable firm specific" skill through sufficient experience in the new job. The 
employer will have to bear, in addition to any recruitment costs (advertising and 
interview fees), at least part of the toll cost which includes direct costs such as any 
formal orientation program, expenditure to foreman or "breaking in" new employees as 
well as lowered productivity during the adjustment process. The worker, in addition to
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the search cost while unemployed, may have to accept a temporarily lower wage if the 
required knowledge or skill in the old job is different from that of the new. Thus, both 
the difference in risk aversion and the non-transferable firm specific skill provide 
incentives for both parties to maintain the employment relationship as long as they can.
According to Okun, an explicit contract may ensure such association, but only at 
considerable expense of negotiation and legal work, and only through sacrifice of 
flexibility. The latter is particularly important to the employer because, over a 
sufficiently long period, some Knightian change of economic climate is bound to occur. 
Instead, employers opt for an implicit contract (ie non-binding statement) to maintain the 
relationship over the long run :
"In  a d d itio n  to  , o r  in s te a d  o f, a ffe c tin g  e x p e c ta tio n s  b y  sp e c if ic  b in d in g  
o b lig a tio n s , th e  f i r m  m a y  tr y  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  e x p e c ta t io n s  o f  w il l in g  
a p p lic a n ts  a n d  o f  p o te n t ia l  q u itte r s  b y  v a r io u s  ty p e s  o f  s ta te m e n ts  a b o u t  
th e  fu tu r e  th a t a r e  n o t b in d in g . T h e y  c a n  h a v e  s o m e  fo r c e  a n d  s o m e  
c re d ib il i ty  b y  p u t t in g  th e  f i r m s  r e p u ta t io n  o n  lin e . T h e  f i r m  p r o v id in g  
s u c h  im p lic i t  c o n tra c ts  m u s t  d e c id e  h o w  m u c h  o f  a n  in v e s tm e n t  i t  is  
p r e p a r e d  to  m a k e  in  its  p e r s o n n e l  p o l ic y .  I f  i t  m a k e s  s tro n g  s ta te m e n ts  
th a t p a in t  a  ro sy  fu tu r e  f o r  its  recru its , it  ca n  ho p e  to  in c re a se  th e  su p p ly  o f  
la b o u r  in  th e  s h o r t  run , b u t  i t  th en  fa c e s  g r e a te r  r isk s  o f  e x c e ss iv e  p a y r o ll  
c o s ts  to  f u l f i l  its  p r o m ise  o r  o f  c o s tly  d is a p p o in tm e n ts  b y  its  w o rk e rs  th a t  
t r ig g e r  h ig h e r  q u i ts  a n d  lo w e r  p r o d u c t iv i ty  i f  i t  f a i l s  to  f u l f i l  th e se  
p r o m is e s ."  [  O k u n (  1981  ),P .8 9 J
Let us now come to the details of the implicit contract. In reality, the employer's 
guarantee over employment and wage is generally far more complicated (and with more 
dimensions) than suggested i the original implicit contract literature. For example, as 
mentioned in section 1.2.2(A), employers may only be willing to insure employment up
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to a certain point; a truly climatic fall in demand lead to layoffs. While employers will try 
their best to emphasize the improbability of such an event, it remains a potential worry to 
workers. To reduce such worry and raise the attachment of workers, they may also 
guarantee, or condition the thinking of workers by their previous action, that the utmost 
will be done to reduce the harm and experienced workers are to be the last affected. 
Thus,
" I f  th e  s la c k  p e r io d  is  c o n fid e n tly  e x p e c te d  b y  th e  f i r m  to  b e  v e r y  s h o r t  in  
d u ra tio n  a n d  i f  th e  g o o d s  p r o d u c e d  b y  th e  f i r m  a re  re a d ily  s to ra b le  a t  lo w  
co st, th e se  w o rk e rs  m a y  b e  u s e d  to  b u ild  u p  in v e n to r ie s  in  s la c k  p e r io d s .
B u t  i f  th e re  is  c o n s id e ra b le  u n c e r ta in ty  a b o u t th e  p o s s ib le  d u ra tio n  o f  the  
s la c k  a n d  h ig h  c o s ts  to  s to ra g e  ( in c lu d in g  th e  im p o s s ib il i ty  o f  s to r in g  
o u tp u ts  th a t a re  s e rv ic e s ) , o u tp u t m a y  b e  re d u c e d . F ir m s  m a y  b e  a b le  to  
a s s ig n  th e  w o r k e r s  m a in te n a n c e  ta s k s  l ik e  c le a n in g , r e p a ir in g  a n d  
p a in t in g ,  o r  i t  m a y  r e a l ly  k e e p  th e m  in  a  s ta te  o f  o n - th e - jo b  
u n d e re m p lo y m e n t."  [  O k u n (  1981  ) ,P .5 7 ]
"F in a lly , f i r m s  th a t n o rm a lly  su b c o n tr a c t p a r t  o f  th e ir  o p e ra tio n s  m a y  b e  
a b le  to  im p le m e n t a  n o -c u t  s tr a te g y  in e x p e n s iv e ly  b y  s u sp e n d in g  th a t  
p r a c t i c e .  I n d e e d ,  th a t  is  s o m e t im e s  a n  im p o r ta n t  in c e n t iv e  f o r  
su b co n tra c tin g  d u rin g  p ro sp e r ity . "[O ku n ( 1 9 8 1 ),P . 1 07]
If the recession is expected to be so adverse and prolonged that some cut in the labour 
force is necessary, some employers may choose to have, say, a four-day workweek 
instead of a twenty percent layoff within the labour pool. The employer will also 
promise that recall will be made as soon as the economy begins to recover. Besides, 
employers will try to convince the experienced and productive employee that they are to 
be the last affected by establishing the practice o f :
(i) stopping new recruitment before any layoff or part-time working schedule is made;
(ii) making sure that only the least productive worker will be dismissed if layoff is 
unavoidable.
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Thus, the guarantee of employment in reality is more complicated than that suggested in 
the early implicit contract literature. Moreover, the extent of guarantee may differ 
according to the difference in the nature of firms. For example, firms or organizations 
with more steady demand for output will try to emphasize greater insurance of 
employment to attract qualified employees. The extreme case is the government that 
virtually provides a full insurance of employment to the civil servant On the other hand, 
firms with more erratic demand for output will opt for higher relative wages to attract and 
compensate qualified employees.
Similarly, the implicit guarantee of wage path in reality is somewhat different 
from that in the implicit contract literature. In the early implicit contract and efficiency 
wage models, the rigidity of wage is in real terms. Okun and Schultz, suggest that wage 
will be
(i) rigid in nominal terms for some length of period; and
(ii) periodically adjusted so that the fluctuations of real wage will be within a limited 
range and yet long term changes in wages reflect long term changes in market 
fundamentals.
Thus, we do not have the insurance of a fixed real wage in reality. Instead, employers 
only insure workers by guaranteeing small variations in real wages. This raises the 
question as to why employers do not find it optimal to offer the insurance of a fully fixed 
real wage. This writer, following the analysis of Schultz(1985), sees the explanation as 
follows:
In the contracting approach, a certain known distribution of states is 
assumed. In such a case, the guarantee of a fixed real wage is perfect. In 
reality, however, there are Knightian changes (whose probability of 
occurrence cannot be determined in advance) in relative demand, 
technology and cost that necessitate some unknown changes of real wage
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over the very long period of association23. If so, the guarantee of a fixed 
real wage (or a fixed path of real wage) will not be optimal. The ideal 
wage scheme has to be capable to cope with two hard-to-reconcile facts.
It has to be sticky enough to provide sufficient insurance to workers but 
yet allow flexibility to deal with Knightian uncertainty. This led Schultz 
to recommend the wage scheme mentioned earlier.
Beside the short term nominal rigidity of the wage, Schultz also suggests a very cautious 
and sluggish adjustment of the money wage to changes in conditions whose permanence 
is open to question. This bears a close resemblance to the signal extraction problem we 
explored in the context of the product market. Thus, employers prefer to wait for more 
observations before any change in the wage is made. Indeed, such a practice has become 
so "natural” that once the .wage is raised, it will be extremely awkward to revise it 
downward. This is probably why traditional Keynesians tend to pre-suppose the 
Keynesian wage floor as an institutional feature, rather than as behavioural pattern 
arising from long run optimization.
(D) Role of Our Model
One of the troubles with most macroeconomic models is that they rely on wages, 
employment or both as the adjustment variable(s) to aggregate demand shocks. 
However, as seen in the previous review, employers have incentives to provide at least 
some implicit guarantee over both wages and employment. Thus, at least in the short 
run, wages and employment will remain sticky in the face of moderate reductions in 
demand. It also implies the labour market is more complicated than that supposed by the 
simple debate over price (wage) versus quantity (employment) adjustment. In Chapter 3, 
we will present a model which emphasizes the role of another variable -  production
^Indexation is impossible because the list of variables will be too long and the 
functional form will be too complex. Moreover, employers and workers have incentives 
to disagree in the choice of variable, and to what extent it is used in the indexation.
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effort -  in the short run adjustment to moderate demand shocks. By incorporating some
important elements of the efficiency wage models (an effort function) and the theory of
implicit contracts (a cost of layoff), it is shown that
(a) In the case of moderate demand shocks, production effort (and hence output) instead 
of employment will be the main variable of adjustment. In other words, there will be 
some form of labour hoarding in mild recessions and a tighter working schedule in 
mild expansion.
(b) Because the reputation cost of layoff consists of a fixed and sizable component, 
employers will resort to layoffs only in the case of very adverse demand shocks. 
Once the layoff option is chosen, there will be a considerable amount of workers 
being laid off. Thus, in the case of general demand shocks, we expect a mild shock 
will be characterized by little change in unemployment and an adverse shock be 
characterized by massive and sharp fall in employment.
(c) While efficiency wage and traditional Keynesian models are criticized for their 
embarrassing prediction of counter cyclical productivity [see Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985) and Okun(1981)], result (a) demonstrates that these models - after allowing 
for the invariance of unemployment with respect to mild demand shock - can be 
consistent with the usual observation that productivity, measured in terms of output 
per head, is procyclical.
(d) In the face of an adverse demand shock, it is usually better, from the point of view of 
aggregate employment, to simulate the economy before rather than after employers 
make the layoffs. The rationale is as follows. If the Government succeeds in 
stimulating the economy before the recession, employers with an excessive amount 
of labour may, in view of the reputation cost of layoffs, hesitate to make the 
retrenchments. On the other hand, once the recession has started and employers 
have cleared the excessive amount of labour through layoffs, employment will not 
return to the original level even if aggregate demand does.
4 7
Last but not least, the model in Chapter 3 is consistent with many of the features 
of the labour market discussed in the previous review. It is consistent with the implicit 
guarantee of employment as there is a reputation cost of layoff. By assuming that cost is 
finite, albeit large, it is consistent with Okun's proposal of only partial guarantee of 
em p lo y m en t^ . The same type of model is also applicable to the case in which the 
employer, in view of a recession, chooses between hoarding the excessive amount of 
labour and the introduction of part-time working. Again, once the option of part-time 
working is chosen, the model predicts a large and discrete reduction of working hours. 
(Whether the employer, in the case of adverse recession, chooses layoffs or part-time 
working will depend on the specific nature of the firm.) The model is also consistent 
with the toll cost explanation of emplover-emplovee relationship by assuming a hiring 
cost which includes the cost of the on-the-job acquisition of the non-transferable firm 
specific skill. The model can also be extended to explain that the recruitment policy of 
employers in the career market is dominated by long-term considerations. In the face of 
a temporary rise in demand, employers may choose to have a tighter working schedule 
(ie higher production effort) despite its higher cost in the short run. This is so because
(i) it takes time to train a worker; and (ii) new recruitment in case of temporary demand 
shock may mean excessive payroll or costly layoff in the future. On the other hand, if 
the rise of demand is permanent, employers may find it worthwhile to take the effort to 
recruit and train the new employees. Once the employers have made the recruitment, 
they dislike retrenchments because of the large reputation cost of layoff. Thus, in 
contrast to the Neoclassical theory, the model predicts labour in terms of heads (and 
hence the "usual" labour cost25), is fixed in the short run. While capable of explaining 
cyclical variations of unemployment, the model can also be consistent with a static pool
24 So long as one assumes that wage rates are made before the employment 
decision, the model will also be consistent with the implicit guarantee of wage, short 
term rigidity on nominal wage and etc.
25This excludes the higher cost associated with the higher production effort.
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of involuntary or search unemployment due to the high wage policy characteristic of 
efficiency wage models. Thus, in contrast to Akerlof and Miyazaki(1980), employment 
insurance can co-exist with unemployment
(E) Cyclical variations of unemployment
In section 1.2.2(B), we discussed some models which suggest the existence of a 
static pool of unemployment. Unfortunately, the models do not explain the presence of 
nominal wage rigidity and fail to account for those cyclical variations in unemployment 
which should be the target of Government stabilization policies. Schultz uses Knightian 
uncertainty to explain "short-term nominal wage rigidity". While some degree of 
nominal wage rigidity, as supposed by many Keynesians such as Yellen(1984), is 
necessary to allow the aggregate demand shock to cause cyclical variations of 
unemployment, this is never a sufficient condition. For example, if employers are 
willing to offer a full guarantee of employment, one might not have any cyclical variation 
of unemployment even if the wage is nominally rigid. Nevertheless, not all employers 
are so risk neutral as to provide full guarantee of employment. Thus, in the case of very 
adverse demand shock, layoffs or part-time working will result. If we assume a large 
number of firms evenly distributed between the point of layoff and the point of hiring (ie 
some are growing while some are declining), moderate aggregate demand shocks will 
cause cyclical variations in unemployment. Besides, the guarantee of employment refers 
only to those employed by firms, but not to those who are unemployed. Suppose we 
start with a static equilibrium with some workers retiring and some school leavers 
entering the labour force. In the face of a reduction in aggregate demand, employers will 
stop or slow down new recruitment while allowing old workers to retire. When 
aggregate demand rises, they will speed up their long term plan of recruitment. This 
gives another explanation for cyclical variations of unemployment. It also explains why 
most of the burden of cyclical unemployment falls on school leavers or new applicants.
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1.2.3 Empirical Works on the Theory of Mark-up Pricing
Since empirical work on the pricing decision has already been reviewed in 
Godley and Nordhaus (1972), and Laidler and Parkin (1975), our remarks here will be 
brief.
As reported by Laidler and Parkin, most of the empirical work in the United 
Kingdom, with only a few exceptions, show significant demand effects in the price 
equations. Among the few exceptions, the most appealing challenge is by Godley and 
Nordhaus (1972). By decycling factor price and productivity changes, they computed a 
time series for "normal costs" and then found empirical support for the "normal cost 
hypothesis", according to which prices respond to changes in normal costs and are 
independent of demand. On the other hand, empirical work in the United States, 
including the subsequent work by Gordon (1975), found that demand variables exert 
independent upward pressure on prices.
Laidler and Parkin, possibly influenced by the literature on the Phillips Curve at 
that time, attempt to reconcile the difference in results by claiming mis-specification in 
ninety out of the one hundred regressions conducted by Godley and Nordhaus (1972). 
They criticize Godley and Nordhaus(1972) for specifying the rate of price change as a 
function of changes in demand instead of level of demand. We disagree with this 
criticism. As we will show in Chapter 4, if Pt = (1 + mt) ACt is the right equation and 
ln(l+m t) can be approximated by a linear function of the logarithm of demand, the 
appropriate price equation should have the level of price depending on the level of 
demand (or the change in prices depending on the changes in demand.)
Although we disagree with Laidler and Parkin's previous claim of mis-
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specification in Godley and Nordhaus (1972), the result by Godley and Nordhaus may 
still be mistaken because of the presence of some other mis-specification(s). For 
example, as criticized by Laidler and Parkin, the coefficient on price changes predicted 
from normal cost changes is only 0.6 in Godley and Nordhaus’s "preferred" equation. 
Such estimated value, being significantly less than the theoretical value of unity, is 
evidence of possible mis-specification in their equation.
Instead of just searching for mis-specifications in Godley and Nordhaus(1972), 
we would like to make some more general criticisms on all the empirical work referred to 
here. First of all, this work is all based on aggregate data. Second, it assumes the 
mark-up equation Pt = (1 + m t)ACt holds for all observations. As we will show, by 
means of a more elaborated theoretical foundation in Chapters 2 and 4, Pt = (1 + mt)AQ 
only holds for those observations in the "raise price" regime. For those observations in 
the sticky price regime, we will have P t = Pt, where Pt is the price in the last period. As
discrete jumps in individual prices may be smoothed out on aggregation, our theory also 
suggests that empirical work using individual price data should be preferred. Last but 
not least, the demand variable used should be some kind of expected instead of current 
demand. Our empirical work in Chapter 4 attempts to overcome these criticisms. In 
addition to testing the "normal cost hypothesis", we would also like to provide some 
rough estimate(s) of the cost of changing price for the product chosen. Such estimation 
is important because the quantitative significance of the sluggishness/stickiness of prices 
will depend on the cost of changing price. It will also provide side evidence on whether 
the reputation cost or menu cost is a more important component in the cost of changing 
price.
Before moving to the next section, it is worthwhile repeating here one important 
comment by Laidler and Parkin (1975):
"W h e th e r  o r  n o t p r ic e s  r e s p o n d  to  e x c e ss  d e m a n d  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  c o s t  
c h a n g e s  is  n o t  r e le v a n t to  th e  o v e r a ll  e x is te n c e  o f  a  s h o r t- r u n  tr a d e  o f f  
b e tw e e n  th e  r a te  o f  in fla tio n  a n d  e x c e ss  d e m a n d . T h is  tra d e  o f f  w il l  e x is t  
i f  e ith e r  p r o d u c t  p r ic e s  o r  fa c to r  p r ic e s  o r  b o th  a re  r e s p o n s iv e  to  e x c e ss  
d e m a n d  s in c e  n o  o n e  d is p u te s  th a t  c o s t  ( fa c to r  p r ic e )  c h a n g e s  e f f e c t  
p r o d u c t  p r ic e s .  I t  is  a n  a lm o s t u n iv e r s a l f in d in g  th a t  p r ic e s  r e s p o n d  to  
c o s t  c h a n g e s , a  m a jo r  e le m e n t o f  w h ic h  is  w a g e  c h a n g e . W a g e s  in  tu rn , 
a s  w e  h a v e  se e n , a re  u su a lly  f o u n d  to  b e  r e s p o n s iv e  to  e x c e ss  d e m a n d  a s  
w e ll  a s  to  o th e r  v a r ia b le s , so m e tim e s  in c lu d in g  c u r r e n t o r  e x p e c te d  p r ic e  
c h a n g e s . B y  ta k in g  th e  w a g e  a n d  p r ic e  e q u a tio n s  to g e th e r , i t  is  p o s s ib le  
to  o b ta in  q u a s i-r e d u c e d  fo r m  r e la tio n s  w ith  w h ic h  b o th  p r ic e  a n d  w a g e  
c h a n g es  a re  fu n c t io n s  o f  e xc e ss  d e m a n d  a n d  e x p e c te d  in fla tio n , a s  w e ll  a s  
o f  o th e r  e x o g e n o u s  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  m ig h t  a p p e a r  in  o th e r  s tr u c tu r a l  
e q u a tio n ."
1.2.4 Disappearance of price stickiness on aggregation and the 
neutrality of money
In section 1.2.1(B), we have reviewed the various arguments for individual price 
stickiness/sluggishness. Under the assumption of a representative producer, they all 
implicitly or explicitly conclude there is aggregate price sluggishness and thus also the 
non-neutrality of money. The jump from individual price stickiness to the non-neutrality 
of money is however questioned by Caplin and Spulber (1987) who present a model in 
which individual price stickiness disappear on aggregation. The result is striking 
because it produces the neutrality result despite the presence of a fixed cost of changing 
price and individual price stickiness. However, because of the complexity in 
aggregation, Caplin and Spulber can only show their result for the very restrictive case in
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which (i) monetary growth is monotonic so that, in the absence of other shocks, one side 
(S,s) rule will be the optimal pricing policy; and (ii) the initial cross-sectional distribution 
of relative prices is uniform between the two thresholds (S,s) 26. The robustness of their 
result to more general specifications is however questioned by Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989). To see this, first consider the intuition behind Caplin and Spulber (1987): 
Suppose there is a 1% rise in money supply and the fixed cost of 
changing price is of the magnitude equivalent to, say, an 10% rise in the 
desired price. Because of the fixed cost of changing price and the 
assumed distribution of relative price, only one tenth of the firms will 
raise the price. However, these firms will raise the price by 10%, an 
amount large enough to make the rise of aggregated price index equal to 
1%. Such percentage rise is exactly the same as that of the money supply.
Thus, the discrete jump in price by a fraction of the firms implies 
individual price stickiness disappears on aggregation.
As we can see, the above argument depends very much on whether there exists a steady 
state cross distribution of price deviations and whether such distribution is uniform or 
not. For example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) suggests that if money is not growing 
monotonically, but instead follow a symmetric random walk, the optimal pricing policy 
will be a two sided (S,s) rule and the steady state cross distribution of price deviations 27 
is likely to have higher density at the return point (eg triangular) instead of being 
uniform. If so, a 1% rise in money supply will cause less than one tenth of the firms to 
make the 10% rise of price and the percentage rise in aggregate price index will be
26To justify the second assumption, Caplin & Spulber proceed to show that the 
uniform distribution will survive with the specific monetary shocks they considered.
27If, as will be explained in Chapter 5, we want to use idiosyncratic shocks to 
generate the dispersion of price endogenously, it would be more appropriate to analyze in 
terms of price deviations between the actual price and "optimal" price [as was done in 
Blanchard and Fischer(1989)] rather than the relative prices between individual price and 
aggregate price index [as was done in Caplin and Spulber (1987)]. We well return to 
this in Chapter 5.
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smaller than the percentage rise in money supply 28. Nevertheless, even in such a simple 
counter example, Blanchard and Fischer find that it is extremely difficult to derive the 
steady state cross distribution of price deviations2?. Thus, the counter argument by 
Blanchard and Fischer here remains hypothetical:
"U n fo r tu n a te ly , a g g reg a tio n  is  h a r d  i f  n o t  im p o ss ib le  in  m o s t  m o d e ls  w ith  
s ta te  d e p e n d e n t r u le s , s o  w e  d o  n o t  k n o w  th e  a n s w e r . F r o m  th e  f e w  
e x a m p le s  w e  h a v e , h o w e v e r , i t  a p p e a rs  th a t  th e  n e u tra l i ty  r e s u l t  is  n o t  
ro b u s t ." [B la n ch a rd  a n d  F isc h er  (1989), C h a p te r  8]
Indeed, one reason that stops Caplin and Spulber from going towards more general 
specifications of the monetary generation process is due to the difficulty in analytic 
aggregation:
"A th e o r e t ic a l  d i f f ic u l ty  in  m o d e ll in g  tw o -s id e d  p o l ic ie s  is  th a t  th e ir  
p r o p e r t ie s  u n d e r  a g g re g a tio n  a p p e a r  h ig h ly  c o m p le x . S p e c if ic a lly , i t  is  
n o t  p o s s ib le  to  s p e c i fy  a n  in it ia l  c r o s s - s e c t io n a l  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  p r ic e s  
w h ic h  su rv iv e  sh o c k s  ." [C a p lin  a n d  S p u lb e r  (1987)1  
Because of this, we can only resort to numerical methods. The aim of Chapter 5 is to 
use numerical simulation to check the robustness of the Caplin and Spulber result to 
some more general specifications of monetary generation process. In particular, we 
would like to check whether the neutrality result will hold in Blanchard and Fischer's 
counter example (i.e. when the monetary generation process follows a symmetric 
random walk). Besides, we would also like to check whether the conclusion will again 
be changed with the addition of an underlying trend of monetary growth to Blanchard 
and Fischer's counter example.
28Indeed, as admitted by Caplin and Spulber themselves, " i f  m o n e ta ry  g r o w th  is  
n o n -m o n o to n ic , th e  o n e -s id e d  p r ic in g  p o lic y  h a s  to  b e  r e p la c e d  b y  a  tw o  s id e d  o n e  a n d  
th e  n e u tra lity  p ro p o s itio n s  no  lo n g e r  h o ld s"" . Again, aggregation problem here forbidden 
a rigorous analysis by Caplin and Spulber.
29Blanchard and Fischer emphasize that their statement refers to the steady state 
distribution of price deviations across price-setters, and not of price deviations for a 
given price-setter which will be triangular.
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The following results are obtained:
(a) Money is neutral in the sense that one cannot keep raising (reducing) aggregate 
output by an indefinite rise (reduction) of the money supply; and
(b) Money is non-neutral in the sense that occasional reduction of money stock in an 
inflationary world will cause a reduction in aggregate output If there were any other 
exogenous reduction in aggregate demand, the government may be able to use 
monetary policy to reduce the initial reduction of output Monetary policy, however, 
cannot reduce the "long-run" 3° reduction in output arising from such an exogenous 
cut in aggregate demand.
1.3 Plan o f the Thesis
In Chapter 2, we will first present a model on the price decision. The model is 
particularly helpful in showing how signal extraction problems and the cost of changing 
price can generate a significant degree of price stickiness not well explained by the recent 
literature. The remaining part of Chapter 2 is then devoted to examining the remaining 
two hypotheses in the theory of mark-up pricing. A brief discussion on the evolution of 
cost-oriented pricing and the applicability of the mark-up equation in macroeconomic 
analysis is also included. After that, the model is extended to the employment decision 
and is presented in Chapter 3. Here, emphasis is on (i) the role of production effort 
(instead of wage and employment) as the main adjusting variable with respect to 
moderate demand shocks; and (ii) the role of a fixed reputation cost of layoff (originating 
in the implicit, non-binding guarantee of employment) in creating a bang-bang 
employment decision. Chapter 4 is a piece of empirical work on the cost of changing
30"Long run" here is defined as the state where the actual price (Pkt) is adjusted to 
the desired price(Pkt*). See the discussion in Chapter 5.
price; we also check the "normal cost hypothesis" proposed by Godley and Nordhaus 
(1972). Chapter 5 is a simulation exercise to check the robustness of Caplin and 
Spulber's neutrality result to more general specifications of the monetary generation 
process. Finally, the conclusions and suggestions for further research are included in 
Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
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In Chapter 1, we have briefly reviewed the limitations of the B-M-R models in 
explaining the degree of price stickiness in our world. Now we build a new model that is 
not only capable of explaining a greater degree of price stickiness, but also more realistic 
and elegant in tackling the signal extraction problem and the associated process of 
expectation revision. After this, we will go into the details of pricing response to various 
types of shocks. We will also check the following three hypotheses implicit in the theory 
of mark-up pricing:
(a) a sluggish pricing response to demand shocks;
(b) a relatively fast pricing response to cost shocks; and
(c) a unit elasticity of average cost (AC) in the formula P=(l+m)AC.
2.1 The Basic M odel
2.1.1 A ssum ptions
Based on the argument by Koutsoyiannis (1979), we assume that a representative 
firm has some kind of planned excess capacity so that production will always be within the 
capacity i. The following assumptions for the formulations are made to achieve a more 
realistic condition:
(i) A representative producer does not have perfect information to distinguish between a 
permanent demand shock from a transitory one, and there is uncertainty about the 
persistence of any observed demand shock.
1This is a slightly restrictive assumption because it is possible that the demand shock is 
so large that the required production is beyond capacity. If the shock is also expected to be 
permanent, the producer may consider expanding the capacity instead of raising the price. 
In other words, a satisfactory formulation should, in addition to the decision of changing 
price, include the decision of changing capacity. We will return to the discussion later.
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(ii) As a result, the producer does not know the exact demand until the end of each period. 
However, price has to be set before the goods can be sold (i.e. at the beginning of each 
period).
(iii) At the beginning of any period t, the producer forms an expectation for the probable 
sales and sets the price according to such an estimated demand.
(iv) At the beginning of the next period t+1, a new observation of sales at t arrives and the 
producer revises his expectations and pricing policy accordingly.
To facilitate a simple presentation of the model, we also make the following specific 
assumptions:
(1) We assume the level of demand Ot consists of a permanent component o^P and a
transitory component 0CtT :
a t = a tp + a tT (2.1)
and the two components are generated from the following stochastic process :
= a t_iP + EtP (2 .2 )
o J  = etT (2.3)
where £tP is generated from a normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance ap2 [i.e. EtP ~ N(0,ap2)]; and 
c tT is generated from a normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance Or2 [i.e. etT ~ N(0,Ct 2)].
With such kind of settings, it can be shown that
(i) given the information at the beginning of t, the optimal predictors for all future 
demand a l+j , j>0 are equal to each other. That is
Ot+jlt = «t+klt = V j,k > 0  (2.4)
where oti+jit is defined as a t+J expected at the beginning of t; and
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dt is a simplified notation for all these Ot+j|t, j>0.
(ii) d t the optimal predictor of future level of demand expected at the beginning of t, is a 
distributed lag of previous level of demand:
(2) Whenever a producer changes the price, there is an administrative cost of changing the 
posted price list; of notifying (or explaining to) the customers about the price change 
etc. There should also be a reputation cost (gain) for every rise (fall) in price. For
presentation sake, we will first assume the following cost of changing price, L(APt):
where (i) the fixed component, A, is used to capture the menu cost and part of the 
reputation cost2 [It also has the effect of penalizing too frequent changes 
in prices]; and
(ii) the linear component, £(APt), is used to captured most of the reputation
cost/gain of changing price.
In section 2.3.2, we will consider more general specifications of L(APt) such as the
inclusion of a non-linear component which will penalize too sharp a change of price 
[Since this will create an interlinkage of price decision at different periods (c.f. the 
quadratic cost in Rotemberg (1982a,b)), the solution procedure will be somewhat more
oo
d t  =  X ' L  (l-A,)1 cct.i (2.5)
i=0
where X  = Gp2 /  Or2 •
A + £(APt) if APt * 0
0  if APt = 0
2It is also possible to assume that the fixed component to be different for APt > 0
and APt < 0. Some may also prefer the fixed component to be zero for APt < 0. These 
will not cause much complication and is left as an exercise to the reader.
complicated than that with fixed and linear cost].
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(3) With the expectation in assumption (1) and cost of changing price in assumption (2) 3, 
the producer, at the beginning of any period t, is choosing between :
(a') Changing the price with an initial cost A + E(APt]
If the demand shock turns out to be a permanent one, the profit at t will be 
higher than that of action (b) (not changing the price). This is so because the price 
has been changed to a more appropriate level.
On the other hand, if the demand shock turns out to be a transitory one, 
the profit at t will be lower than that of action (b) since the price has been changed to 
an inappropriate level. Besides, to avoid further loss of expected profit in later 
periods, the producer might have to reverse the initial price change which will
involve a cost A -  5(APt).
ftp Maintaining the price
If the demand shock turns out to be a permanent one, the profit at t will be 
lower than that of action (a) because the price is maintained at an inappropriate 
level. Besides, to avoid further loss of profit in later periods, the producer might 
have to change the price at some period t+j (j>0) which will involve a cost A +
S(APt).
On the other hand, if the demand shock turns out to be a transitory one, 
the profit at t will remain at its optimal level. Neither is it necessary to change the 
price in the future.
Table 2.1 summarizes the various costs and benefits of actions (a) and (b) under the
3As we will see the presence of a fixed cost per price change will lead to a very 
sophisticated formulation.
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two possible cases of permanent and transitory demand shocks.
^ ^ ^ s t a t e s  
ac tions'—
If the demand shock 
is permanent
If the demand shock 
is transitory
(a) changing the 
price by APt
(i) initial cost of 
raising price;
(ii) maximum profit at t
(i) initial cost of raising 
price;
(ii) lower profit at t
+ need to reverse the price 
change later (or keep 
having the lower profit)
(b) Maintaining 
the price
(i) no initial cost of 
changing price;
(ii) lower profit at t
+ need to change price 
later (or keep having 
the lower profit).
(i) no initial cost of changing 
price;
(ii) optimum profit at t
Table (2.1)
(4) The producer is assumed to choose between action (a) and (b) so as to maximize the 
expected-sum-of-discounted profit. If the producer chooses action (a), he also needs to 
decide at which level the price should be raised. Hence, at the beginning of any period 
t, the producer's pricing decision involves two steps :
(i) Choosing the optimal APt to maximize the expected-sum-of discounted profit for 
action (a); and
(ii) Comparing the maximum profit of action (a) with that of action (b), and then decide 
to change or maintain the price accordingly.
(5) For simplicity, we assume a linear demand curve so that the producer's expected 
demand O tis:
Qt = «  - p p t ,
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and the cost of production is :
C(Qt) = a + b<i
Such simplifying assumptions are only for illustrative purpose. As we will see, 
formulations with more complicated demand and cost functions will still yield the same 
type of price sluggishness with respect to demand shocks.
2.1.2 The Formulation
Let y be the discount rate. Suppose the price before any decision period t is P and 
the expected level with probability of demand is 4. The maximum of the expected-sum-of- 
discounted-profit arising from actions (a) and (b) is defined as f( P, c£) Hence, if the
producer maintains the price at P, the expected-sum-of-discounted profit will be
( P - b)[bc- p P ] - a  + yf(P,c£)
The first two terms of the above expression refer to the expected profit at period t; and the 
last term, by the Principle of Optimality in dynamic programming is the present discounted 
maximum of expected-sum-of-discounted profit for all periods after t.
If the producer changes the price to P + AP, the expected-sum-of-discounted profit
will be
(P + AP - b)[ d  - p (P + AP) ] - a - [A + % (AP)] + y f(P + AP,dc)
Again, the first two terms of the above expression refer to the expected profit at period t. 
The third term is the cost of changing price by APt, and the last term is the present
4 For simplicity sake, the time subscripts will be dropped in the remaining part of this 
chapter.
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discounted maximum of expected-sum-of-discounted profit for all periods after t, with the 
new starting price P + AP.
Thus,
fp“ o (P+AP-b)[c£-P (P+AP)]-a-[A+^(AP)]+yf(P+AP,d) 
f(P,a) = max {  (p . b)[(f _ p p j _ a + (2'6)
where the first expression on the right hand side of equation (2.1) represent the supremum
(maximum) return when the producer chooses to change price at t, and the second 
expression represents the maximum return when the producer choose to keep the price 
fixed at t. Whether the producer will choose to raise or maintain the price will depend on
the relative size of the first and second expressions, which in turn depends on c£. Putting 
Q(P, a)=(P-b)[ c£-pP]-a, equation (2.1) can be written in the following compact form :
Sup Q (P + AP, d )  - [A + £(AP)] + y f  (P + AP, d ){ AP#*
Q (P, <*) + y f (P , d )  (2'7)
Hence, the producer's pricing decision consists of two steps :
(i) Chooses the optimal AP**0 and calculates the supremum of the first expression; and
(ii) Compares the values of the first and second expressions. If the supremum of the first 
expression has a higher value, changes the price by AP*. Otherwise, maintains the
price at P.
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2.1.3 Outline of the Solution Result
As shown in Mathematical Appendix (I), equation (2.7) can be rewritten as
Q (P + AP, d)
f (P, a) = max
SupAtVO
L ,
1 - 7
-  [A + (AP)]
Q (P , <*)
1 -7
In the same mathematical appendix, it is also shown that:
(2 .8)
T (slope=fy
P2Pl Pt P* P PH
where hi = f(P*,d) - [A + % (P* - Pi)]
h2 = Q(P2, <£>/a-y>
(i) the graphical shape of the second expression of equation (2.8) is represented by the 
parabola [Q (P, d)/(l - y)] in diagram (2.1); while
(ii) the first expression of equation (2.8) is represented by the straight line SSS' with slope 
^ in diagram (2.1).
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From equation (2.8), we know that f(P,<£) will be represented by the full-line curve in 
diagram (2.1).
The interpretation of the pricing decision is as follows :
(a) If the starting price lies within the curvature section of f( P,cx) (i.e.between Pl and Ph ) ,
the producer will keep the price fixed5; and
(b) If the starting price is on the straight line section (i.e. below Pl or above Ph ), the 
producer will change the price to P*6.
We have also shown that the shape and position of f(P^x) depends on :
(i) the fixed cost per price change (A )
The greater A is, the lower the SS line, the greater the gap between Pl and 
Ph , hence the less likely for the producer to change his price; and if the producer 
happens to change his price, the greater the size of each revision of price.
(ii') the linear component (fo
The lower ^ is, the flatter the straight line section of f(P,cx) and the greater the values 
of Pl, P* and Ph - However, as shown in Mathematical Appendix (II), the gap between 
Pl and Ph is independent of
5The expected-sum-of-discounted profit for a starting price such as Pi will be 
represented by f(Pi,c£) in diagram (2.1). As shown in the same diagram, this is higher than 
that of raising price to P* which will give hi = (f(P*,ri) - [A + £ (P* - P i)]}.
6The expected-sum-of-discounted profit for a starting price such as P2 will be 
represented by f( P2,tf) which is equal to (f(P*,c£) - [A + ^ (P* - P2)]}. As shown in 
diagram (2.1), this is higher than that of keeping the price at P2 which will give h2 =
[Q(P2,cx)/(1-y)].
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(m )  the function TO (P. d ) / ( \  - 7)1
This is in turn a function of P, a, b, y and d. Of particular interest is that Q (P, d ),
and hence f( P,d) is an increasing function of d . Thus, with an upward revision of
expected demand from do to d i and then to d 2, f(P,d) will be shifting to north east 
such as that shown in diagram (2.2):
In general, the greater the upward revision of d, the greater the shift in f(.). 
Besides, we have shown that
P
_ d  + bp - %(l-y) 
2P
(2.4)
PL = P*- V[A(l-Y)/2p] (2.5)
PH =P* + V[A(l-y)/2p] (2.6)
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so that the gap between Pl and Ph is 2V[A(l-y)/2(3]. Note,
(a) the greater the fixed cost per price change (A), the greater the gap between Pl and Ph, 
and the less likely for the producer to change his price;
(b) the greater is p, the smaller the gap between Pl and Ph , and hence the more likely for
the producer to change his price. [The economic reasoning is as follows: the greater p
is, the more sensitive are sales to a given change in price? and hence the more costly to 
maintain a suboptimal price (as against the fixed cost per price change).];
(c) if A=0, Pl and Ph collapse to P*, and price will be adjusted immediately to any shock.
This will be the case even if £*0. Thus, the linear component alone cannot cause any
price stickiness/sluggishness. As the gap between Pl and Ph is independent of
neither will the linear component help to raise the price stickiness arising from the fixed 
components;
(d) the gap is independent of a , but P* and the position of f(P,a) do.
(e) the "optimal" price change between any two periods of different a  is AP* = (A dc)/2p.
7This is represented by a steeper turn in the parabola section of f(P,cx).
8The only effect of ^  is on the value of P*
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2.2 Pricing Response to Various types of Specific Demand  
Shocks
Now, we come to use the basic model to explain the pricing response to various 
types of specific demand shocks.
2.2.1 Sluggishness with respect to,a large permanent demand
sh ock
Suppose the producer has experienced a long period of mixed occurrence of 
permanent and transitory demand shocks, then suddenly comes a permanent shock so that
the mean level of demand rises from oco to oto+u. Without other information, the producer 
cannot, at the beginning stage, tell from the sales whether the shock is permanent or not.
f(.)
According to equation (2.5), the producer will only make a small upward revision of d  
which implies a very minor shift of f(.) from f(P,cico) to f(P,dti) in diagram (2.3). If the
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starting price is Po*, the producer will not raise the price. As time passes, the producer 
begins to get more observations on sales. If the shock is permanent, the sales will show 
favourable observations and the producer will start revising & towards (ao+u) which 
implies further shifts of f(.) to the north east. Sooner or later, f(.) will shift beyond 
f(P ,$2). The producer will then raise the price by [(<£2 -c£i)/2(3] to Po*+AP". Thereafter, 
the producer will stick to the price until further observations suggests a continuous upward 
shift of f(.) to f(P,dc3). This time, the producer will raise the price by [((£3 - ri2)/2p] to
Po*+AP’". This process will continue until & is revised to the permanent level (ao+u).
Hence, the producer’s pricing response with respect to a permanent shock will be a 
stepwise function such as that shown in diagrams (2.4a)9.
Note:
(i) The analysis can be extended to more general specifications of <£. As long as d
increases with more observations of the permanent shock, the result will be 
qualitatively the same. One can also extend the analysis to the case in which the 
producer has extraneous information on the persistence of the shock (the extraneous
information will cause an immediate jump in d ) .
(ii) The size and length (and hence the pattern) of each step depend on how fast d  is
adjusted and whether d  shows discrete jumps. (If d  is adjusted steadily, it implies the
size of the steps will be the same).
(iii)In general, the more extraneous information a producer has, the better he can 
distinguish between a permanent shock from a transitory shock. In the extreme case, 
if, due to the extraneous information, he has complete certainty on the permanent
9 Diagrams (2.4b) and (2.4c) are also drawn respectively for the cases where the starting 
price is lower than and greater than Po*.
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shock, price will be adjusted immediately from Po* to [Po*+u/2p].
time
(a) starting price at Po*
price
P«+
time
(b) starting price less than Po*
time
(c) starting price higher than Po* 
diagamU^X
7 0
(iv) Unless the final price revision occurs at the tim ed is revised to ao+u, there is no 
necessity for the final price to reach [Po*+u/2|3]. Indeed, it is likely that the final price 
revision occurs at somewhere & < ao+u which implies the final price will be somewhat
below (above) [Po*+u/2p] when u is positive (negative). Nevertheless, the gap will be
limited by A, the cost of changing price. Otherwise, it will pay the producer to make 
another price revision.
(v) Diagram (2.4a) is drawn with the assumption that the starting price is Po*. Using the 
argument of (iv) above; the starting price can also be below or above Po* such as those 
shown in diagram (2.4b) and (2.4c).
(vi) If the producer is risk-averse (i.e. he also prefers less variation in return in addition to a 
higher level of expected return), he might not raise the price immediately at the time Pl
of f(.) shift beyond the initial price Po. Instead, he might prefer to wait longer and
raise the price by a larger step. In other words preference over less variation in return 
might intensify the stickiness of price. The formal proof of this is however beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
Finally, it is interesting to note that there are indeed two sources of sluggishness 
discussed in the model10:
(1) Sluggishness due to the pure signal extraction problem (without the cost of changing 
price); and
(2) Stickiness arises from the fixed cost of changing price.
The explanation is not difficult with the help of the model. Suppose there is no fixed cost 
per price change (ie A=0), from equations (2.10) and (2.11), Pl and Ph will collapse to
lOThere can also be other sources of price sluggishness such as the information 
transmission lags discussed in Chapter 1.
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Q (P + AP, tf)
Po*. In addition, S u p ---------------------- [A + £ (AP)] and hence f(P4) will be
ap*o 1 - y
represented by the tangent line TT of diagram (2.1). This is redrawn in diagram (2.5a). 
Suppose we have the permanent shock again. As & is being revised upwards with more
observations, the producer will raise his price continuously as shown by the dotted path CD 
in diagram (2.5b) [or C'D' in diagram (2.5a)]
f ( ) price
CD
T  Q ( P ,& |0t 0 < O .< (X g + U )
time
diagram (2 .5a) diagram (2 .5b)
Thus, quite contradictory to that suggested by Mussa (1981), a cost of changing price is not 
a necessary condition for price sluggishness. There exists some other sources of price 
sluggishness, such as a confusion over the persistence of a stock.
For comparison purposes, the price path with the fixed cost of changing price is drawn in 
the same diagram (i.e. the stepwise path AB in diagram (2.5b)). There are two interesting 
interpretations with the diagram :
(i) With a signal extraction problem, the presence of the fixed cost of changing price will 
make the pricing response more sluggish (as shown by the gap between AB and CD);
(ii) Without a signal extraction problem, the representative producer, in the face of a large
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demand shock, will raise the price immediately to Pi* even if there is a cost of changing 
price. The addition of a signal extraction problem, not only exerts its own effect on 
price sluggishness as shown by the gap between Pi* and path CD, but also allows the 
fixed cost of changing price to cause further price sluggishness as shown by the gap 
between CD and AB.
Thus, the addition of a signal extraction problem produces a greater degree of price 
stickiness than that would be generated by the B-M-R models reviewed in Chapter 1.
2.2.2 Pricing Response to a Transitory Demand Shock
Let us suppose the demand shock discussed in diagram (2.3) is a transitory one. 
Again, without other information, the producer cannot, at the beginning tell from sales 
whether the sales shock is transitory or not. As usual, the producer will only make a small
revision of dt in the first period. Thus, unless the shock (u) is really large, it is unlikely that
a  in the first period is large enough to shift f(.) by such amount that the lower threshold of
the new f(.) exceeds the starting P n . Hence, it is unlikely that the producer will raise the 
price in the first period. Given the shock is a transitory one, further evidence on sales will 
cause the producer to reduce the dt 12 which means that f(.) will be shifting back towards
f(P,cxo) and price will remain unchanged throughout the whole process. This explains why
HThe only exceptions are that the transitory shock is so large or the starting price is near 
to the lower threshold of f(.) (i.e. the producer is at the margin of raising price) so that the
(mistaken) upward revision of dt causes the lower threshold of f(.) to shift beyond the 
starting price.
12If there is another transitory shock at t,dt at the beginning of t+1 will be raised. 
However, by the definition of ’’transitory" the shock will vanish sooner or later. Hence, cf 
is expected to adjust back towards cto.
a producer's pricing policy seldom reacts to a transitory shock.
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Moreover, if we include the variance of return^ (along with the expected return) 
into the producer's utility function, the producer might prefer to wait for more 
observations. Given the shock is a transitory one, more observations will result in a
revision of a  back towards oto. Thus, preference for less variation in return might imply a
producer is less likely to raise price with respect to a transitory demand shock. 
Nevertheless, a formal proof of this is again outside the scope of this thesis.
i3The inclusion of risk consideration into producer’s pricing decision will mean a 
slightly more complicated formulation than the present model of expected return 
maximization. We will however, as mentioned earlier, have this as an interesting 
hypothesis for further research.
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2.2.3 Pricing Response to a Small but Permanent Demand Shock
As before, f(.) will shift upwards with the rise in & . However, if u is too small, Pl 
of f(P,do+u) might never exceed the initial price Po14 such as that shown in diagram (2.6):
In such case, even if we have a permanent shock so that cx will reach (ao+u) sooner or 
later, the producer will not change his price with this permanent but minor shock15.
i^The only exception is when the producer is at the margin of raising price.
15It should, however, be noted that the small permanent shock has made the starting 
price P much closer to the margin of raising price. Its effect on price will be regained 
when some other shocks shift the lower threshold of f(.) beyond P.
f ( )
P
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2.3 Solution for more general functional forms
In the previous section, we have derived our result by assuming the demand curve, 
the total cost curve and the cost of changing price are all linear. In this section, we will 
outline the solution procedure for more general functional forms.
2.3.1 Non-linear demand and total cost curves
If demand and total cost curves are non-linear, Q(.) of equation (2.7) may no longer 
be a parabola. Nevertheless, if one went through the solution procedure in Mathematical 
Appendix (I), one would find that the derivation from equation (2.7) to equation (2.8) will 
be applicable to all functional forms of Q(.), so long as there is a global maximum. Thus,
one can derive a diagram similar to that of diagram (2.1) except that the new Q(.)/(l-y) may 
no longer be a parabola. One such example is drawn in diagram (2.7):
Q(.)
J _________ i_____ I____________________
P l  P '  p h  P
diagam_(171
Thus, the results will be basically similar to those discussed in section 2.1.3.
2.3.2 Non-linear cost of changing price
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With a non-linear cost of changing price, the solution procedure will be more 
complicated. In addition, the degree of complication depends on whether IXAP1+AP2) is
greater than, equal to, or less than L(APi)+L(AP2). If we assume L(APi+AP2> ^
L(APi)+L(AP2> for the relevant range of APi and AP2 16, step (I) of Mathematical 
Appendix (I) still applies so that
Q (P + AP, tic)
Sup — ---------—  -  L(AP)
AtVO 1  "  Y
f(P , tic) = max 1 _  (2.12)
Q (P , c£)
1-Y
where (i) L(AP) is any non-linear cost of changing price satisfying the condition
L(APi +AP2)<L(APi )+L(AP2). Examples of these are {A+\yi [exp {\|/2(AP)} -1 ]} 
and [A + £(AP) + \j/(AP)2] 17.18 with \j/j,\j/2« A  and \ |/« A  so that, for the 
relevant range of AP, L(AP) £ L[AAP]+L[(1-A.)AP] V^,<1; and
(ii) Q(P,<*) = (P -b )[d -p P ].
As L(AP) is no longer linear, the optimal (or desired) price for the first expression of
16Such condition states that, for the same total rise in price, it is always less costly to do 
it by one single large revision than by many small revisions. This implies, for the relevant
range of APi and AP2 , the fixed component will dominate the non-linear component. If 
this condition does not hold, the solution procedure will be even more complicated since 
we now have to compute an optimal price path, instead of an optimal price level, for all 
future periods. As we rarely observe changes of price in two consecutive periods, where
the length can be as short as a month or a week, it seems that the assumption L(APi+AP2)
< L(APi )+L(AP2) is quite reasonable.
17The specification of exponential cost will be better than that of quadratic cost. This is 
so because the latter will give the unreasonable prediction that for some large enough
negative APt, the reduction of price will imply a loss instead of a gain in reputation.
18It is also possible to assume the fixed component for APt<0 is different from that for 
APt>0.
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equation (2.12) is no longer fixed but depends on the value of the starting price P 19 (i.e.
there is an inter-temporal decision through the linkage between the optimal price and the 
starting price). This make a somewhat more complicated solution procedure and we outline 
it as follows:
(a) First Step
Our first step is to remove the fixed cost of changing from Q (P, c£)/(l - y). This 
gives the curve Q (P, c£)/(l - y) - A in diagram (2.8).
(b) Second Step
Above, we have seen that the desired price of the first expression of equation (2.12) 
depends on P. Putting the argument the other way round, it implies that the price at any 
point such as E,F or G in diagram (2.8) will be the "desired" price for some corresponding 
P. Pre-supposing the price at E, F or G as a potential optimal price, we draw the curves
Q(P,a)/( 1 -y)-L(AP) for points E,F and G. For the case where {A+\|/i[exp{\j/2(APt))-l]  }20,
these curves are shown by the dotted curves passing through E,F and G respectively. We 
then develop the envelope curve above this set of curves. Such an envelope curve 
(shown by the smooth full line curve AD of diagram (2.8)) indeed represents
Sup Q(P,cx)/(l-y) - L(AP), the first expression of equation (2.12).
(c) Third Step
By taking the maximum of the envelope curve and Q (P, cx)/[l - y], f  (P, d )  is
^Differentiating H(.) = [Q (P  + AP, <5t) - a]/[l-y] - L(AP) with respect to AP and 
setting the derivatives to zero gives [(P*-b)(-p) + (a - pP*)]/[l-y] - L'(AP*) = 0 where AP*
= P* - P. Thus, as long as L(AP) is non-linear, L'(AP) will be non-zero and the optimal 
price P* will depend on P.
20The case for L(AP) = [A + £( P) + \|/(AP)2] will be similar and only differs in 
curvature to that shown in diagram 2 .8.
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diagram (2.8)
indeed represented by the full line curve ABCD.
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Thus, the pricing decision of the producer will be as follows :
(i) Suppose the starting price is Pq (i.e. lower than that at B), the producer should raise 
the price to that at G so that the (optimal) value of f  (P, (X) is shown by the height of 
the envelope curve at Pg ;
(ii) If the starting price is Pf (i.e. the price at point B), it does not matter whether the 
producer decides to maintain the price or raise the price to that at point F;
(iii) If the starting price is Pe (i.e. within the range of BC), the return for not raising price 
will be shown by the height at En while the highest return for raising price is only that
at Er. Hence, the producer should decide to maintain the price.
2.4 Pricing R esponse to G eneral D em and Shocks
In sections 2.1-2.3, we have been assuming a cost of changing price due to a 
change in absolute price. This implicitly assumes that the representative producer's 
expected competitor price (Pwt) is Fixed throughout the process. While this will be a 
reasonable assumption for the case of specific demand shocks, it may not be the case for 
general demand shocks. With a general demand shock, the representative producer would 
expect the other producers to change their prices as well. Thus, a more convincing model 
should include the effect of the representative producer's expectation on his competitor's 
pricing response into the model. This will be what we are attempting to do in this section.
2.4.1 The extended model
Instead of assuming a linear cost of change in absolute price, we now assume a 
linear cost that depends on the deviation of relative price from a norm. Thus, we write the
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linear cost as £[ (P/Pw) - (P/Pw)*]. where (P/Pw)# is the relative price normal. However,
because of the menu cost and the producer's need to pledge some degree of constancy of 
nominal price, we assume a fixed cost per change in absolute price. If we let P w be a 
weighted average of competitors' prices expected by the representative producer, the model 
can be rewritten as
Sup (P+AP-b)J & - p(P+AP)/Pw] - a
- {A+5[(P+AP)/PW - (P/Pw)#] }+ Yf(P+AP,Pw,c£)
f(P,Pw ,cx) = max |
(P-b)[<*-p(P/Pw)] - a - «(P/Pw) - (P/PwW + Yf(P,Pw,c2)
Following the same solution procedure of the basic model, the above equation can be 
rewritten a s :
Sup Z(P+AP,PW>(£) _ ^
_ ,  ap#o 1 - y
f(P,Pw,d) = m ax {  Z ( p p _ d )  (2.13)
1-Y
where Z(P,Pw,ri) = Q(P,PW4 )  - §[(P/Pw) - (P/Pw)#]
Q(P,Pw,d) = (P-b)[ p(P/Pw)] - a
Thus, the graphical shape of f(.) can be obtained by the following procedures :
(a) plot Z(P,Pw,a)/(l - y) against P,
(b) draw a tangent line TT at the maximum of Z(P,PW ,cx)/( 1 - y);
(c) draw a straight line SS below TT by a vertical distance A;
(d) f(P,Pw,<© can be represented by the maximum of SS and Z(P,Pw,c£)/(l - y) which is 
shown by the full line curve in diagram (2.9).
21 For the case where producers are identical, (P/Pw)# will be unity.
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P
diagram  ( 2 ,9 )
It is interesting to note that in the above procedure of obtaining f(.):
(i) Z(P,Pw,cx)/(l - y) instead of Q(P,Pw,a)/(l - y) is plotted against P,
(ii) the effect of the linear component ^[(P/Pw) - (P/Pw)#] is included in Z(.)/(l - Y) so that 
any rise in Q(.)/(l - Y)or reduction in the linear component will cause a rise in 
Z(.)/(l - Y); and
(iii) a rise in Pw to Pw' will shift Z(.)/(l - Y) to the north east direction by raising Q(.)/(l-y)
and reducing £[(P/PW) - (P/Pw)#] .
In other words, a rise in expected Pw with a general shock will make it more likely for 
producer to raise the price because
(a) the higher Pw implies that the desired price in Q(.)/(l - Y) is higher, and
(b) the linear cost of having a higher price is reduced when Pw is higher.
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We will further discuss this in section 2.5.
2.4.2 Signal Extraction Problem between General and Specific 
shocks as another source of Price Sluggishness
In the basic model, we have shown that the signal extraction problem between 
permanent and transitory shocks; and the cost of changing price are two important sources 
of price sluggishness/stickiness. Now we come to the third source of price sluggishness : 
signal extraction problem between general and specific shocks (referred as signal extraction 
problem (II) in later discussions). The three sources of price sluggishness will then be 
used to explain cost-oriented pricing (i.e. producer raise price fairly quickly with moderate 
cost shocks but react slowly to moderate demand shocks) in section 2.5.
To make the presentation simple, we will try to see how the third source alone 22 
can cause a sluggish pricing response. We do so by assuming the following hypothetical 
case in which
(i) there is no cost of changing price;
(ii) there is a permanent general demand shock so that the mean level of demand rise from 
oto to ao+u. Producers are completely certain that the shock is permanent, but are not
sure whether the shock is general or specific; and
(iii) producers are identical 23.
22The interaction between the cost of changing price and signal extraction problem (II) 
will produce a more complicated pricing response. Nevertheless, it can be concluded the 
higher the fixed cost of changing price; and the less certain the producer about the 
persistence and generality of a shock, the more likely for a sluggish/sticky pricing 
response.
23Such assumption is only made for the sake of simple presentation. As the reader will 
be aware, the subsequent proof will go even for non-identical producers.
8 3
These assumptions imply that equation (2.13) can be simplified to
~ , e (P-b)[ao+u - PCP/Pw)] - af(P,Pw,oto+u)= Sup ----------- ---------------------
prf 1 - y
Solving for the optimal price (P*) and adding time subscript t to P* and Pw, we have 
Pt* = b/2 + (a 0+u)Pwt/2p (2.14)
which implies that the optimal price P* will depend on the expected competitor price index 
Pwt*
(a) If the producers recognize the shock is general
If the producers know at the beginning, or getting to recognize with the passage of 
time, that the shock is general, then 
Pwf = Pf*
where subscript f  is defined as the "final period" when the producers get to 
recognize the shock is general.
Substituting this into equation (2.14), we have
Pw f = ------------------— and Pf* = Pwf
[1 - (oo+u)/2p]
Thus, the permanent general shock, in the absence of signal extraction problems and cost 
of changing price, will cause an immediate rise of price from Po* = Pwo = [b/2]/[l-ao/2p]
to Pf* = Pwf = [b/2]/[l - (<Xo+u)/2p].
(b) With signal extraction problem about the peneralitv of the shock
However, with the co-existence of general and specific shocks and absence of 
extraneous information, the representative producer will, at the beginning, assign a low 
probability that the shock is general. This makes his expected competitor price index (Pwt) 
less than PWf. With further observations from the general demand shock, the producers 
begin to revise Pwt upwards. Thus P wt > Pw,t-i • Combining the two, the revision path of
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Pwt must satisfy the following inequalities :
P wo — Pw,t-i — Pwt— Pwf V t > 0  (2.15)
The adjustment speed of PWt towards PWf will depend on how fast the representative 
producer can recognize the shock as a general one. As long as it takes some time for Pm to 
go from Pw0 to Pwf, equation (2.9) implies that Pt* (the price chosen by the representative 
producer) will only adjust sluggishly from Po* to Pf* . Thus, the signal extraction problem 
can also be a source of sluggish price movements.
8 5
2.5 The three hypotheses in the theory o f M ark-up Pricing
In Chapter 1, we have argued that the theory of mark-up pricing is a more general 
theory than the B-M-R models. Beside being a theory of price decision, the modem 
version of mark-up pricing is also a theory involving capacity, production and quality 
decisions. It says quite a few things not recognized or properly tackled by the B-M-R 
models. In particular, implicit in the formula of P t = (l+m ^A Q , there are indeed three 
hypotheses:
(a) the assumption about mt (the planned profit margin) implies prices change sluggishly or 
remain unchanged with demand shocks;
(b) the separation of AQ from mt reviews the belief of an asymmetric pricing response with 
respect to cost shocks and demand shocks (prices rise relatively fast with cost shocks, 
but either change sluggishly or remain unchanged with demand shocks); and
(c) the unit elasticity of ACt implies that 1% rise in average variable cost will cause 1% rise 
in price. (Note, the use of ACt in the formula also reflect their belief that the average 
cost pricing is superior than the one period Neoclassical marginal cost pricing rule.)
Hypothesis (a) has indeed been justified/supported by the B-M-R models and our 
discussion in sections 2.2 -  2.4. The aim of this section is to check the robustness of the 
other two hypotheses with our model.
2.5.1 The Second Hypothesis
In sections 2.2 -  2.4, we have shown that
(i) signal extraction problem between persistent and transitory shocks;
(ii) signal extraction problem between general and specific shocks; and
(iii) the cost of changing price
lead to sluggish pricing response with respect to a persistent and general demand shocks.
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The argument will, however, be weaker for the case of cost shocks:
Unlike demand shocks, cost shocks are usually persistent and 
general -  a rise in average variable cost is likely to affect the whole industry and 
persists in the near future. As a result, there is little uncertainty about the 
generality and persistence of the cost shocks, and this implies that there is little 
sluggishness arising from the two types of signal extraction problems. 
Besides, the generality of cost shocks implies producers will expect each other 
to raise price sooner or later. This raises the expected Pwt which implies a 
significant reduction in the reputation cost of raising price. These suggest that 
prices will rise fairly quickly with moderate cost shocks. Last but not least, if -  
because of the above reasons -  price did rise fairly quickly with cost shocks in 
the past and had become a usual practice of the economy, everyone will find it 
acceptable [in addition to the "fairness” emphasized by Okun(1981)] to raise 
price with the rise in cost. In other words, the practice implies a further 
reduction in the cost of raising price with respect to cost shocks (as contrast to 
that with respect to demand shocks) which make it possible for price to rise 
with even smaller cost shocks.
The above arguments can be seen clearly with the help of our model and diagram. 
Rewriting our model for the case of a permanent and general cost shock and solving, we 
have
Sup (P+AP-b)[a-B(P+AP)/Pw 1 -a-^f(P+AP)/Pw - (P/P„)»1 ^
{ap-0 1 - y
(P-b)[a-P(P/Pw)l - a - SKP/Pw) - (P/P„)«l (2' 16)
1 • Y
where : Ac is the fixed cost of raising price with respect to cost shocks which will be 
lower than that with respect to demand shocks (i.e. Ac < A) when cost- 
oriented pricing has become a practice in our economy.
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To illustrate the point, we draw the cases of a reasonably large and a moderate cost shock 
in diagram (2.10a) and diagram (2.10b) respectively :
f( .)
____i
____ /
f()
2 F 'p * v V 1+ vl»  
? (P ;P ¥ l,V l+V^) 
,f(P,PV0^
-I
■  W
p 0 p > p ’ ( l+ v ,)
diagram f2.10a')
“ V H ,  ‘- ; f ( p .p » * '6p<1+va» 
A j t p  'P » o 'V 1+'v*))
* - - f< P ,P ,0,V l+ v J))
^  f(P/PVO,l>o)
I ■ • r< p ,p ,0,b„)
p ;  p;=PoU +^ >
diagram  (2 .10b)
First consider the case of large cost shock in diagram (2.10a). Without any change in the 
expected competitor price index, a rise in cost from bo to bo(l+wi) will shift T(.) from
?(P,Pwo,bo) to7(P,Pwo»bo(l+wi)). However, if the shock is known to be general, 
producers will expect each other to raise price. This cause a rise in Pw which implies 
further shift to T(P,Pwi ,bo(l+wi)). Besides, if cost-oriented pricing has long been a
practice of the economy, Ac will be much smaller than A, and f(.) instead of ?(.) in the
above diagrams will be the relevant profit curves. If, as suggested in the verbal argument, 
there is no uncertainty about the persistence and generality of the cost shock, the shift from
f(P,Pwo,bo) to f(P,Pwi,bo(l+wi)) will be immediate. As Po* lies outside the curvature
section of f(P,Pwi,bo(l+wi)), the cost shock will cause an immediate rise of price to Pi*.
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Thus, the absence of signal extraction problems suggest that price will be adjusted 
immediately with a reasonably large cost shock.
Once the cost-oriented pricing has become a practice and producers usually find it 
right to expect a rise in Pwt with a cost shock, it will be more likely for price to rise with 
moderate cost shock. This is illustrated in diagram (2.10b) in which the higher P w 24 and 
the lower A c make it just possible for price to be raised with the moderate cost shock W2. 
Thus, the second hypothesis in the theory of mark-up pricing (asymmetric pricing response 
with respect to cost shocks and demand shocks) is supported by our model. Nevertheless, 
it must be noted that cost-onented pricing is only a good approximation of the actual pricing 
behaviour of producers. There are at least two reasons in saying s o :
(a) A strict attachment of cost-oriented pricing by producers requires the price to be 
adjusted with every change (no matter how small and frequent) in cost. However, for 
any cost shock that is less than that shown in diagram (2 .10b), the producer will choose 
to keep the price unchanged. The reasoning is simple : because of supplier's need to 
pledge constancy of price for a reasonably long period so as to encourage customers to 
rely on inter-temporal comparison and return to shop, it is better not to raise the price 
until the cumulated rise in cost has reached some reasonable amount. Thus, the need to 
pledge constancy of price for some time reflect that Ac will not be too small, albeit 
smaller than that of demand shock; and
(b) If there had been some long term change in demand before the cost shock so that the
optimal price is somewhat below or above the starting price Po* shown in diagrams
(2 .10a) and (2 .10b), the producer will change the price, in addition to that arising from
the change in cost, by another amount that reflect the change in demand. This is
24As explained in section 2.4.1, the rise in Pw will make it more likely for producer to 
raise the price because
(i) the desired price in Q(.)/[l-y] is higher; and
(ii) the linear cost of having a higher price is reduced with a rise in Pw.
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possible because customers do not have perfect information about the actual change in 
cost (c.f. section 1.2.1(D)(3) in Chapter 1).
2.5.2 The Third Hypothesis
Suppose prices do respond fairly quickly to moderate cost shocks, our next 
question is to check whether price will rise equiproportionately with the cost shock. 
Solving for the optimal price in the first expression of equation (2.16), we have
P* = b/2 + (aP w)/2p - V2P (2.17)
where £ is the linear cost coefficient which will "on the average " rise by x% when there is 
a x% rise in cost and general price level.
Suppose there is a general rise in cost by x% and every producer expects Pwt to rise by x%
as well, the sum of the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (2.17) will rise by
x% as well. As £ also "on the average " rises by x%, P* will rise by x% which in turn
justify producers' initial expectation of a x% rise in P ^ . This leads us to conclude that the 
unitary power index of ACt in the formula Pt = (l+mt)AQ is a good approximation of 
optimal pricing behaviour in the case of a general cost shock. However, the approximation 
will be a bad one to the case of specific cost shocks. Suppose there is a specific cost shock 
(due to, say, a technological improvement specific to the firm) that changes b. Since the 
shock is a specific one, the producer will not expect any change in Pw. According to 
equation (2.17), the percentage change in price will be different from that of cost. Hence, 
the approximation will be a bad one in case of specific cost shocks. Nevertheless, this 
should not be too discouraging to the use of the mark-up pricing equation in 
macroeconomics because the size of inflation in our world implies general cost shocks (i.e.
rising Pw, bt and with inflation) instead of specific cost shocks are dominating 25.
25The solution in case of inflation is discussed in section 2.6.
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2.6 R em arks in the case o f expected inflation
In the previous sections, we have seen the flexibility of our model and its power in 
explaining pricing behaviour with respect to various types of once-and-for-all demand/cost 
shocks. There is however one important limitation associated with the complexity of 
solution 26 in case of continuously rising prices. For example, in equation (2.13) or 
(2.16), the most general equation in the previous sections, we have assumed that the 
representative producer is expecting only a mean value of competitor price. While this may 
be a reasonable assumption for the case of once-and-for-all demand/cost shocks, we need 
to assume a path of Pw for-the case of continuous rising cost and competitor price. In this 
case, equation (2 .8) has to be replaced by the following equation :
Sup (Pt+APt-bi)[ &-P(Pt+APt)/PwJ - a
A I \ .0  _
- (A+$[(pt+AP,ypwt - (p /p „),*]}
f(Pt. {Pw. t+iitl. {bi+iit}, {at+iit} ,<2) — max
+ yf(Pt+AP t.{Pw. t+iitl • {bi+iii}, {at+iit) ,d) 
(Pt-b^fc-frP/PwOl-a
-S[(Pt/Pm)-(P/PwX#]
+ y f(Pt*{Pw»t+iit}» (bi+iit) t{at+nt},d)
where {Xt+iit } is the sequence of Xt+i expected at the beginning of period t, and Xt+i 
can be Pw,t+i>bt+i or a^ +i.
Unfortunately, solution of the above equation is still a mathematical problem. 
Nevertheless, approximate solutions for some special cases can be computed. For 
example, if we assume that (a) there is no demand shock; and (b) inflation is constant, the 
problem will be the same as that in Mussa (1981). The path of actual price (lnPt) will have 
pre-adjustments and under-adjustments around the path of "desired" price flnPt*) such as
26Note, the problem arising from the complexity of solution rather than the formulation 
of the model.
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that shown in diagram (2 .11) :
InP?,
lnPt InP,
lnP,
time
diagram (2.1H
In Chapter 4, we will try to approximate the solution for the case with (a) demand shocks; 
and (b) constant expected inflation.
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2.7 Conclusions and Remarks
2.7.1 M ark-up Pricing as an approxim ation of Actual/Profit 
Maximizing Pricing Behaviour
In this Chapter, a dynamic programming model was built to check the following 
three hypotheses in the theory of mark-up pricing:
(a) a sluggish/sticky pricing response with respect to demand shocks;
(b) the pricing response with respect to cost shocks would be much faster than that with 
respect to demand shocks;
(c) a unit elasticity of average cost (AC) in the formula P=(l+m)AC.
With regard to the first hypothesis, we have analyzed three important sources of 
individual price stickiness/sluggishness with respect to demand shocks. These are the 
signal extraction problem between persistent and transitory shocks; the signal extraction 
problem between general and specific shocks; and the cost of changing price. Within the 
third source, the fixed component will cause a bang-bang solution : price will remain sticky 
for moderate fluctuations in demand; and the percentage change of price will show discrete 
jumps once the cumulated demand shocks exceed the threshold. Interestingly enough, the 
linear component was found to have no effect on the price stickiness. This is so because 
the cost of changing price arising from such a component will be the same as long as the
total AP are the same, no matter whether the producer makes the AP by one large change or
many small changes. Thus, a large cost of changing price does not necessarily imply a 
high degree of price stickiness. If most of the cost is due to the linear component, price 
will not be very sticky despite a large cost of changing price.
Perhaps a comparison with the existing literature will help to reveal the 
contribution/significance of our model in explaining the extensive degree of price
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stickiness/sluggishness in the world. For example, in the review of the menu cost 
hypothesis in Chapter 1, we have pointed out two important limitations in these models:
(i) there is nothing in these models to guarantee that the "near-rational" agent starts at the 
optimal price (ie a crucial assumption without which the envelope theorem will not be 
applicable); and
(ii) these models are usually for but a single period, and a replacement of the single period 
framework by a multi-period setting would imply that the individual loss from inaction 
may no longer be of second order (ie we need something more than the menu cost to 
explain the inaction of the producer).
The first limitation suggests that an explicit specification of both the cost of changing price 
and the nature of the trade off between action (changing the price) and inaction (not 
changing the price) are necessary. The model in this Chapter was built with this need in 
mind, and it demonstrates that the representative producer does not usually have the starting 
price at the optimal level. With regard to the second limitation, we emphasize the role of a 
significant reputation cost, which will be supported by the empirical work discussed in 
Chapter 4, in balancing off a possibly first order loss of inaction.Thus, although the menu 
cost hypothesis may create the interesting possibility that a small menu cost may cause a 
significant degree of price stickiness, we believe that the reputation cost is a more important 
source of price stickiness.
The model also helps to highlight a few limitations in the B-M-R models. For 
example, it suggests that (i) the overemphasis of a quadratic cost of changing price in 
Rotemberg (1982a,b) has led to an unrealistic solution of pricing response to a demand 
shock such as that shown in diagram (1.6) of Chapter 1; (ii) the solution in Mussa (1981) is 
not suitable for any once-and-for-all permanent demand shock; and (iii) the two bins policy 
in Barro (1972) may fail to be an optimal policy whenever sales are affected by both the 
permanent and transitory demand shocks. However, the most innovative contribution of
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our model over the B-M-R models is its capacity in dealing with the signal extraction 
problem. As highlighted in section 2.2, the signal extraction problem not only causes a 
certain degree of price sluggishness with respect to a permanent demand shock by itself [eg 
the gap between CD and Pi* in diagram 2.5(b)], but also allows the fixed reputation cost of 
changing price to cause a further degree of price stickiness (eg the gap between AB and CD 
of the same diagram). Without the signal extraction problem, the fixed reputation cost of 
changing price will not be able to explain any price stickiness to a large enough permanent 
demand shock. Thus, our emphasis of a significant reputation cost of changing price, the 
signal extraction problems and their interactions have greatly extended the degree of price 
stickiness (with respect to demand shocks) that could be explained by existing models.
With regard to the second hypothesis, it was found that the three sources of price 
stickiness/sluggishness will be much weaker in the case of cost shocks:
Unlike demand shocks, there is less uncertainty about the generality and 
persistence of cost shocks. Besides, the rise in expected competitive price 
associated with the generality of cost shocks; and the wide acceptance of 
cost-oriented pricing imply the cost of raising price with respect to cost 
shocks will be much lower than that with respect to demand shocks.
In section 2.5.1, the above argument were put in mathematical terms and it was shown that 
the size of cost shocks required to induce a rise of price would be, ceteris paribus, much 
smaller than that of demand shocks 27. Thus the hypothesis that prices will be more 
responsive to cost shocks is justified.
The work in this Chapter also provides some hints on the evolution process of the 
"so called" cost-oriented pricing. Unlike Okun (1981) who attempts to use the concept of
27"Same size" here refers to sizes of various shocks that will give the same %  change in 
the desired level of P*.
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"fairness" to explain why price will be raised with respect to a cost shock but not a demand 
shock, we argue that this is unlikely to be the original reason for the evolution of cost- 
oriented pricing instead of a demand-oriented pricing [ie if demand-oriented pricing were 
ever evolved and widely accepted as a practice of the economy, consumers will find it 
"normal", if not "fair", even when prices are raised with demand]. Instead, we emphasize 
the persistence, the generality and the associated rise of expected competitor price with cost 
shocks as the major reasons for the evolution of cost-oriented pricing. We then proceed to 
integrate Okun's argument into our model by suggesting that once the practice of cost- 
oriented pricing instead of demand-oriented pricing is evolved, the argument of "fairness" 
will imply Ac is much smaller than A so that it is more likely for price to respond to cost
shocks than demand shocks.
It must however be noted that the reasons we list here are only part of the story. For 
example, if we replace the assumption of profit maximization by some kind of satisficing/ 
inertial behaviour, inflation can be another reason for the evolution of cost-oriented (instead 
of demand-oriented) pricing [ie producers have to raise price (sooner or later) with the ever 
rising costs; but there is no corresponding force to push the producers to raise price with 
demand shocks]. While developing such an argument is beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
is certainly an interesting area of further research.
While it is true that the pricing response with respect to cost shocks would be much 
faster than that with respect to demand shocks, our model also suggests that:
(a) As long as Ac>0, prices will not be adjusted with very small change in cost; and
(b) If price is ever changed, the change will take into account the change in permanent 
demand as well as the change in cost.
These imply that the cost-oriented pricing proposed in the literature may not be a perfect
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description of profit maximizing or even actual pricing behaviour (ie it is at most an 
approximation). However, it appears to the writer that the approximation may still be a 
good one as long as there is a moderate inflation. This is because:
(i) with a moderate inflation rate, the small change in cost [mentioned in (a)] will be 
accumulated until there is a rise in price. Once the price is raised, the effect of the small 
changes in cost will be reflected in the change in price; and
(ii) with a moderate inflation rate, the effect of cost change on price will dominate that of 
demand shocks so that the problem mentioned in (b) is significantly weakened.
However, a formal proof of this cannot be done until a mathematical solution for the case 
with inflation is available (c.f.. section 2 .6).
In section 2.5.2, we also checked the third hypothesis by assuming that prices do 
respond fairly quickly to moderate cost shocks. It was found that the unit elasticity of AC in 
P=(l+m)AC will be a bad approximation in the case where specific cost shocks turned out 
to be dominating. Nevertheless, once again, the inclusion of a moderate inflation rate will 
tend to make general cost shocks dominating and hence help to justify the use of mark-up 
pricing as a good approximation in macroeconomic analysis.
The checking of the three hypothesis here further support the notions that average 
cost pricing can (i) originate in profit maximizing behaviour, and (ii) be superior than short 
run Neoclassical marginal pricing. From the above discussions, we also believe that the 
existence of a moderate inflation will ensure mark-up pricing as a good approximation to 
actual/profit maximizing pricing behaviour in the customer market. However, a formal 
proof of this has yet to be developed.
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2.7.2 An Overview of Pricing Behaviour in Various Types of 
Markets
With the help of our model, let us make a general overview on the behaviour of 
price in various types of markets. First consider the case of customer markets where there 
is significant cost of changing price. As expected, we often find that prices of televisions, 
hair cuts, cinema tickets and etc are usually fixed for about half to one year period. Once 
the prices are raised, they are usually in the range of five to twenty percent. Indeed, our 
theory does predict that once the producer decides to change the price, the percentage 
change will be at least greater than some minimum size which is in turn a function of the 
elasticity of demand and the cost of changing price of the particular firm 28. it is however 
possible to have the percentage price change anywhere 29 above the minimum size. For 
example, if the shock at that period is particularly large, such as that in the oil crisis, the 
percentage price change will be high. Besides, the price changes will be more dispersed if 
the cost of changing price do vary at
(a) different months simply because the producer has in the past developed a practice of 
changing price at some particular months; or
(b) different prices because of non-proportionate psychological feelings about numbers (eg. 
cost of changing price at £99 might be higher than that at £89 or £90).
Next consider the market of financial assets (such as shares, bonds, foreign exchanges and 
etc) where there is almost no cost of changing price. As predicted by our theory, price 
changes are frequent and it does not seem to be of any minimum size of price change except 
for the reason of visibility. The case of interest rates decision in Hong Kong is somewhere 
between the above two cases. As there is a cost for representatives to attend the meetings,
28lf, for some particular period, the producer gets a very good reason to raise price 
(such as oil or material surcharge in cases of temporary rise in material and fuel cost), the 
percentage change of price might be lower than the minimum size because the cost of 
changing price at this period is particularly low.
29The upper limit will depend on the cumulated change of demand and cost between the 
present and previous price changes.
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interest rates are usually30 reviewed fortnightly (instead of hourly or daily). Before the 
next revision, quantity (amount of deposit or loan) will be the variable of adjustment. 
However, as there is no reputation cost and menu cost of changing interest rate, there is 
almost no minimum size of change in interest rate.
2.7.3 Extensions to other types of Decisions
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our model can be modified to analyze 
many decisions other than price and output. For example: a fixed component of changing 
capacity can be used to explain why changes in capacity are discrete; a relatively high cost 
of unsatisfied demand (compared with the cost of having inventory or excess capacity) can 
explain why producers will try their best to avoid unsatisfied demand; a fixed component in 
the cost of layoff explains why producers hesitate to retrench workers in the case of 
moderate reduction in demand. Also, a fixed component of the reputation cost of changing 
quality can be used to explain the stickiness of quality for most manufactured products3*. 
For some special cases such as restaurant services or newspapers where the additional cost 
of changing quality 32 (such as giving more food for each portion; having better quality of 
papers) is negligible, we might find that qualities are raised at the beginning of every rise in 
price so that the effect of price change on demand is smoothened. In the subsequent 
Chapter, we will go into the details of the employment decision.
30Except for the emergency case where the cost of not adjusting interest rates is higher 
than the cost of holding an emergency meeting.
31 When there is a significant technological innovation where the gain from improving 
the quality is enormous, the quality improvement will be carried out. Again, the jump in 
quality will be discrete.
32Note that according to our definition, there is a cost of having higher quality, but there 
is no additional cost of changing the quality in these industries.
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M athem atical A ppendix (D: Solution  o f equation  (2,7)
In this appendix, we come to the solution of the basic model (equation (2.7)) whose 
properties are outlined in section 2.1.3. Repeating equation (2.7) here:
Sup Q (P + AP, d )  - L(AP) + y f (P + AP, c£)
  f  A P #0
f (P.ct) = max (  Q (p iCE)+Yf(p id )  (Al)
where Q(P, a )  = (P-b) ( a  - pP) - a V P ;  and 
L(AP) = A+ % (AP)
W e note that Q(P, cx) is a quadratic function in P, with the coefficient of P2 being -p, a
negative number. Hence Q(P,cx) is a function, concave downward, with a unique 
maximum occurring at some Pq:
P
diagram (Al)
Since the producer's pricing decision involves the possibility of switching from the regime 
of maintaining price to that of changing price, or vice versa, f(P, d) may sometimes take 
the value of the first expression and sometimes the second expression in (Al). Moreover,
both expressions are in turn a function of f( P, cx) or f( P+AP, a). These make the inter­
relationship between f(P, a) and the two expressions extremely complicated. Our solution
procedure will involve the following two steps:
(1) We first prove that (Al) can be rewritten as:
Sup Q (P + AP, tic) - L(AP) + y G (P + AP, ri)
{ A P #0
Q (P, a )  + y G (P, cx) (A2)
where G(P, tic) = Q(P, a)/(l-y)
[Note that (A2) is much simpler than (Al) in the sense that there is no more 
recursive relation between f  (P, tic) and the two expressions in (A2).]
(2) We then solve (A2) in step (II).
In (A2), the complications remaining are:
(i) the possibility of regime switching between the two expressions; and
(ii) the need to find the optimal AP for the first expression, before the comparison of
the two expressions (or regimes).
Although the problem is still somewhat complicated, step (II) of this appendix shows 
that they can be solved.
Step ffl: Equivalence of (A l) and fA2)
To prove this, we need to consider the following two cases:
Case (1): Q (P,tic) + y f  (P, tic) £  Sup Q (P + AP, tic) - L(AP) + y f  (P + AP, tic)
________________________________ AIUH_________________________________________
If this happens, f  (P, tic) will take the value of Q (P, c£) + y f  (P, tic)
= >f (P,tic)= Q(P,tic) + y f(P ,(2 )
=> f  (P , cx) = Q (P , cx)/(l-y) = G (P , tic)
Thus, f(P, tic) in the second expression of (Al) can be rewritten as G(P, tic).
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Case (2): Q (P , tit) + y f  (P, tit) < Sup Q (P + AP, tit) - L(AP) + y f  (P + AP, tic) 
 &£&  ______________
Before starting the proof, we note that:
(i) For any fixed P i, there exist APi such that
Q(Pi + APi, tic) - L(APi) + y f(Pi + APi, tic)
= Q(Pi + AP, tic) - L(AP) + y f(P! + AP, tic)
[We can justify this fact when the solution has been obtained.]
(ii) For the APi satisfying (i) above, we have
Q (P i+ A P i,tit)+ y f(P i+ A P 1,ti£)
> Q(Pi+APi+AP2, d )  - L(AP2) + y f(Pi+APi+AP2, tic) V AP2
[ie if we start with Pi + APi and tit, which means the price is at its optimal level, the 
best policy is to keep the price unchanged.]
P roof:
If not, then there exists AP2 such that
Q(Pi +APi+AP2, tit) - L(AP2) + y  f(Pi+APi+AP2, tit)
> Q(Pi+APi, tit)+ y f(Pi+APi, tit)
Thus, Q(Pi+APi, tit) - L(APi) + y f(Pi+APi, tic)
< Q(Pi +APi+AP2, tit) - L(APi) - L(AP2) + y f(Pj+APi+AP2, tit) 
£ Q(Pi +APi+AP2, tic) - L(APi+AP2) + y f(Pi+APi+AP2, tit) 
[since L(APX+AP2) < L(APi) + L(AP2)]
This contradicts the fact that
Q(Pi + APi, tit) - L(APi) + y f(Pi + A Pi, tit)
= §jjp Q(Pi + AP, d ) - L(AP) + y  f(Pj + AP, d )
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With (i) and (ii) in mind, we now proceed to show that f  (P + AP, &), the last term of the 
first expression of (Al), can be rewritten as G (P + AP, d):
Applying (Al) for f(Pi + APi, d),we know that it satisfies the following relationship:
Sup Q(Pi+APi+AP2, tf)-L(AP2)+7f(Pi+APi+AP2, tit)
{AP2*Q(Pi + APi, d )  + y  f(Pi + APi, a )  (A3)
From (ii) above, we note that the value of the second expression of (A3) is greater than or 
equal to that of the first expression. Therefore, f(Pi+APi, d) will take the value of the 
second expression:
=> f(Pi+APi, tit) = Q(Pi + APi, tit) + yf(Pi + APi, tit)
=> f (P i+ A P i,  tit) = Q (P i + A P i ,  d ) / ( l - y )  b  G (P i+ A P i ,  cx)
Combining cases (1) and (2), it becomes obvious that (Al) can be rewritten as:
Sup Q (P + AP, tit) - L(AP) + y G (P + AP, d)
Y G (P, d) 
where G(P, d) = Q(P, d)/(l-Y)
Substituting the value of G(P, d) in, equation (A2) can be rewritten as
Sup Q (P + AP- <*) _ [A + ^ (Ap)]
APkO 1 -  Y
f (P, tit) = max 1 _
Q(P> rt)
1-Y
which is equation (2.8) of the main text
Q(P,CE) +*, r ! ( A 2 )
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Step (II); Solution of (A2)
Having proven the equivalence of (Al) and (A2), we now come to the solution of 
(A2). As the relationship in (A2) is less complicated (ie no recursive relationship between 
f(P, &) and the two expressions), the two expressions can be analyzed separately. We start
with graphical analysis of the two expressions:
(1) Graphical shape of the first expression
Lemma: gyp Q (P + AP, cx) - L(AP) + y G (P + AP, cx) 
can be represented by a straight line SS shown in diagram (A2)
P
diagram (A2)
Hence, §jjp Q (P + AP, d) - L(AP) + y G (P + AP, d) 
can be easily found out with the following steps:
(i) Plot Q(P, d)/( 1-y) against P,
(ii) Find a point on Q(P, cic)/( 1 -y) so the slope of its tangent (TT) is
(iii) Draw a line SS which is vertically below TT by a distance A.
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Proof:
(a) We note that
Q (P  + AP, d) - L(AP) + yG  (P + AP, d)
= Q (P + AP, d) - L(AP) + Q (P + APLd)/(l-Y)
[since G (P+AP, d) = Q(P+AP, d)/(l-y) ]
= Q (P + AP, d)/(l-y) - L(AP)
= Q (P + AP, d)/(l-y) - A - ^ (AP)
= Q(P,d)/(l-y) - A - £ (P - P) where P =  P + AP
(b) To find the value of §jjp Q (P + AP, d) - L(AP) + y G (P + AP, d ) ,
we differentiate the above expression with respect to P, noting that P is the 
starting value which can be considered as fixed during the differentiation. 
Setting the derivative to zero, we find that Q( P+AP, d) - L(AP) + yG(P+AP, d) 
has a maximum value at point P
where W ) M |  (A4)
3 P  Ip =p*
(c) Substituting the expression of Q(P, d) into (A4), we have:
( d - p P ) ( P * - b ) ( - p )
1 - y = %
d  + bB - £(l-y)=> P* = ----------  which is equation (2.5) in the main text.
Note that P  is independent of the starting value P.
(d) We now proceed to our diagrammatic discussion by plotting Q(P, d)/(l-y) 
against P and assuming Pi as the starting value:
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Q(.)
^>.Q (-P .S1
AP:
P
From (b), we note that Q ( P + AP, d) - L(AP) + y G ( P + AP, a ) has a 
maximum value at P* at which the slope of Q(P , d)/(l-y) is That is, for any 
starting value Pi, the optimal change of price is APi *. After the change in price, 
Q(P*, a) is represented by the height of point D. With the deduction of the two 
costs of price changes from Q(P*, d), Q(P*, d) - A - £ (APi *) or 
§14P Q (Pi + AP, c2) - L(AP) + Y G (Pi + AP, d) is now represented by the
height of point E.
For illustrative purpose, we also consider the case when the price is
raised from Pi to P#. The value of Q(P#, d)/(l-y) - A - ^(P# - Pi) is represented
by the height of point F which is smaller than that of point E. Comparing with
all other points, we can see the value of Q ( Pi + AP, d) - L(AP) + y G (Pi +
AP, d) takes a maximum when price is raised to P* (not P# or other points).
Now, for any other starting value P2 ,
%>,p Q (P2 + AP, a) - L(AP) + y G (P2 + AP, d) is represented by the height of
point B. Hence, Q (P+AP, a )  - L(AP) + y G  (P+AP, a )  V P is
represented by the straight line passing through the points B and E (ie a straight 
line parallel to TT by a vertical distance of A).
(2) Graphical shape of the second expression
As Q (P, (£) + y G (P, d)
= Q (P, ct) + y [Q (P, c£)/Cl-y)]
= Q(P,d)/(l-Y) ‘ ,
the graphical shape of the second expression is parabolic:
P
diagram (A4)
(3) Graphical shape of f  ( P. d )
We now put the graphs of the two expressions into the same diagrams. As shown in 
the two subsections above, the first expression is represented by the straight line SS
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and the second expression represented by the curve Q (P, <3t)/(l-y). From (A2), we
know that f (P, d)  will take the maximum of the two. Hence, f  (P, (2) will be 
represented by the thick dotted line curve in diagram (A5):
P, P
diagram (A5)
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Mathematical Appendix (II): Solution of for Pl .Ph  and P*
We now come to solve for the value of Pl,Ph and P* in diagram (2.1):
(i) Solution for P*
As we have show in step (H)(1)(c) of Mathematical Appendix (I),
r ,  rf + bp - S(l-V) 
2p
(A5)
Hence, the "optimal" change in price between any two periods of different fit is
where Q (P, a )  = (P-b) [ a  - p P] - a 
Differentiating the first expression on the right hand side of the above equation with 
respect to AP and setting the derivative to zero, we know that the optimal AP* satisfy
(P + A P » -b )(-p ) + [ r t -  ft (P + AP*)] _ ^ = 0 (A6)
To solve for Pl and Ph (intersections of the curvature section and the straight line 
section SS in diagram (2.1)) is to look for the P at which the first and second
(ii) Solution for PL and P^
From equation (2.8), we have
f (P, a ) = max
AP*0
-  [A + \  (AP)]
1-Y
1 0 9
expressions on the right hand side of (2.3) are equal to each other. Thus,
(P+AP*-b) [d-p(P+AP*)] - a + = ( P - b ) [ d - p P ] - a
1 - Y 1 - Y
(P + AP* - b) (- B AP*) + AP* [ a  - B (P + AP*)1 
=> - ------------- ^— - — 1 ----------—— [A + 5 (AP*)] = 0 (A7)
Substituting (A6) into (A7) and rearranging, we have
AP* = ±  V[A(l-y)/2p] 
which implies
PL = P* - V[A(1-y)/2P] ; and
P h = P * +  V[A(l-y)/2P]
Thus the gap between Pl and Ph is 2\'[A(l-Y)/2p].
1 1 0
Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, we will try to build a model on the employment decision of firms 
with respect to demand shocks. Before presenting the model, we will first discuss the 
idea of insured employment suggested by Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980). The idea was 
originated in the literature on implicit contracts and real wage rigidity which suggest that 
it pays both parties if the less risk averse employers "insure" their risk averse employees 
with small variations in wage rate over the various possible states of nature, and in return 
the employers are compensated by risk premia in the form of lower average wages which 
workers are implicitly willing to pay for such wage insurance. Akerlof and Miyazaki 
suggest that the difference in risk aversion will also imply implicit insurance of 
employment provided by employers:
Outline of their argument
By assuming that the worker's utility function (U[.]) is strictly concave 
with respect to wage, the paper argues that workers will prefer a lower expected 
wage with a guarantee of employment. That is,
U[wj(s)nj(s)Aj] > U[wj'(s)] > {nj(s)Aj} U[wj(s)] 
where (a) U[wj(s)nj(s)A,j] is the worker's utility due to a guarantee of employ­
ment with wage wj(s) {nj(s)Aj);
(b) U[wj'(s)] is the worker's utility due to a guarantee of employment 
with wage wj'(s), where wj'(s) < Wj(s){nj(s)Aj); and
(c) {nj(s)Aj)U[wj(s)] is the worker's utility due to a non-guaranteed 
employment where there is a probability {nj(s)Aj} that his wage is 
wj(s) and a probability (1 - {nj(s)Aj)) that his wage is zero.
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If the employer is risk neutral, he will be indifferent between scheme (a) and 
scheme (c) because both schemes imply the same expected wage bill nj(s)wj(s). 
Hence, compared with the case of no guarantee of employment in scheme (c), the 
employer can offer a lower wage Wjf(s) with guarantee of employment (i.e. 
scheme (b)) so that expected wage bill is reduced from nj(s)wj(s) to nj(s)wj'(s)
and yet workers are happier.
Once scheme (b) is concluded, there is little incentive for the employer to 
violate the guarantee of employment because this will ruin the reputation of the 
firm's personnel policy which would imply a higher wage to attract (or retain) 
sufficient workers in the future.
The contribution of the above analysis is that it provides a good explanation of the 
wide acceptance of some implicit guarantee of employment in the economy. However, 
there are quite a few difficulties with the above analysis. First, it does not allow for the 
possibility that
(i) employers might find it advantageous to break the promise in case of very adverse 
demand shocks; or indeed
(ii) employers will not, at the very beginning, promise to provide a full (or perfect) 
guarantee of employment covering any size of adverse demand shocks.
That is, for some large and persistent enough reduction of demand, the cost of layoff 
may be lower than the cost of maintaining the excessive wage bill. What will the 
employment decision be in such case? Will the employment response be different for 
different size of demand shocks? Second, for the case of mild demand shocks, the 
implicit guarantee of employment would imply stickiness of employment with respect to 
the demand shocks. What variable(s) will then be adjusted to ensure that output will be 
produced to satisfy the variations in demand? These are the questions that will be dealt 
with in this Chapter.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Assumptions
(A) In a fully set up model, one should have the producer -  based on the present
expectation -  facing the simultaneous decisions on capacity, price, output, 
employment, wage, inventory and etc. In particular, because of the fixed cost per 
change in some of these decisions, a producer who experiences a demand shock will 
have to simultaneously consider among the following bang-bang decisions of
(1) changing the capacity or not;
(2) changing price or not;
(3) changing the employment or not;
(4) changing the wage promise or not;
(5) having unsatisfied demand or not
However, this will - according to our usual formulation - imply a huge dimension of 
complexity. For example, even if we consider the simultaneous decisions of (2) and
(3) only, we will have
(a) keeping the price at P and keeping employment at N
(b) changing price to P+AP* and keeping employment at N
(c) keeping the price at P and changing employment to 
N+AN*
(d) changing price to P+AP** and changing employment to 
N+AN**
where AP*, AN*, AP** and AN** are respectively the optimal AP and AN with 
respect to their particular solution.
As will be shown later, unlike the case of pricing decision, it is necessary to sub­
divide the expression of changing employment into that of raising employment 
(hiring) and that of reducing employment (layoff) so that there are indeed six
expressions in the above formulation. Moreover, the graph of f (P ,N, a ) will also be 
three dimensional.
Max of 
f(P,N,a)=expected ' 
profit by
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For the sake of tractability, we will try to make a few assumptions so that 
a simplified model can be formulated to highlight the response of producer's 
employment decision to demand shocks. We do so by assuming 1:
(i) the planned excess capacity is sufficiently large so that the demand shocks we 
consider are well within this planned excess capacity;
(ii) there is no inventory;
(iii)the cost of having unsatisfied demand is relatively high when compared with the 
cost of raising production within the planned excess capacity so that the producer 
will choose not to have any unsatisfied demand; and
(iv)the nominal wage is bargained and revised every year, and the cost of paying 
below the agreed nominal wage is high enough to stop the producer from cutting 
wages in the face of a reduction in demand. We also assume the producer -  in the 
case of positive demand shock -  will choose to promise a higher bonus at the end 
of the year rather than raising the wage rate immediately.
With assumptions (i) and (iv), now we can consider the capacity and nominal wage at 
the beginning of most periods as predetermined for the employment decision. 
Assumptions (ii) and (iii) on the other hand will avoid the complexity arising from 
further choices on the levels of inventory and unsatisfied demand. The two 
assumptions also imply that the output decision is determined once the price decision 
is made. Thus, the only inter-dependent decisions left will be those on price and 
employment. Yet, as explained above, the problem will still be highly complicated. 
To avoid the complexity, we make the following assumptions so that price will also 
be predetermined for the employment decision :
(a) The case of a negative demand shock
Following the argument in Okun(1981), we assume the demand curve 
will have a kink at the present price Po and the price elasticity of demand at any price
1 The results we derive in the subsequent sections may still hold even with the 
relaxation of some of these assumptions. A proper formulation of these will however 
be highly complicated.
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below Po will be far smaller than unity. Such a demand curve is drawn as Da or Da' 
in diagram (3.1). The rationale for this assumption is as follows :
price
quantity
Because of the cost of shopping, most of the customers of the firm 
who are satisfied with the previous purchase will come back to shop. If they 
find the price unchanged, they will become the buyers. If they find the price 
is raised, they may or may not decide to shop further. Thus, the demand 
from the "usual customers" will have a kink at Po. Below Po, the price 
elasticity will be low because presumably the repeat callers were ready to buy 
for the same price that they paid the last time. But the elasticity may be 
substantial at price above Po because the repeaters are responsive to price 
levels that exceed what they experienced previously. Such demand from the 
"usual customers" is drawn as Du in diagram (3.1) in which the part of 
demand below Po is assumed to be highly inelastic 2. In addition to the usual
2ln the extreme case that the repeat customers only demand fixed amount of 
quantity (eg. a room in the hotel, a ticket for the film etc), the lower part of Du will be 
vertical.
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customers, we can also allow for some percentage of random shoppers who 
are new to the firm. As a group, the demand from the ’’random shoppers’’ is 
likely to be elastic and continuous. We draw this as D r  in diagram (3.1). 
Finally, the overall demand curve Da can be obtained by the horizontal 
summation of D u  and D r . Thus, we can assume the elasticity of demand 
from random shoppers is not too high and the percentage of random shoppers 
in the total demand is small enough so that the elasticity of overall demand at 
any price below Po is far smaller than unity.
As is well known in the standard theory of firm, the short run profit maximization 
point will never lie on the region of demand where elasticity is less than unity. Thus, 
if the producer were to start with demand Da and price Po* a negative demand shock 
shifting the demand to D a' will imply the best short run price for the producer is still 
Po*
However, the above reasoning -  as noted by Okun(1981) -  takes a 
myopic view of firms’s profit maximization. It neglects the interdependence 
introduced by the customer relation between today's purchase and tomorrow's level 
of demand. That is, the value of obtaining the additional random shoppers as 
customers includes not merely the proceeds from their current purchases but also an 
additional benefit associated with the likelihood that they will return to buy in the 
future. With such potential gain in the long run, the producer might in the short run 
choose to reduce price in face of a reduction in demand. To avoid the complexity 
arise from such a possibility, we will -  based on the explanations above -  assume the 
elasticities of the overall demands (Da and Da') below Po are far smaller than unity so 
that the expected gain of the repeated purchase from random shoppers in the future is 
negligible when compared with the cost of charging a lower price at a very inelastic 
region. Such assumption guarantees that the producer will not reduce the price below
Po in face of a negative demand shock.
(b) The case of positive dem and shock
We will assume the cost of hiring (such as advertisement and training 
cost) will be relatively small when compared with the cost of raising price 3-4. This is 
not an unrealistic assumption because the absence of any reputation cost in hiring 
implies that the cost of hiring is at most related to the number of new employees, 
while most of the cost of raising price lies on the reputation loss to all customers. 
Thus, for those positive demand shocks that are not sufficient to cause a rise in price, 
we can assume price is predetermined for the employment decision 5.
We think that the above discussion is a more reasonable justification for 
assuming that price is predetermined for the employment decision. For example, if 
we drop the assumption in case (a), we might have to rely on the less realistic 
assumption of a lower cost of layoff than that of reducing price.
With this set of slightly restrictive assumptions, we can then rigorously 
develop the subsequent model and highlight the response of the employment decision 
to the range of demand shocks we have restricted to. It should however be 
emphasized that the response may be qualitatively the same for a larger demand shock
3 Unlike the case of layoff, there is no reputation loss in hiring. Indeed, this is 
why we assume the cost of layoff is higher than the cost of reducing price on one 
hand, and assume the cost of hiring is lower than the cost of raising price on the 
other.
4The result may still be the same even if the cost of hiring turns out to be higher 
than the cost of raising price so that price is raised (instead of predetermined) for 
some large enough demand shock. In such case, the employment and price decision 
will be interdependent so that they have to be solved simultaneously.
5 We also assume that the starting price is not too close to the margin of raising 
price. If this is not the case or the demand shock is too large, price will be raised and 
there will be interdependence between the price and employment decisions. We will 
return to the discussion of such possibility in section 3.5.
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along which there might also be a rise in price as well 6. We prefer the slightly 
restrictive assumptions only because we want to have a rigorous and simple model on 
employment decision.
(B) We assume that the cost of layoff, which include
(a) the actual payment to the worker being laid off; and
(b) the reputation cost (which imply a higher potential quit of existing workers and 
less willing applicant in the future 7) due to the act of layoff,
can be approximated by [B - 0(AN)]8, where AN<0 is the amount of workers being 
laid off.
Similarly, the cost of hiring, which include
(a) the advertisement and interview cost;
(b) the training cost; and
(c) the production loss due to the distortion arising from on-the-job-training,
can be approximated by [C + y(AN)], where AN>0 is the amount of new 
recruitment.
(C) As with efficiency wage models, we assume that output (Q) is a function of the 
efficiency unit of labour hours. That is, Q=k(ehN), where (i) e is the effort; (ii) h is 
the working hours; and (iii) N is the amount of workers in the firm. For simplicity,
we also assume that k’(.)>0; k"(.)<0; k(0)=0; and k(ehN)— as ehN—»«>.
6In such case, the employer may have to raise the wage to reduce the potential 
quits and attract more willing applicants when the economy recovers. Since there 
exists some high enough wage that can stop the potential quits and attract sufficient 
new applicants, the reputation cost would be finite.
7For the case of restaurants and hair salons, unsatisfied demand can be a 
possibility, we will assume that this is not very significant for the whole economy.
8 The result will only be slightly more complicated in case the cost of layoff (and 
hiring) is quadratic rather than linear.
1 1 8
Q
ehN
diagram^y^
For most jobs in the economy (which include those office/shop-keeping jobs in the 
banks, government offices, departmental stores, restaurants, hair salon, wholesaling 
offices, retail shops and etc), the number of working hours is fixed by usual practice. 
If the number of workers N is fixed as well, production effort will be the only 
variable of adjustment (i.e. if customers come in, the staff will serve them; if no 
customer comes in, the staff will just sit there)9. For the case of accounting, 
executive and administrative staffs, they might work overtime or bring work home 
during the high season. Nevertheless, as official hours are fixed and they only 
receive additional payment through the bonus at the end of year, we can still include 
this type of overtime or bring home work as effectively higher production effort 
instead of longer working hours h. However, for the others such as those in the 
manufacturing industry, the employers will ask their workers to increase production 
effort and possibly work overtime. In such case, both e and h will be raised. For
simplicity, we will mainly present the case where h is institutionally fixed at h.
Nevertheless, the results we derive in the later sections will be basically the same as 
long as e is also raised with the rise of demand.
9 In the case of hair salons where there is a temporary rise in demand, production 
effort is raised (or quality reduced) in the sense that the hair-dresser will speed up the 
hair cuts.
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(D) W e also assume, within a certain range of output-labour hour ratio (Q/hN), e can be 
adjusted up or down (without any additional cost o f changing e) so that the required
output can always be produced even if employment is fixed at N. There is however a
cost for higher effort per worker and the cost, g(e), takes the follow ing shape 
(monotonically increasing and convex around a reasonable range o f normal effort):
ee, e
diagram (3.3)
Thus, we can conceptually distinguish two types of cost per worker :
(a) the normal wage wh; and
(b) the additional cost g(e) such as higher bonus at the end o f year; the greater 
consumption of materials in case o f  tighter production schedule; or higher 
administrative cost in keeping labour at a higher level o f production effort.
(E) Unlike the case o f layoff or hiring, there is no additional (reputation or administrative') 
cost in changing effort from one level to another.
(F) For simplicity, we assume that the total cost other than whN (the wage bill) and
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g(e)hN to be a+b § , where 0  is the expected output at price P  (eg. ^  = a  - (3 P). 
Thus, by assumption (A), §  is also predetermined for the employment decision. 
Moreover, the revenue minus such kind of cost will be (P-b)Q - a.
3.2.2 Form ulation
(A) Similar to the case of pricing decision, the employer's problem -  given £  andO -  is 
to choose the optimal level of e and N to achieve the maximum expected profit 
f (N, Q) where
Sup (P-b)0-a-wh(N+AN)-g(e)h(N+AN)-[C+\j/(AN)]+7f(N+AN, §)
f  (N, Q)=max
AN>0
(f*~b) §-a-whN-g(e)hN+yf (N, §) (3.1)
k Sup (P-b)(^a-wh(N+AN)-g(e)h(N+AN)-[B-0(AN)]+yf (N+AN, §)
AN<0
where N is the initial employment at the beginning of that period.
Unlike the case of price decision, layoff (AN<0) is now associated with a linear 
reputation cost instead of gain. Hence, it is necessary to separate the cases of AN>0 
and AN<0 as shown above.
(B) Given that (i) there is no extra cost in changing e from one level to the other, (ii) g(e) 
is convex; and (iii) labour is homogeneous, it is always the best to share the output 
evenly among workers and keep the average e -  given the level of output O.
employment N and working hours h -  to the minimum. From the production
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function Q=k(e hN), this implies e = k-1 (<$) /  (hN)
Substituting this into equation (3.1), the employer’s problem becomes choosing the 
level of N to achieve the maximum expected profit f (N ,§ ) :
f Sup H (N+AN, §)-[C+Y(AN)]+7f(N+AN, 0)
f  (N, Q)=max <
AN>0
H(N,0)+Yf(N,0)
where
Sup H (N+AN, 0)-[B-6(AN)]+7f (N+AN, 0 )
v AN<0
H [N ,0] = (P -b )0 -a -  w hN - g[k~ ^  ]hN
nN
(3.2)
(3.3)
3.3 Outline of the Solution
(1) Similar to the case of pricing decision, solution of (3.2) and (3.3) can be shown to be 
equivalent to that of
f(N, Q) = max
r Sup h (n +a n ,Q)
a n >* 1-y
H(N,Q)
1-y
Sup H (N+AN, Q)
-[C +v(A N )]
(3.4)
AN<0 1-y -  [B+0(AN)]
(2) Our next step is to find the shape of HfN.fo. Given the shape of g(e) in diagram 
(3.2), it can be easily shown that the shape of g[k-i(Q)/(hN)] and g[k-i(Q)/(hN)]hN
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will be as follows :
£
h N
N
diagram (3,4)
With a rise in ($. g[k-i (<$)/(hN)] and g[k-i(§)/(hN)]hN will shift to the dotted line. 
Hence, whN + g[k-i(($)/(hN)]hN and H[N,<5] can be drawn as follows :
£
CMhN
hN J 
^  vhN
N
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With a reduction of <5> (P-b) Q-a will shift downward and whN + g[k-i(§)/(hN )]hN  
to the south east direction (not shown) so that H[N,Q] will shift to H[N,Q"], where
Q"<&
(3) After finding the shape o f H(N,<$), the value o f f(N ,Q ) in equation (3.4) can be 
found as follows:
£
slope = y
v  slope = 8
N
(a) Knowing that the linear cost o f hiring and layoff are y (A N ) and 0(AN)
respectively, we locate S" and T" on H[N, § ] /[ l-y ]  so that the first and third 
expressions o f equation (3.4) are respectively shown by the straight lines SS'X 
and YT'T. Hence, f (N ,Q )  will take the shape of SS’S" and t 'T T  when the
initial N is below No or above Ni (c.f. the mathematical appendix about the 
pricing decision).
(b) The remaining part of the analysis is for the case in which N lies between No and 
N i. Consider any point D on the curved section S"T". If the employer keeps the
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employment at N, his expected profit will be shown by the height of point D. On
the other hand, if he reduces (raises) the employment to No (Ni), his expected 
profit will only reach the height of point F(E). Clearly, the optimal policy for 
Ni>N>No is to keep the employment unchanged.
Hence. ffN.O^ will be represented bv the solid curve SS'Sf,D T T T  which will shift 
to the south west (north east) with a reduction (rise) of <$.
If (i) the initial N is below that of S', the employer should raise employment to No;
(ii) the initial N is between that of S' and T', the employer should keep the 
employment unchanged and only adjust the effort with respect to changes in (J
(iii)the initial N is above that of T', the employer should reduce employment to N \ .
It is interesting to note that, even if the fixed costs per action of hiring and layoff (B 
and C) are zero, there is still a range of N in which the employer would prefer to keep 
the employment unchanged. This is so because, unlike the linear cost of changing 
price, the "linear cost" of changing employment is indeed non-linear in the sense that
there is a kink at AN=0. In other words, a change in N in any direction is costly 
even if B=C=0.
linear cost
0
diagram (3.7)
125
3.4 Em ploym ent Response with respect to a Permanent  
Demand Shock
f(.)
diagram (3.8)
(A) Mild Dem and Shock
Suppose the employer starts with a value of No and f(N,Qo) as shown. If there is
a mild increase in demand shifting f( N,Q) slightly to the north-east of f(N,Qo), the
employer will try to maintain the same employment and request a tighter production (or 
working) schedule [i.e. e is raised 10]. Similarly, if there is a mild reduction of demand,
the employer will keep the employment at N and allow the production effort (e) to fall
automatically (i.e. let the workers sit around in the office). Hence we have shown that:
(a) In the presence of hiring and layoff cost, employment will be invariant to mild 
demand shocks. It should also be noted that such kind of sticky employment still
i°For a larger demand shocks, employers in the manufacturing industry might also 
request overtime.
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holds even if B and C are zero;
(b) Unlike the case of efficiency wage model [see the criticism by Yellen (1984)], 
productivity per head (Q/N> is procyclical as employment is invariant to mild 
demand shocks;
(c) For those jobs whose working hour is officially fixed, productivity per man hour 
will also be procyclical for mild demand shocks. Even in the case where overtime 
is introduced with the rise in demand, productivity per man hour may still be 
procyclical as long as e is raised with the higher demand. Only in the infrequent 
case where e falls with the overtime (eg. due to exhaustion), will productivity per 
man hour be couiuer-cyclical n . Because of these, the discussion behind 
assumption (C) implies that productivity per man hour for the whole economy is 
likely to be procyclical as well.
(d) Unlike the case of Azariadis(1975), even if there is a permanent reduction of 
demand, the employer might still hoard the "excessive*' workers 12 as long as the 
reduction of demand is not too large. This is so because the reputation cost of 
layoff may be even higher than the discounted sum of the cost of holding a small 
amount of excessive workers.
(B) Large Demand Shock
If the change of demand is so large that f(N,Q) shift beyond that enclosed by
f(N,Qn) and f(N,QL), the employer will then lay off (or hire) workers in significant 
amount. [Note, (i) if there is a sluggish revision of expectation about the persistence of
11 Even so, the reduction will be small. Otherwise, the employer will rather not to 
have overtime.
I2lf  there is a certain rate of retirement or quitting (which has not been explicitly 
incorporated in our model), the employer might prefer to wait (or raise wages below the 
trend value to encourage quitting) until the "over employment" falls gradually to zero.
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the shock, the massive layoff will only occur after a w hile13; and (ii) as the fixed cost of 
hiring is relatively small when compared with the reputation cost of layoff, hiring may 
not be as massive as layoffs 14.] In that case, productivity(per head or per man hour)
may rise, remain unchanged or fall -  depending on the relative position of the initial N
and f(N,Qo). For example, if the initial N is close to Ni of diagram (3.8), productivity
will fall with the large demand shock. On the other hand, if initial N is close to N2, 
productivity will rise with the shock. In other words, productivity may not be
procyclical when massive layoff occurs.
Thus, combining the results in the cases of mild and large demand shocks, we 
have shown the following bang-bang employment response to negative demand
shocks^:
(a) within a certain range of reduction in demand, employment will be invariant; and
(b) beyond that range, layoffs will be massive.
With regard to the cyclical movement of productivity, we have shown that it is 
procyclical with respect to mild demand shocks. It is thus not surprising that empirical 
works will find some evidence of procyclical productivity. Nevertheless, as shown in 
case (B), productivity may not be procyclical when the demand shock is large enough to
13If we assume (i) demand will fall further with reduction in employment; and (ii) 
there is a substantial lag in the linkage between demand and employment, the economy 
will only reach the bottom after a substantial lag.
14In case C is zero, hiring will be gradual with gradual rise in expected demand.
15So far, we have only derived our result for the case of a specific and permanent 
demand shock. Nevertheless, the bang-bang result should also hold for the case of 
general demand shock where there is still a reasonably large fixed component of 
reputation cost of layoff. Perhaps the major difference is that, in the case of general 
demand shock, the reputation cost of layoff (in terms of higher quit rate or higher 
recruitment cost in the future) will be lower so that it takes a smaller reduction in demand 
to cause the massive layoff. The result should also hold for the case of temporary 
demand shock. This time, the threshold demand shock for the bang-bang turn will be 
higher than the case of permanent shock. We believe that research in this area will 
provide a better account than the traditional Keynesian models for the sharp rise in 
unemployment rate in recessions such as that in U.K. during 1982-1986.
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induce a discrete change in employment. This also implies that previous empirical 
literature in this area should be refined or reformulated to allow for the possibility of case 
(B).
3.5 Im pl ica t ions for the effectiveness  o f  stabilization  
policies
Having established the bang-bang employment response to negative demand 
shocks, let us
(a) check whether it makes much difference, from the point of view of keeping a lower 
unemployment rate, for the government to stimulate the economy before or after the 
massive layoff; and
(b) see why mild stimulation policies may not help reducing unemployment in the case of 
adverse demand shock 16.
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i6The logic below will help to suggest why, during severe recession (such as those in 
U.K. or Singapore in 1982-1986), many governments had found their stimulation 
policies relatively ineffective in reducing unemployment. [Note, because we have not 
solved for the case of temporary shock, the subsequent discussion is not a formal proof 
because recession refers to temporary instead of permanent demand shock.]
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Consider the hypothetical case in which (i) all producers are expecting the demand to be 
Qo over the future so that their expected discounted profit is shown by f(N,Qo) in
diagram (3.9); and (ii) the starting levels of employment are somehow (eg symmetrically 
or triangularly) distributed between N l and Nh- Suppose there comes a negative demand 
shock so that every producer expects a reduction of demand to Q' and hence a shift of 
f(.) to f(N,Q'). Thus,
(a) those producers whose starting level of employment are between No and Nh will cut 
their employment to Ni-through massive layoff; and
(b) those producers whose starting level of employment are between N l and No will keep 
their employment unchanged.
Suppose the government, after seeing the massive layoff, starts stimulating the economy
and succeed in shifting f(.) to f(N,Qo). In such case, the group of producers who had
cut their employment will now raise their employment to N2. Nevertheless, when 
compared with the initial situation, their employment is still lower. Now, consider an 
alternative scenario in which the government succeeds in stimulating the economy back to
f(N,Qo) before the massive layoff, all producers will then keep their employment
unchanged. In this case, the total level of employment will be higher than the case where 
the stimulation only occurs after the massive layoff. Hence, we propose that it would be 
preferable -  from the point of view of keeping a lower unemployment rate -  to stimulate 
the economy before layoffs occur 17. The result will still hold for large negative demand 
shocks (not shown) as long as the fixed cost of layoff is higher than the fixed cost of 
hiring and the starting levels of employment is symmetrically distributed around the
i^This is so because stimulation before the massive layoff will induce those employers 
with excessive labour hoarding to maintain the hoarding instead of making the massive 
layoff.
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middle of Nl and Nh 18.
Let us now discuss the effectiveness of mild stimulation policies after a massive 
layoff. As illustrated in diagram (3.9), the mild stimulation policy will cause a shift of
f(.) from f( N,Q') to f( N,Q"). However, no producer will raise his employment because
Ni is still above the lower threshold of f(N,Q"). Thus, the unemployment rate is not
reduced by the mild stimulation policy. Again, let us consider a mild stimulation before 
massive layoff. In such case, the recession and the mild stimulation will cause a shift of
f(.) directly from f(N,Qo) to f(N,Q"). Unlike the stimulation after the massive layoff,
only those producers whose starting level of employment is between N3 and Nh will cut 
the level of employment to N4. As a result, there are less producers cutting employment 
and the amount by which they cut are smaller. Thus, it is again better to have the mild 
stimulation -  say, due to government's worry about inflation -  before rather than after 
the massive layoff.
18Indeed, the result will hold as long as the mean of N lies to the right of N2.
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3.6 Sensitivity o f  the result with respect to A ssum ption (A) 
-  interdependence hetween the other decisions and the 
em ploym ent decision
So far, the results in section 3.4 are derived with the simplified assumption that 
the price, wage and capacity decisions are determined before the employment decision. 
Let us now explore the sensitivity of our results to such simplifying assumptions. For 
example, if the pricing decision is simultaneously determined with the employment
decision, the producer's problem is to choose the optimal AP and AN so that the 
maximum expected profit f( P, N, 0 ) =
r H (P,N ,§) + yf(P ,N ,§) (maintain P and N)
Sup H(P+AP,N,§) - [A + % (AP)] + yf(P+AP,N,0)
ap*o (change P and maintain N)
Sup H(P,N+AN,§) - [B-G(AN)] + y f(P,N+AN,§)
a n « o  (reduce N and maintain P)
max'
Sup H(P,N+AN,§) - [C+v(AN)] + y  f(P,N+AN,0)
a n >o  (raise N and maintain P)
Sup Sup H(P+AP,N+AN, 0)-[A+4(AP)]-[B-e(AN)]+yf(P+AP,N+AN, 0) 
a i m ) a n <o  (reduce N and change P)
Sup Sup H(P+AP,N+AN,0)-[A+^(AP)]-[C+v(AN)]+7f(P+AP,N+AN,0)
a i m ) a n >o  (raise N and change P)
where H(P,N,0 )  = (P-b)[a-pP]-a-whN-g[k-i(a-pP)/hN]hN 
(ie the expected profit at period t)
Hence, we can separate demand shocks into three different ranges :
(a) "small" demand shocks
For a reasonably mild demand shock, we expect the producer will choose to keep
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P and N unchanged 19. In such a case, the invariance of employment with respect to a 
mild demand shock holds.
(fr) la rg e” demand shock
In the case of a reasonably large reduction of demand, the producer would find it 
worthwhile to change both P and N. Thus, our "bang-bang" result still holds for the 
case of a very large demand shock.
(c) "medium" demand shocks
In case of a medium-sized reduction of demand, the result will depend on
(i) the relative size of the cost of reducing price and the cost of layoff; and
(ii) the relative contribution between a reduced price and reduced employment to the
expected stream of profit H[P,N,($]/[l-y].
Suppose demand is very elastic (i.e. an optimal reduction of price with respect to the
demand shock will contribute a lot to H[P,N, Q ]/[l-y]) and the cost of layoff is greater
than the cost of reducing price so that the second expression of equation (3.5) always 
dominates the third expression, the decision of reducing price will always precede the 
decision of layoff 20. If price is reduced, output will rise which will in turn make it less 
worthwhile to cut employment (as the problem of redundancy is less urgent). In such a 
case, the possibility of a "bang-bang" decision on price raises the stickiness (or 
invariance) of employment2! towards negative demand shocks 22
!9We assume the starting price and employment ( P,N) are not too close to the trigger 
points.
20This can be consistent with the possibility that the decision of hiring always precede 
the decision of raising price with respect to a favourable demand shock.
21There would also be repercussions from the employment decision to the pricing 
decision.
22Or more correctly, the possibility of a "bang-bang" decision of price raise the critical 
size of adverse demand shock that would cause the "bang-bang" reduction of 
employment.
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As changing the capacity also involves a sunk cost, the joint decision of planned 
capacity and employment will be qualitatively similar to the pricing-employment decision 
mentioned above. Indeed, we suspect that
the need to simultaneously consider the employment decision with the 
others will only change the critical size of demand shock, below which 
employment will be invariant to demand shocks.
Nevertheless, a rigorous proof of such hypothesis is beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.7 Rem arks 23
With the help of the model, let us explore the sources of cyclical unemployment 
and the effect of other policy options on the employment decision. It should be 
emphasized that, because of the complexity of the problem, all the remarks here remain 
tentative.
3.7.1 Source of Cyclical Unemployment
Unlike Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980), we believe cyclical variations in 
unemployment rate can result despite the implicit guarantee of employment by employers.
The reasoning is as follows. First, the difference in risk aversion between 
employers and workers may not be that great for the state of very low demand 2 4 . This
23ln this section, we sometimes refer our discussion to cyclical demand shocks 
instead of just permanent negative demand shocks. It must be emphasized that we have 
not yet solved for the case of temporary (cyclical) demand shocks. Nevertheless, it 
appears to the writer that the solution procedure, though somewhat more tedious, is 
basically similar to that with permanent demand shocks.
24Schultz(1985) suggests that guarantee of employment can only be partial because 
risk aversion may be reversed in case of very adverse cyclical demand shocks. While it 
is not sure whether the risk aversion is reversed when employers are making heavy loss, 
we think that it is not necessary (though sufficient) to rely on the risk reversal to explain 
why guarantee of employment is partial. Indeed, (i) employers' preference on flexibility, 
and (ii) workers distrust on employer's ability and incentive to honour the insured
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makes the potential gain from insured employment against the states of very adverse 
demand shocks rather small. Because of the preference for flexibility, employers may 
not -  at the very beginning -  find the small reduction of wage worthwhile for the promise 
of fully insured employment against the states of very adverse demand shocks. Even if 
they do, they might find it worthwhile to break the promise in case of general adverse 
demand shock because he (rightly) expects many other employers will do the same thing 
as he does. Workers, seeing this as a possibility, will not accept a wage cut even if some 
employers "claim" to provide the insured employment against very adverse demand 
shocks 25. In other words it is not the risk shifting between workers and employers, but 
rather (i) the worker's fear that the employer may not honour the guarantee of 
employment; (ii) the employer's preference for flexibility; and (iii) the small potential gain 
form insured employment against adverse demand shock that make the scheme of insured 
employment only partial instead of full.
Having this in mind, our result in section 3.5 suggests that massive layoff may 
happen in the case of an adverse demand shock. Thus, a large increase of unemployment 
(in the case of adverse demand shock) can occur even though there is apparently an 
implicit guarantee of employment simply because the guarantee we can have in this world 
is usually unenforceable and therefore partial.
The next thing we have to explain is the fact that cyclical variations of 
unemployment also appear to coexist with insured employment even in the case of mild 
variations in demand. This should not be too surprising if one recognizes the fact that the
employment in case of adverse demand shock may be sufficient to make it not 
worthwhile to have a full guarantee of employment.
^Government may be the only exception because civil servants know, explicitly or 
implicitly through their previous observations, that the government have the incentive to 
maintain employment so as to avoid further reduction in aggregate demand. In other 
words, the government is "rational" in the sense that it can achieve its stabilization aim 
and can afford to pay lower wage by providing a full guarantee of employment to the 
civil servants.
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guarantee of employment is provided only to those already employed in the firm but not 
to those outside the firm. Consider an economy in static equilibrium where there are 
some old workers retiring from the labour force and some new workers entering the 
labour force. Suppose there comes a mild negative demand shock. The employer, due 
to the reputation cost of layoffs, will try to honour his promise of insured employment to 
those already in the firm. However there is no need for the employer to provide 
insurance to those outside the firm. Hence there is no reputation cost in delaying (or 
suspending) new recruitment in case of a mild negative demand shock. What the 
employer can do is to let the old workers retire and delay new recruitment. This explains 
why most of the burden of recession will fall on school leavers or new applicants. 
Similarly, if we have a pool of involuntary unemployment 26, the employer can speed up 
his recruitment in the case of mild positive demand shock. These explain why, even if 
the guarantee of employment is perfectly honoured in the case of a mild demand shock, 
we still have cyclical variations in the level of employment or the unemployment rate.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the variations of employment here will be 
limited by the quit rate in the case of a mild reduction of demand. In other words, the 
extent of cyclical variations of the unemployment rate here is far from proportional to that 
in the case of a very adverse demand shock. Indeed, the difference is so great that it is 
preferable to emphasize the difference between mild and adverse demand shocks rather 
than the difference of cyclical or sticky variations of employment in case of mild demand 
shock.
Extending the above analysis to the case where there are some firms near the 
margin of layoff (eg. declining industries) and some firms near the margin of hiring (eg. 
expanding industries), we get another explanation for the coexistence of cyclical
26The traditional efficiency wage, labour turnover and shirking models reviewed in 
chapter 1 can be used to explain the existence of a pool of involuntary unemployment.
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variations in unemployment with the insured employment. The reasoning is as follows. 
With a moderate positive demand shock, those firms near the margin of hiring will be 
induced to hire (or speed up the expansion) while the other firms will keep employment 
unchanged. As a result, the overall unemployment rate will show a small reduction with 
the positive demand shock. Similarly, a moderate negative demand shock will induce 
those firms near the margin of layoff to start the layoff (or speed up the contraction), 
leading to a small rise in the overall unemployment rate.
Finally, cyclical variations of the unemployment rate can also arise from the 
casual labour market where there is little cost of training or layoff. Nevertheless, it must 
be emphasized that, given the size of career market such as that in the world, the cyclical 
variations in the overall unemployment rate with respect to mild demand shocks is far 
from proportional to that with respect to very adverse demand shocks.
3.7.2 Presence of Other Policy Options
So far, the model built in section 3.2 -  3.5 only allows the employer to choose 
between (i) changing the production effort; and (ii) changing the employment level. In 
reality, the employers will have more policy options other than the two mentioned above. 
For example, if we introduce inventories, the producer might -  in the case of a recession 
-  decide (at least at the beginning of the recession) to build up inventories instead of 
making massive layoffs. In such a case, the presence of inventories may increase the 
stickiness/invariance of employment to negative demand shocks 27,28.
27lt would be interesting to show that the possibility of inventory will increase the 
threshold of the bang-bang employment response. Such kind of formulation will 
however be highly complicated and is beyond the scope of this thesis.
28Of course, if the negative demand shock is persistent enough, the cost of holding 
the continuously increasing inventory may be so high that employer will make the layoff 
eventually.
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In addition to the building up of inventories, the producer also has the choice of 
asking his workers to do some maintenance work (such as cleaning, repairing and 
painting). The presence of such options is again likely to increase the stickiness of 
employment to negative demand shocks.
In setting up equation (3.1), we have assumed tha t:
(i) there is no retirement and quitting of workers; and
(ii) workers are homogeneous.
Suppose we relax assumption (i) by assuming a fixed amount of retirement (and quits) 
Rn every period, we will then have to replace all the N on the right hand side of equation
(3.4) by (N - Rn). Thus, when the demand is at the normal level, the producer will
regularly replenish his pool of workers by a discrete amount that depends on the fixed 
cost of hiring. In case of negative demand shock, the producer can however halt the 
recruitment of new workers and let the old workers retire 29. When demand recovers, the 
producer can then pick up the previous lag by making larger recruitment30. As there is 
no additional cost for not recruiting, our theory suggests that the producer will have a 
high tendency to defer recruitment in case of recession. Indeed, this appears to be what 
is happening in the world.
We can also relax assumption (ii) by assuming heterogenous labour. Indeed, 
even if all the workers (after training) have the same productivity and they only
29As noted by Okun(1981), quitting will be low in such case.
3°By the same argument, producers will speed up the recruitment and slow it down 
subsequently when the demand is at the expansion part of the cycle.
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(apparently) differ from each other by their number of years with the firm 31, producers 
can — in the case of negative demand shock — choose the less costly last-in-first-out 
policy of layoff. That is, producers can ensure established worker's attachment by 
developing the practice that only those new workers will be laid off in case of adverse 
demand shocks. The advantage of this policy over random layoff is that it avoids cost of 
quitting of established workers when the economy recovers. Although it might increase
(i) the cost of recruitment; or (ii) the promise of legal compensation in future layoff 32 
when potential applicants get to know such policy, the advantage of avoiding the 
turnover cost from the quitting of the established workers is likely to be dominating. 
This explains why, in the case of very adverse demand shocks that some kind of layoffs 
have to be made, many producers will choose to retrench the new workers. 
Mathematically, if the representative producer has established 33 a last-in-first-out 
employment policy, we have to replace [B-0(AN)] and [C+\y(AN)] of equation (3.4)
respectively by [B'-6'(AN)] and [C+v'(AN)], where [B'-0’(AN)] < [B-G(AN)] and 
[C'+\|/'(AN)] < [C+y(AN)].
In addition to the above, producers -  at the beginning -  can also choose to (i) 
have some optimal percentage of casual workers who will receive a higher wage in 
compensation for the absence of any guarantee of employment; or (ii) subcontract part of 
its production to other firms. Thus, despite the higher payment in case of normal
3iln case the productivity of workers differ, producers might develop the practice of 
retrenching the least productive worker so that the more productive workers have little 
incentive to quit when the economy recovers. Nevertheless such practice might have to 
be limited to the very unproductive worker. Otherwise, the productive workers and the 
new applicants who believe they are reasonably productive will still worry about a layoff 
in the case of extremely adverse demand shocks.
^Alternatively, producers with an established last-in-first-out employment policy can 
offer higher wage or additional payment to the new workers. This implies we should
replace [B - 0(AW)]+WN by [(AW)Nn +WN],where AW is the additional payment to 
the new workers and Nn is the number of new workers.
33Before the producer's first attempt to retrench the new workers there will not be any 
rise in recruitment cost in case of recession.
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demand, the producer can avoid the cost of layoff or excessive payroll in the case of 
recession. In general, the greater the variations of demand, the greater the percentage of 
casual workers and/or subcontraction 34.
Finally, our model and hence equation (3.4) can also be extended to include, in 
addition to the choice of massive layoffs, the choice of part time working schedule whose 
introduction will also involve a fixed reputation cost. Thus, in the case of adverse 
recession, the producer can have the choice of massive layoff and part time working 
schedule. Which one the producer chooses will depend on whether the cost of layoff is 
greater or smaller than the cost of a part-time working schedule, and this will in turn 
depend on the nature of his business and the expected length of the recession. This 
explains why some producers choose to retrench workers while some others choose to 
have a part-time working schedule. In addition, if the recession is really adverse so that it 
is worthwhile to close a plant, a producer might announce an overall dismissal subjected 
to recall.
Having reviewed the few policy options other than hoarding (with production 
effort changing) and layoffs, we believe that producers -  in the case of negative demand
340ne very good example of this is Hong Kong where the manufacturing industry is 
very much export-oriented. When there is no order from overseas, there exist 
redundancy in capacity and labour. However, when the order comes, it will generally be 
a big one. To find somebody sharing the risk of excessive payroll in case of no order 
from overseas, the exporter (usually the trading company) will try to subcontract the 
production to some manufacturing firms who might further subcontract part of their 
production to smaller firms. Thus, a typical trading company is effectively working as 
the marketing department while the manufacturing firms are effectively working as the 
various production lines of a big firm [in addition to the advantage of spreading the risk 
arising from the large variations in demand, such a kind of arrangement is very effective 
in cutting the cost, because each firm is very specialized in its production and knows very 
well about the various opportunities in cutting the costs (eg. distributing the sewing to the 
housewives in the housing estate and those in China with a much lower labour cost). In 
addition to the subcontraction, the manufacturing firms will as well hold only a few 
regular workers in the firm. When demand is high, the producer will try to ask the 
regular workers to work overtime. If the order is really big, the producer will also 
employ some casual workers with a higher wage. When demand is low, the producer 
will stop hiring the casual labour and the amount of labour hoarding is only limited to the 
few regular workers.
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shocks -  will try to avoid the reputation cost of layoff by
(i) stopping new recruitment;
(ii) stopping or reducing subcontraction;
(iii) retrenching casual labour,
(iv) building up inventory;
(v) asking the workers to do some maintenance work such as cleaning, repairing and 
painting; or
(vi) simply keeping the insured workers in a state of on-the-job unemployment
If the demand shock is really adverse, they might start to:
(i) retrench the new or least productive workers;
(ii) introduce a part-time working schedule;
(iii) close a plant and announce overall dismissal subjected to recall; or
(iv)make massive layoffs.
Which option they choose will depend on the cost and benefit of the policies, which in 
turn depend on the nature of the firm.
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3.8 Conclusions
In the early version of Implicit Contract Theory [Bailey (1974), Gordon (1974) 
and Azariadis (1975)], real wage rigidity was considered/shown to be a result of implicit 
contractual arrangements between risk averse employees and less risk averse employers. 
The result of such insured (sticky) wages were then used by macroeconomists [such as 
Gray (1976,1978), Poole (1976) and Fischer (1977) to account for non-neutrality of 
monetary policies on aggregate output and employment. Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980), 
however, challenged such an explanation of Keynesian unemployment by arguing that 
" i t  p a y s  b o th  p a r t ie s  i f  th e  le s s  r is k  a v e r s e  e m p lo y e r s  in s u re  th e  r is k  
a v e r s e  e m p lo y e e s  a g a in s t  la y o ff;  a n d  in  r e tu r n  th e  e m p lo y e r s  a r e  
c o m p e n s a te d  b y  r is k  p r e m ia  in  th e  f o r m  o f  lo w e r  a v e r a g e  w a g e s  w h ic h  
w o rk e r s  a r e  im p lic i t ly  w il l in g  to  p a y  f o r  s u c h  e m p lo y m e n t  in s u r a n c e  
[ A k e r lo f  a n d  M iy a za k i (1 9 8 0 )] ."
They then suggest that
" B e c a u s e  b o th  f i r m s  a n d  w o rk e rs  p r e fe r  fu l l - e m p lo y m e n t  to  la y o ffs  in  
a n y  g iv e n  s ta te , i t  f o l l o w s  th a t  u n e m p lo y m e n t  c a n n o t  o c c u r  in  a n  
eq u ilib r iu m  w ith  ra tiona lly  n e g o tia ted  con trac ts ."
The contribution of Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) is that it highlights and explains the 
phenomenon of insured employment to those employed within the firms. Their second 
argument (from insured employment within the firms to full employment for the whole 
economy) is however subject to debate.
There are at least two important lines of criticism that cause us to believe that 
involuntary unemployment might coexist with insured employment. The first is due to 
the possibility of involuntary unemployment in the traditional efficiency wage, shirking 
and turnover cost models discussed in Chapter 1. Thus, although employers find it 
beneficial to provide insured employment to those within the firm, they might not reduce
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the wage to the full employment level as such a reduction in the wage may reduce 
production effort, raise shirking and increase turnover cost (ie the existence of 
involuntary unemployment is due to the high wage policy of every employer who initially 
attempts to offer a higher relative wage to encourage high production effort, discourage 
shirking and reduce turnover which is in fact achieved by the pool of involuntary 
unemployment associated with the high wage policy of all employers). In such a case, a 
guarantee of employment to those employed (within the firms) mav coexist with a (static') 
nooLof involuntary unemployment (in the economvi.
The second criticism of Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) is that the implicit guarantee 
of employment may only be partial instead of full. That is, in the case of very adverse 
demand shocks, employers may find the cost of layoff much lower than the cost of 
maintaining the excessive wage bill so that the decision of layoff is preferred. The aim of 
this chapter is to build an explicit model on the employment decisions of firms where the 
reputation cost of layoff is finite. The following results were derived:
(1) The employment decision of a representative employer will be a bang-bang solution:
In the case of a moderate reduction in demand, employers -  because of the 
cost of layoff arising from the implicit guarantee of employment -  will 
attempt to hoard the excessive amount of labour. However, if the 
reduction in demand exceeds a certain threshold, there will be massive 
layoffs.
(It also appears that, if the demand shock is general, the reputation cost of 
layoff for each employer will be lower and hence the more likely such significant 
layoffs will be. This is probably why general negative demand shocks are 
usually accompanied with significant layoff in many firms.);
(2) In the case of a moderate demand shock with labour hoarding, production effort -  
instead of wage and employment -  will be the variable of adjustment. This suggests 
that the Keynesian and Classical debate of Price versus Quantity Adjustment in the
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labour market may be misleading. The results also suggest that efficiency wage 
models and the traditional Keynesian models can be refined to produce procyclical 
productivity; and
(3) In the case of a very adverse demand shock, it is always better, from the view of 
employment, to stimulate the economy before rather than after employers layoff their 
workers.
Thus, in contrast to Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980), our bang-bang solution suggests that 
unemployment can result despite the implicit guarantee of employment by employers. 
With these results in mind, the Remarks in section 3.7.1 suggests how cyclical 
unemployment can evolve despite the presence of an implicit guarantee of employment to 
those within the firms.
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Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we have built a model in which the degree of price stickiness/ 
sluggishness depends on the size of the cost of changing price. In this chapter, we will 
try to provide a rough estimate of the cost. The magnitude of such an estimate may also 
help to ascertain whether reputation cost or menu cost is the more important component 
in the total cost of changing price. In Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b), Mankiw (1985) and 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), it was argued that a "second order" menu cost may be 
sufficient to explain a "first order" degree of price stickiness. In Chapter 1, we have 
criticized their underlying assumptions and suggested that it is the much higher reputation 
cost that causes the extensive degree of price stickiness/sluggishness in the world. To 
find an empirical support for our argument, we will try to show that the estimated size of 
the cost of changing price is much higher than that could be explained by the menu cost. 
Along with the estimation, we would also like to check whether the planned profit mark 
up over cost is constant (such as that suggested by Nordhaus and Godley (1972), who 
claim to have found empirical support for the normal cost hypothesis) or an increasing 
function of demand (such as Gordon (1975)).
4.2 Derivation of the Price Equation
As data on expected profit in the future is not available, a test of equation (2.6) of 
Chapter 2, rewritten as equation (4.1) here *,
1 As (i) the linear component will not affect the gap between the thresholds of 
changing price, and (ii) the distance between the Pt* with the linear component and that 
without the linear component will possibly be picked up a constant term, we will omit the 
linear component for simplicity.
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r, (Pt -bt)Q(Pt, &t) - at + p f(Pt, &t) - At
f(PtAt) = max
(Pt - bt)Q(PtAt) - at + p f(Pt4t)
(4.1)
is not possible^. Thus, we will first derive the price equation from equation (4.1) and 
test the model through such an equation.
4.2.1 The Price Equation without inflation
As inflation is fairly high within the sample period chosen, one should derive the 
price equation from a model with explicit consideration of expected inflation. However, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2, the explicit solution of such a model is in itself a difficult 
problem. Instead, we will approximate it by solving the model without inflation in this 
section and then add the effects of inflation in section 4.2.2.
Following the solution procedures in the Appendix of Chapter 2, equation (4.1) 
can be simplified to
(A) First order condition for the Raise Price Regime
To solve for equation (4.2), the first step is to obtain the optimal Pt, denoted as
2 Another difficulty of estimating equation (4.1) is that only one of the first and 
second expressions on the right hand side of (4.1) will be observable at any point of 
time: if the producer has chosen to raise price, only the first expression would be 
observable; if the producer has chosen to keep the price, only the second expression 
would be observable. Such a problem does not exist for the corresponding price 
equation.
(Pt-bOQCPt.ttO-a, 
f  (Pt, a t) = max
(Pt -bt)Q(PtA ) - a t
AJVO 1 - P
(4.2)
1-P
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Pt*, for the "raise price regime" expression on the right hand side of equation (4.2). 
Differentiating
(Pt -bt)Q(Pt , &t)_H(.) = ..... ...■— 1 .  At (4.3)
i - p
with respect to Pt and setting the derivative to zero, we have
9Q(.)
+ Q(P*, &t)
Pt_?t = 0 (4.4)
1 -p
P.* - b, 1 1
Pt* Pt* 3Q(.)
Q(P,*. fit,) 3P, P.=Pt*
) 6‘I
(4.4’)
where 0t = 0(Pt*, 60 is the elasticity of demand. Rearranging, we have
Pt* - b t (4.4")
Bt - 1
Defining
1 +  m t 5  "g ~ T  <4'5>
equation (4.4") becomes
P t* = (l+ m t)b t (4.6)
Thus, the planned profit mark-up m t will be an increasing function of the expected level
of demand 6ct if 0t is a decreasing function of 6ct. On the other hand, if 0t is insensitive
to the level of demand, the planned profit mark-up will be fixed -  which is favoured by 
the normal cost hypothesis.
Equation (4.6) is almost the same as the equation in the theory of mark-up 
pricing, except that our theory suggests that equation (4.6) only applies when the 
condition for raising price is satisfied (i.e. when the first regime expression of equation
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(4.2) is greater than the second regime expression). When the condition of raising price 
is not satisfied, the producer's choice of price will be Pt instead of (1 + m j bt. This
explains why, as we proposed in Chapter 1, the theory of mark up pricing is at most an 
approximation of actual pricing behaviour. Indeed, we believe this also explains why 
some empirical works such as Gordon (1975), have found that the planned profit mark­
up mt is an increasing function of the level of demand whilst others such as Nordhaus
and Godley (1972) have found that m t is invariant to We will return to this at the end 
of the section.
(B) Condition for raising price
The second step in the solution of equation (4.2) is to derive the conditions under 
which the first regime expression of equation (4.2) will be greater than the second regime 
expression. If
(Pt* -bt)Q(Pt*, &t)-at a (Pt - bt)Q(Pttft) - at
-----------------------------At >--------------------------
1 - p  1 - p
the producer will raise price to Pt*. As
(Pt*-bt)Q(Pt*, 60 = (Pt + APt* - bt)Q(Pt + APt* A )
= (Pt - bt)Q(Pttft)+ (Pt - bt)[Q(Pt +APt* ,dCt)-Q(Pt4t)]
+ APt*Q(Pt + APt* ,cxt)
the condition for raising the price can be simplified to
(Pt - bt)[Q(Pt +APt* 4t)-Q(Pt4t)] + APt*Q(Pt + APt* A ) A 
---------------------------- ------------------------------------------  > A t (4.7)
1 -p
Substituting equation (4.4), the first order condition for Pt*, into the above inequality, we
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have
_ aon i aon
]APt*
-  -  9Q(.) I dQ(.
(PrW{[Q(Pt+APt*AHJ(PtA )]  - —  I APt*} + APt* [- —
3Pt Pi=Pt* 3Pt
 >At (4.8)
1 - p
To simplify the above inequality, we assume the demand curve is approximately linear 
between Pt and Pt+APt* so that
(a) Q(Pt +APi* A ) - Q(PtA )  -  ^  I p ^ p ^  (AP,*)
(b) 3QQ I _ „  9QQ I
3Pt lPt=P|+APt* 3Pt lPt=Pt+A Pt*/2
Substituting these into inequality (4.8), the condition for raising the price becomes 
AP,V ( - 3- ^ |  )A P t*apt Ip f p .a > A( (4.9)
1 - p
where PtA is the average of Pt and Pt+APt*.
Suppose (i) the menu cost is relatively insignificant compared with the reputation cost of 
changing price; and (ii) irregular rise of price will cause an inward shift of demand, we 
can approximate At by
_ P^QCPAcxt)
At = Ao m —  -----------------------------------  (4.10)
1 - p
where Aq is some percentage « 1 ;
m is the average mark up; and
PtAQ(PtA, c£t) is the revenue evaluated at the "average1' price PtA
u P ^ Q tP A d t).
so th a t -----------------is a proxy of discounted revenue over the
1 - p
future.
Thus, the specification assumes the cost of changing price is a percentage of the 
"average" discounted profit over the future. The presence of the term PtAQ(PtA, a j  also
implies that the size of a firm will not affect its frequency of changing price. We believe 
this to be a more satisfactory specification than that of fixed At (such as that in the 
literature of menu cost) which implies firms with greater revenue will have a higher 
frequency of changing price. This is so because the menu cost in a large firm will be 
relatively insignificant compared with the change in revenue associated with a change of 
price to the optimum level.
Substituting specification (4.10) into inequality (4.9),
we approximate this as the average price elasticity for the whole sample 0 . Using 
definition (4.5), this elasticity can be rewritten as (1 + m)/ m . Thus,
PtAQOWtft)
Q(PtA4 t)
Ac _ _ _ _ _ _  y
Q G V W  . t=PiA
) is the elasticity at the "average" price of Pt and Pt*,
Q(PtA4 t)
P ^
Substituting this into the inequality,
where y=  m V A o/(l+  m)
1 5 0
AP * —If we further approximate — — by (In Pt* - In Pt) , the condition for changing price
P ^
can be written as
In Pt* - In Pt > Y where y  = nW  Aq/(1 + m) (4.11)
(C) The Price Equation with Switching Regimes
Combining the results in sections (A) and (B) [i.e. equations (4.6) and (4.11)],
the solution to equation (4.2) will be as follows:
Pt* = (1 + m^ bt
r Pt* if In Pt* - In Pt > Y
P‘ = U  otherwise <4' 12>
The equation is not yet suitable for estimation because we do not have data on mt. One 
way to circumvent the problem is to assume
mt = In ko + ki In a t (4.13)
where kQ, ki are constant and d t is the expected level of demand (to be generated from
appropriate data). The intuition of the assumption in equation (4.13) is that 1%  change in 
the level of demand will cause ki % change in planned profit margin. For those 
economists who favour a constant mark up, ki will be zero. [Note: the expected level of
demand <£t is different from the actual quantity demanded, Q(Pt,cXt). Later in the empirical 
work, we will have to generate dtt from Q(Pt,a l) -  see section 4.5.1 for the details].
In order to derive a simple log-linear form price equation, we have to make a 
linear approximation of ln(l+m t). Thus, using a Taylor series expansion around the
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average mark up m 3,
In (1+mO = k3 +k4 mt where k3 = ln[(l+m) -m/(l+m )]; k4 = ki/(l+m). 
Substituting equation (4.13) into the above equation, we have
In (1+mt) = k5 +k^ ln(£t (4.14)
where ks = k3 + k4 In ko; and k6 = kik4 .
Taking the logarithm of equation (4.6), we have
In Pt* = In (1+mt) + In bt (4.15)
As we only have index data on material cost and wage cost, we assume
In bt = K + \  In ct + (1-A.) In wt (4.16)
where ct is the index of material cost per unit output; 
wt is index of wage cost per unit output; and 
K is a constant4.
Substituting equations (4.14) and (4.16) into equation (4.15) and adding the stochastic 
error term ut, the price equation for the raise price regime can be written as
In Pt* = Co + Ci in dC + X  In ct + (1-A.) In wt + ut (4.17)
where Co = ks ; and Ci = k 4 = l/(l+m ) 5.
Replacing the first part of equation (4.12) by equation (4.17) implies that the empirical
3 As mt can be as high as 50% so that ln(l+mt) 4  mt, we expand ln(l+mt) around 
m = m instead of m = 0.
4K will be zero if ct and wt are the actual cost instead of index numbers.
5If we have actual data instead of index numbers on ct and w t (ie K=0), there will
be a restriction on yo» Yi» Co and Ci • However, as only index numbers are available, we 
have to give up such restriction and proceed to get free estimates of the four parameters.
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version of the price equation will be
In Pt* = £o + Ci In eft + X  In ct + (1-k) lnwt + ut
if In Pt* - In Pt > y 
otherwise (4.18)
Thus, if the estimate of £1 = k i/(l+m ) is significantly positive, the hypothesis of a
constant mark up is rejected and there will be empirical evidence that demand affects the 
pricing decision through the planned profit margin. It must be noted, however, that a
increasing function of demand is the correct one. As our theory and equation (4.18) 
suggest, the correct price equation is one with switching regimes and Pt = (1+mObt only
constant mark up neglects the possibility of switching regimes, one can conclude that the 
debate has a mistaken theoretical foundation and hence, it is not surprising that the 
associated empirical work has contrasting results for different sample periods and 
different countries.
Our theory also suggests that the sum of coefficients of In c t and In w t in equation 
(4.18) should be close to one.
4.2.2 Adjustments for expected inflation
In formulating our model in equation (4.1), it is assumed that there is no expected 
inflation. However, if expected inflation significantly affects the pricing decision, 
empirical work with equation (4.16) will not be satisfactory without appropriate 
adjustments. The reasoning for the adjustment is as follows.
First, suppose that there is no expected inflation, the derivation in section 4.2.1 
suggests that price should be raised to (l+mt)bt when the condition for raising the price is
significant t i  does not imply that the price equation P t = (l+m t)bt with m t as an
holds when the condition of raising price is satisfied. As the debate over a variable or
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satisfied. With expected inflation, the producer will raise the price to (l+m^bt plus some 
"preadjustm ent" associated  with such expected in flation  [i.e. to 
(l+mt)bt(l+preadjustment)]. Assuming the preadjustment is proportional to the expected
inflation 6 (i.e. preadjustment = <p Aln(Pwte)» where Aln(Pwf) is the expected inflation
rate), we have
Pt* = (1+mO bt (1+preadjustment) = (1+mO bt [l+<p Aln(Pwte)] (4.19)
where Pt* is reinterpreted as the price that would be chosen by the producer whenever the 
condition of raising price is satisfied.
In addition to the effect on the price chosen in regime 1, expected inflation will 
also affect the condition of raising price. Instead of waiting for
((3° lnXt° + ut) - In Pt > y
where P° lnXt° = Co + Ci 1° + ^  1° ct + (1-k) lnwt , the producer will raise price
whenever
(po lnXt° + preadjustment + ut) - In Pt > y
That is, a producer will raise price whenever changes in demand and cost plus the 
preadjustment exceed the threshold. If we also believe the cost of changing price will be 
higher with higher inflation rate,7 the above condition should be replaced by
(po lnXt° + preadjustment + ut) - In Pt > Yo + Yi Aln(Pwte) (4.20)
6 We assume a higher inflation rate will at most cause a moderate increase in 
frequency of changing price so that the size of preadjustment rises with the higher 
inflation rate.
7 If yo is negligible so that Y = Yi Aln(Pwf), a one percentage point rise in 
expected inflation will cause a one percentage point rise in threshold. In this case, the 
frequency of price adjustment will be independent of the inflation rate. On the other
hand, a significantly positive Yo will imply that price adjustment will be more frequent 
with a higher inflation rate.
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Thus, replacing equation (4.6) by equation (4.19) and inequality (4.11) by inequality 
(4.20) respectively, the appropriate price equation in a world with expected inflation will 
be
In Pt* = p lnXt + ut
, r, f lnP t* if P lnX, - In P, + ut > V In Zt
In Pt = ( , — , (4.22)1 In Pt otherwise
where p lnXt = po lnXt° + preadjustment
= Co + Ci ^  In ct + (1-^) lnwt + cp Aln(Pwte ); and 
ylnZ t = y 0 + Y i  Aln(Pwte)
4.3 The Likelihood Function
4.3.1 Without stochastic variations in the cost of changing price
We now come to the likelihood function for equation (4.22). Assume that the 
distribution of ut is normal with variance a u so that the density function is denoted as
/(u t,ou). For an observation lnPt in regime 1, the likelihood of such an observation,
/,(.). is:
/(In Pt - p In Xt I ut > Y In Zt - P In Xt + In Pt) * Prob(ut > Y In Zt - p In Xt + In Pt) 
with the constraint that
In Pt - P In Xt > Y In Zt - p In Xt + In Pt
because equation (4.22) implies ut = In Pt - P In Xt .
Noting that lt (.) can be simplified to
1‘ ( ) = Prob(ut > y ln Z ,- p ln X [ + ln P l) * Prob(u‘ > Z, - p InX, + In P,)
= /(In P, - P In Xt, o u)
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the likelihood for an observation in regime 1 can be written as: 
1 lnP t - p in X t
- < K —  --------- )CJU Ou
s.t. In Pt - In Pt > y In Zt 
where <|)(.) is the standard normal density function.
For an observation In Pt in regime 2, all we know is that
Prob(ln Pt = In Pt) = Prob(ut < y  In Zt - p In Xt + In Pt)
. ^ ^ yl nZt -Cpl nXt - lnPQ^
where 0 ( .)  is the standard cumulative normal density function.
Hence, the likelihood for equation (4.22) is
t€Ri 1 lnZ t - p ln X t teR2 v ln Z t - ( P ln X f ln  Pt)L/(p,y,au|Pt,Xt,zlPt)= n — <k—  ----- ) n 0 [-------   ]c u a u a u
s.t. In Pt - In Pt > y In Zt V te Ri (4.23)
Thus, our exercise will be a maximum likelihood estimation subjected to a set of 
inequality constraints 8.
To highlight the importance of the constraints and see how maximization of 
equation (4.23) can be simplified, consider the simple case In Z t = 1 so that we have a 
fixed threshold to be estimated. In equation (4.23), there are two forces at play in the 
estimate of y
_ /v
(a) In the non-constraint part of the equation, the term <P(.) will tend to make y  as high
8 In earlier attempts to write down the likelihood function, we committed the same 
mistake as Maddala (1983) (page 164) by neglecting the constraints. As will be explained
later, the constraints are important for a proper estimate of y
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as possible. Indeed, in the absence of the constraints, y will tend towards infinity so 
that all 0 ( . ) approach unity;
(b) The constraints of equation (4.25) however state that 0 ( . ) has to be less than all, 
including the smallest, percentages of price (In Pt - In Pt) found in the first regime of
A
the sample. Thus, the constraints are effectively giving an upper boundary for y .  
Combining (a) and (b), we know that the maximum likelihood estimate of y  will be the 
minimum of On p t - in Pt) found in the first regime of the sample (ie min.{(ln Pt - In Pt), 
V te Ri )). We can then find the maximum likelihood estimate of p and Gu by setting the 
y  of the following likelihood to the above estimate of y.
teRi 1 In Z t-p ln X t .teR2 _ r Y In Zt - (p In Xt - In Pt) 
L(p,au|y,Pt,Xt,ZtPt)=ri — <K  ) IT  <D[---------------------   ] (4.23')
Gu Gu Gu
Thus, for the simple case where In Zt = 1, the constrained maximization of equation
(4.23) can be partitioned into two simple parts described above 9.
To see why our model requires explicit specifications of the constraints while the
usual tobit model does not, consider the hypothetical case where In Pt = 0 and y  = 0.
Substituting these into equation (4.22), we have
, P lnXt + ut if P lnXt + ut > 0 
In Pt = ( o otherwise
which is a typical tobit model. Substituting In Pt = 0 and y = 0 into the constraints of 
equation (4.23), we have
In Pt > 0 V t e Ri
9For the case where In Zt includes other variables, we would favour the single 
step constrained maximization.
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which is automatically satisfied. This is why constraints arc not required for tobit models 
and the likelihood function is usually written as
For the case where y has to be estimated, the constraints are no longer automatically 
satisfied and explicit constraints are required to give an upper boundary of the threshold.
4.3.2 With stochastic variations in cost of changing price
In section 4.3.1, we'have written down the likelihood function for the case where 
y  is assumed to be fixed. In the simple case where In Zt = 1, the estimate of y  will depend
on one observation only -  the observation with the smallest non-zero (In Pt - In Pt) in the
first regime of the sample. If we have reason to believe that there is stochastic variation in 
the cost of changing price (eg. a temporarily lower cost of changing price due to 
metricfication or oil surcharge), this estimate will be biased downward even in large 
samples. To see this, suppose we have a large enough sample size so that there is an
approximately continuous spectrum of On Pt* - In Pt). Without stochastic variations in y, 
the recorded minimum non-zero (In Pt - In Pt) will be equal to the true y. However, with
stochastic variations in y, some observations with (In Pt* - In Pt) < y may stiti be
characterized by an observed rise in price simply because the cost of changing price at 
these periods turned out to be lower than usual. As a result, the recorded minimum non­
zero (In P t - In Pt) will be lower than the true expected value of y. [Of course, there are
also some observations where (In Pt* - In Pt) > y and yet there is no observed rise in price
simply because the cost of changing price at these periods turned out to be larger than 
usual. Nevertheless, the existence of these observations will have no effect on the
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estimate of y described in section 4.3.1].
Having recognized that the estimate in section 4.3.1 will be biased downward 
even in large samples, let us obtain the likelihood function when there is stochastic
variations in the threshold. Adding a disturbance term -vt 10 to yin Z t of equation (4.24)
and noting that (pin Xt + ut) in the inequality of the first regime is equal to In Pt* or In Pt, 
we have
In Pt* = P lnXt + ut
jinP t*  * if lnPt - lnP t > y ln Z t-v t
M nPt if (plnXt + ut) - In Pt £ y ln Z t-v t ( }
Rearranging, we have
,p in X t + ut if vt > y ln Z t-(ln P t -lnP t)_
*■ In Pt if ut + v, ^  y In Zt - (P lnXt - In Pt) ( *25)
It can be easily shown that the likelihood function Ls(.) for this equation will be as 
follows:
te R i . oo te R2________________________________ _
LsC)= n  J Kig(lnPt-plnXt,Vt)dvt I I  F[ut+vt £ y In Zt - (P lnXt - In Pt)]
where g(.) is the joint density function of ut and vt;
F(.) is the cumulative distribution for ut + vt < y In Zt - (P lnXt - In Pt)
Kt = y ln Z t-(ln P t-ln P t)
Assuming that (i) vt ~ N(0, a v2); (ii) ut ~ N(0, a u2); (iii) ut and vt are independent of each
10: As we will assume that v t is symmetrically distributed around zero, it does not 
matter whether we add the disturbance term in the form of vt or - vt.
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other, and writing ow2 = a u2 + ov2 ,we have
teRi f~ teR2 _ ryln Zt - (P lnXt - In P ^
Ls(.) = 11 /(lnPt - p lnXt,au2)J /(v t,av2)dvt 11 0 [ ----------   ]
Kt a w
where 0 [ .]  is the cumulative normal density function;
/(u t,au2) and /(v t,av2) are the normal density functions with variance au2 and Oy2 
respectively.
=>LS(
lnP.-plnXt^  ^ (7lnZ, -(PlnX, -yin Z. -(PlnX, -lnP ^
'W
(4.26)
Unlike the case in section 4.3.1, the estimate of y o f the above likelihood function will
depend on all observations [with heavier weights for small (lnPt - In Pt) in the case of
regime 1 and large (plnXt - In Pt) in the case of regime 2]. We expect such an estimate to 
avoid the problem of downward biasedness mentioned above.
Maximization Routine
In carrying out the maximum likelihood estimations of equations (4.25) and 
(4.28), the Newton's method with analytic second order derivatives is employed. This 
routine is available in commercial packages such as the Time Series Processor, Version 
4.1 (TSP 4.1).
4 .4  A vailability o f  Data and C hoice o f Product
Unlike most empirical work on aggregate price sluggishness, the testing of our 
theory requires disaggregate data, preferably that of a single product n . The product 
chosen must have reasonably well published data on price, cost and demand for a
ii: As mentioned in Chapter 1, aggregation of individual prices tends to smooth 
out the discrete jumps predicted by our theory.
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reasonably long period. Also there must have been little change in quality, definition or 
description during the sample period. No product appears to satisfy all these 
requirements and we have to choose among a few products which, after suitable 
assumptions or approximations, are best suited for empirical work. After careful 
consideration, we decided to choose the steel beams -  one of the many products by the 
British Steel Corporation12. The sample period is from 1970:1 to 1979:12 and from 
1980:8 to 1982:12 because (i) the period 1970:1 to 1982:12 is the only one in which data 
on sales (net delivery) of steel beams is available; and (ii) the steel worker strike from 
1980:1 to early 1980:4 caused exceptionally low delivery in this period and somewhat 
erratic movements of delivery between early 1980:4 and 1980:7. In most of the 
regressions reported later, the sample period will be as mentioned. However, as it is 
necessary to use regressions to generate data for the estimation of (4.14) -  (4.26), the 
sample period of these regressions may be slightly different due to the presence of leaded 
and lagged variables.
As steel beams do not quite possess the "perfect” features listed above, the 
following assumptions or approximations are made:
(a) We assume (i) the material-output ratio for steel beams has remained unchanged 
within the sample period; and (ii) the cost index for steel beams moves fairly closely 
with that of the iron and steel industry 13. These assumptions imply c t (the unit 
material cost of steel beams) can be approximated by the material cost index for the
12: This implicitly assumes the pricing decision of steel beams by the British Steel 
Corporation is independent of the pricing decision of other steel products. While it is not 
certain how strong this assumption is, the absence of well published data in other 
industries dictate a choice within the iron and steel industry.
13: A trend variable can be added to equation (4.24) to pick up (i) any trend 
divergence between the two cost indice; and (ii) and trend difference between the two 
material-output ratios. However, as reported later, addition of a trend variable in equation
(4.24) does not appear to be significant. This implies the material cost per unit of steel 
beam can be approximated by the material cost index of steel beam which can be 
approximated by the material cost index of the iron and steel industry.
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iron and steel industry.
(b) As data about the unit wage cost of steel beams is not available, data for the metal 
industry, for which the iron and steel industry is the main provider, is used to proxy 
that for steel beams. In section 4.5.2, we describe the generation of the unit labour 
cost series.
(c) Expected inflation is proxied by the annual inflation rate of the producer price index 
between t-1 and t-13 [i.e. Aln(Pwte) = (Pwt.i - PWM3)/Pwt-i3]-The only exceptions are
those at 1974:4 and 1979:6-1979:12. During these periods, there were sharp rises in 
the oil price and hence expected inflation rates at these periods are likely to be higher 
than the lagged inflation rates. Seeing this, we will approximate the expected inflation 
rate at 1974:4 by the actual inflation rate of 1974:4; and the expected inflation rate at 
1979:6-1979:12 by the actual rate of 1979:12.
(d) Delivery data of steel beams for each month will be used to generate the expected 
demand.
In addition, because the cost index and inflation rate are monthly averages and the 
revisions of prices did not occur at a fixed date of the month, the following adjustments 
are made:
(i) If the revision of price happened during the first 15 days of the month t, the 
unadjusted data Xt are replaced by
Xt = ((30 - DAYt)*Xt + DAYt*Xt+i)/30 
while the data Xt_i are replaced by
X u  = ((30 - DAYt)*Xt_i + DAYt*Xt)/30
where: Xt is the vector of unadjusted data;
Xt is the vector of adjusted data
DAYt is the number of days from the beginning of the month t when the 
price is raised.
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(ii) If the price revision happened during the last 15 days of the month, the cost index and 
inflation rate at t and t + 1 are replaced by
Xt = ((30 - DAYt)*Xt_i + DAYt*Xt)/30
Xt+i = ((30 - DAYt)*Xt + DAYt*Xt+i)/30
where Xt, Xi and DAYt are the same as that defined in (i)
Last but not least, when there were sharp rises in cost such as that in the oil crisis, 
administrative or decision lags in raising prices may cause a serious overestimation of the 
cost of changing price. To avoid such overestimation, we will also report the result that 
excludes some of the observations which may be subjected to decision lags. This 
exclusion, if inappropriate, might on the other hand, cause an underestimation of the 
cost However, if the estimate is significantly larger than that suggested by the menu cost 
hypothesis, the exercise can still be interpreted as providing a lower boundary estimate of 
the cost. Moreover, a check with equation (4.26) will reveal that the problem of 
underestimation is likely to be less serious than the problem of overestimation 14 Thus, 
given our aim of searching for empirical support for the hypothesis of a significant cost 
to changing price and the trade off between overestimation and underestimation 
mentioned above, the results with the smaller sample are preferred.
14: According to the functional form of <$(.) in equation (4.26), a large pinXt in 
regime 2 will have a much greater weight than a small pinXt. As a result, inclusion of an 
inappropriate pinXt (eg due to decision lags will cause a rise in the estimate of y. On the 
other hand, an inappropriate exclusion of plnXt, in the case of a large sample, will have 
little effect on the estimate of y.
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4.5 The Em pirical R esult
Before the maximum likelihood estimates of equation (4.23) and (4.26) can be 
reported, we need to obtain the proxy for expected demand, &t and unit labour costs, wt.
These are made by a series of regressions and approximations reported in sections 4.5.1 
and 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Proxy for the expected demand ou
When making his price decision, the producer will rely on the expected level of 
normal demand that will prevail until the next revision of price. This implies current 
delivery data will not be a good proxy for such demand variable because
(a) the delivery data, even under the assumption of demand determined output, is only 
the quantity demanded and not the level of demand (ie the price effect has to be 
removed from the delivery data to give a measure of the level of demand);
(b) Strikes and seasonal effects have to be removed to give a measure of the normal 
demand; and
(c) Current demand may differ from the demand that is expected to prevail until the next 
revision of price.
In what follows, we will first remove the effect of strike, price and seasonal variations in 
section(A); and then generate the expected demand in section (B).
(A) Depriced-destrike-and-deseasonalized demand in the cu rren t period
To obtain the current depriced-destrike-and-deseasonalized demand for steel 
beams, our recommended procedure is to
(i) estimate the demand function with relative prices, industrial demand and aggregate 
demand as explanatoiy variables; and
(ii) with the help of the estimated coefficients obtained in (i), remove the price and strike 
effects from the delivery data on steel beams.
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However, the delivery data for the iron and steel industry is also subjected to variations 
in relative price. To generate the industrial demand for the estimation mentioned in (i), we 
have to repeat the above procedures (i.e. estimate the demand function and obtain the 
depriced and destrike demand) for the industry.
Bearing the above procedures in mind, we assume the desired demand for iron 
and steel (In QMt*) is described by
In QMt* = Kt - p In (etPtI/Ptf)+ Strikes + ut (4.27)
where Kt is the vector of variables that affect the level of demand for the iron and
steel industry, examples of which include aggregate demand and trend 
variables;
Pt1 is the wholesale price index of the iron and steel industry;
et is the exchange rate so that Ptf/et is the European export price of Wide
Flange Beam express in sterling;
Strikes is a vector of dummy variables, including the Road Haulage Strike, Coal 
Miners Strikes, Engineering Strike etc. within the sample 
period, multiplied by the associated vector of estimated 
coefficients). As our aim is to obtain a "normal" demand variable, free 
from the short run effect of strikes, strike dummies with not very 
significant coefficients are still included if we theoretically believe that 
the strike has some effect, no matter how small, on observed demand.
We also assume a partial adjustment15 of In QMt from In QMt.i to In QMt*:
In QMt - In QMt.i =8  (In QMt_i - In QMt*) (4.28)
Substituting equation (4.27) into equation (4.28), we have
In QMt = 8 Kt - 5P In (etPtI/Ptf)+ (1-5) In QMt.i + 8(Strikes) + 8ut 
Using instrumental variable estimation for 1969:10 to 1979:12 and 1980:8 to 1982:12,
15: Partial adjustment can arise whenever there are lags for (i) the change in 
aggregated demand to cause a change in demand for iron and steel; (ii) the change in 
demand to affect the order and then delivery of iron and steel. This includes the signal 
extraction problem between persistent and transitory demand shocks. For example, 
producers who demand the iron and steel may have a lag in recognizing a non-transitory 
change in their demand. During this period, they will temporarily run down their 
inventory. Only after they recognize the change is non-transitory will they start making 
the order for delivery. If we have higher levels of hierarchy between the British Steel 
Coiporation and the final users (eg. existence of wholesalers etc), the lag will be longer.
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the best equation we obtain i s 16
In QMt = - 2.09 - 0.0728 In (etPtVPt0 + 0.357 In QMt_i 
(-3.72) (-2.10) (5.15)
(EQ1)
+ 1.18 ln y t - 0.0031 + 8 (Strikes) + 8 ut
(7.25) (-8.29)
with (i) R2 = 0.912;
(ii) F(16,135) = 106.07;
(iii) standard error of regression = 0.059;
(iv) Durbin-Watson statistic =1.805.
where yt is the seasonally adjusted industrial output index which is used to
proxy the aggregate demand 17; 
t is the trend variable;
QM t is the seasonally adjusted output index of the metal industry18; and
the values below the estimated coefficients are the t-statistic.
With the estimated coefficients, we obtain the normal level of demand for the metal 
industry QMDSDPt by removing the price, strike and lag effects according to the 
following formula:
QMDSDP, = In QM, - In (e,P,i/P,9 - In QM,.! - Strikes
QMDSDPt will then be used as a proxy of industrial demand in the next two regressions.
i6: Note that our only aim here is to generate the industrial demand variable for the 
regression of the demand function of steel beams which will then be used to generate the 
expected demand for steel beams. Such an expected demand will then be used in the price 
equation. With such a diffused linkage, insufficiency in the removal of price and strike 
effects from the present regression is likely to have weaker effect on the later regressions 
(i.e. the insufficiency may be absorbed by error terms or other variables in subsequent 
regressions). For this reason, we will not go into the detail mis-specification tests for 
those regressions which are primarily used for the generation of variables in subsequent 
regressions.
17: For those periods such as 1972:1-1972:3, 1973:11-1974:3, 1979:1-1979:2 
and 1979:8-1979:10 when the industrial output index are affected by strikes, yt is taken 
as the average of output one period before or after the periods of strikes.
is As the iron and steel industry contain most of the weights in the metal output 
index, QMt can be considered as a proxy of the iron and steel output index.
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The next step is to estimate the demand function for steel beams with the 
industrial demand variable generated from EQ1. As the regressor contains the 
endogenous variables Pt (the price of steel beams), P t-i and the price of another steel 
product -  heavy angle -  is used as an instrument of Pt. After some experiments, the best 
regression for the sample period 1970:1 to 1979:12 and 1980:8 to 1982:12 was found to 
be
In Qt = - 6.14 - 0.726 In (Pt/Pm) + 1.63 In yt
(-5.73) (-7.06) (6.98)
(EQ2)
+ 0.418 lnQMDSDPt + Strikes + Seasonals 
(7.41)
with (i) R2 = 0.672;
(ii) F(25,123) = 10.09;
(iii) standard error of regression = 0.124;
(iv) Durbin Watson statistic =1.57.
where Qt is the delivery index of steel beams;
Pt is the price of steel beams per metric ton;
Pwt is the wholesale price index for the whole economy; and
Seasonals is the vector of seasonal dummies multiplied my the associated 
vector of estimated coefficient.
The estimated coefficients of EQ2 have the expected sign 19. We then, as before, obtain 
the depriced-destrike-and-deseasonalized demand for steel beam AQDSt by the following 
formula:
In AQDSt = In Qt + 0.726 In (P,/Pwt) - Strikes - Seasonals
(BIExpected demand
In section (A), we have obtained the normal level of demand AQDSt at each 
period. However, what really affects the pricing decision is the expected demand that will
i^The estimated coefficient of relative price is only -0.726 which is somewhat 
higher than -1, the maximum level required for equation (4.5) or (4.6) as a profit 
maximization condition. One explanation for this is that the price effect in EQ2 is a short 
run relationship and this is what we want to remove from the observed demand. On the 
other hand, pricing decision (i.e. equation (4.6)) should be based on long run price 
elasticity which is greater than the short run elasticity under the assumption of sticky 
customer-supplier relationships. Thus, the fact that short run elasticity so estimated is 
less than 1 does not necessarily imply any theoretical embarrassment in deriving equation 
(4.6).
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prevail until the next price decision. To generate this demand variable, we first note that 
the average time between each price revision is 10.4 months. We then generate the 
variable AQDSAlOt by
9
AQDSAlOt = <g AQDSt+i + 0.4 AQDSt+io)/10.4
We then regress AQDSA10t on lagged values of AQDSt (the depriced and destrike 
demand), industrial demand and aggregate demand by the method of ordinary least 
squares. Lagged values of AQDSt are found to be insignificant Thus, the best equation 
we obtain for the sample period 1970:1 to 1979:3 and 1980:11 to 1982:3 is
In AQDSAlOt = - 5.01 + 0.304 In QMDSDt-i + 1.50 ln y n  (EQ3)
(-7.81) (7.86) (11.86)
with (i) R2 = 0.578;
(ii) F(2,125) = 85.65;
(iii) log likelihood = 160.9; and
(iv) standard error of regression = 0.0696;
where QMDSDPt-i = (QMDSDPm + QMDSDPt.2 + QMDSDPt.3)/3 20
By assuming EQ3 as the generation process for producer's expected demand btt, we
proxy the variable in period 1970:1 to 1979:12 and 1980:8 to 1982:12 by the following 
formula:
In &t = - 5.01 + 0.304 In QMDSDPt_i + 1.50 In y u l
4.5.2 Proxy for the unit labour costs w»
As mentioned in section(4.4), there is no published data about wage rates and unit 
labour costs for steel beams. Thus, we can only proxy these by that of the metal
20: if  we replace QMDSDPt_i by QMDSDPt.i, the estimated coefficient will be 
less significant and R2 will be smaller than that reported in (EQ3). One possible reason is 
that QMt-i and hence QMDSDPt.i is more sensitive to random shocks. As our aim is to 
obtain the "normal" demand, the average QMDSDPt.i is preferred to QMDSDPt_i.
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industry. Yet, further approximations have to be made before one can generate the unit 
labour cost variable that is suitable for estimation. The procedures are as follows:
To see how we can construct our wage variable, consider the following sub-sample 
for the wage index in the metal industry between 1973:7 and 1974:8:
period 73:7 73:0 73:0 73:10 73:11 73:12 74:1 74:2 74:3 744 74:5 746 74:7 746
actual
vage
index
115 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 128 129 131 132 1461
which illustrate that there will normally be major revisions of wages every 12 months. 
Between these major revisions, there is little variation in the wage index. It is therefore 
hard to believe that the actual wage index in 1974:7 (=132) is a good measure of the 
"wage pressure" in the producer's mind. Thus, as an approximation, we assume that 
the "wage pressure" is growing steadily between two major revisions. This implies that 
the above actual wage index will be replaced by the following adjusted wage index in 
our regression:
period 73:7 73:0 73:9 73:10 73:11 73:12 74:1 74:2 74:3 74:4 74:5 746 74:7 746
adjusted
vage
index
■125.8 127 i2a.6 190.2 131.8 133.3 134.9 136.5 L38.1 199.7 141.3 142.B 144.4 146
In the subsequent regressions, we also found that the results are better if we replace the 
adjusted wage index at 1978:1-1978:3 by that at 1978:4. The explanation for this is that 
the producers in 1978:1-1978:3 anticipated the failure of the incomes policy and hence 
a large rise in wage rate.
To generate wt (the unit labour cost), we have to multiply the adjusted wage rate by the 
"normal" employment per unit output. We approximate the latter by NMt/ QH , where
(i) NMt is employment in the metal industry at t; and (ii) QH is the average of metal
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output from t-6 to t+5 (ie QMt = L QMt/12) 21 so that
i»-6
wt = AWRt * ( N W Q H )
where AWRt is the adjusted wage rate.
4.5.3 A djustm ents in the m aterial cost index
By tabulating the price o f steel beams and the material cost index o f the iron and 
steel industry at the various dates when a revision in prices occurred:
time
(day)
70:1
(27)
70:10
(16)
71A 
(11)
72:4
(2)
73:4
(30)
73-10
(16)
 ^
a> 75:1
(2)
762
(1)
765
(30)
77:1
(?)
77:7
(10)
70:1
(1)
79:7
(1)
02:1
(17)
price of 
steel 
beam
50.11 53.35 56.8D 99.90 65.15 71.55 96.35 131.7 137.4 157.3 174.5 184.9 203.5 2L9.0 246.5
cost
index 43.22 45.76 43.84 90.29 54.32 59.63 75.36 93.30 3D7.9 129.4 L34.2 141.3 340.5 168.1
223.2
ratio 1.159 1.166 1.159 1.191 3.202 1.220 1.279 1.319 L.273 1.244 1.30a 1.3D9 1.448 3.303 1.104
ln ^ -ln P , 6 .3 * 6.336 5 .3 * 8 .4 * 9.4% 29 .8* 2 3 4 * 12.1* L4.5* ID.4% 5.8% 9 .6 * 7 .4 * L2 6*1
InCVInC vi 5 .7 * 6 .5 * 3 .0 * 7.5% 7.8% 25.1* 20.3* 15.6* L5.8* 6.0% 5.2% -0.6% 17.9* 28.4*]
Table (4.1)
We found that the cost index does move fairly closely with the price o f steel beams in 
most o f the dates except 1978:1 22. This suggests that the actual cost index o f the iron and 
steel industry around 1978:1 may not reflect (even after the adjustment for inflation) the 
expected cost that will prevail until the next revision of price. As this possibility might
21: As we will see, the wage cost that based on QMt is found to perform better
than that based on QMt. This is possibly because QMt is less sensitive to random shocks 
than QMt.
22: The ratio o f the price o f steel beams to the cost index is 1.448 which is 
exceptionally higher than that at any other date. Besides, despite the 9.6% rise in the price 
of steel beams, the cost index falls by 0.6%. If we calculate the percentage change o f cost 
and price between 1977:7:10 and 1979:7:1, we get the value o f 17.37% and 16.93% 
respectively which can be considered as a fairly close movement.
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seriously distort the estimates, we consider the following two alternatives:
(a) estimating equation (4.26) without adjusting the material cost index between 1978:1 
and 1979:6; and
(b) estimating equation (4.26) with the material cost index between 1978:1 and 1979:6 
adjusted according to the following procedure:
(i) the cost index at 1978:1 is adjusted to a level so that the "price-adjusted cost ratio" 
at 1978:1 is equal to the average of 1.309 and 1.303 (i.e. the average of price-cost 
ratios at 1977:7 and 1979:7, where 1977:7 is the most recent regime 1 observation 
before 1978:1 while 1979:7 is the most recent regime 1 observation after 1978:1). 
That is
C78:l' = P78:l/l-306
where C78:i f is the adjusted cost price index at 1978:1; and 
P78;i is the price of steel beam at 78:1.
(ii) the cost indices between 1978:2 and 1979:6 are adjusted so that
% change between ct' and 078:1* % change between ct and C78;i
%change between c ^ j  and C78:i ' %  change between 079:7 and C78:i
where ct' is the adjusted cost index between 1978:2 and 1979:6;
ct is the unadjusted cost index between 1978:2 and 1979:6;
C7 8 1  and C79  7  are respectively the unadjusted cost index at 1978:1 and 
i979:7
(Note: As the cost index at 1979:7 is assumed to be correct, it follows that 
C79:7f =  C79;7  )
As it was found that estimation with alternative (b) gave a higher likelihood than 
alternative (a) (not reported in the next section), the proposed adjustment in the cost 
index between 1978:1 and 1979:6 is supported.
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4.5.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimate of v
(A) When there is no stochastic variations in the cost of changing price
First consider the simple case where (a) there is no stochastic variations in the cost 
of changing price; and (b) In Zt =1. According to the discussion in section 4.3.1, the
maximum likelihood estimate of yis the minimum non-zero percentage change of price in
the sample. From table (4.1), this happened at 1971:4:11. Thus,
y=5.31%
which says that the cost of changing price is of such a magnitude that cumulative changes 
in cost and demand must make the ’’desired" percentage change of price greater than 
5.31% before the price is actually raised to the "desired" level. Otherwise, the nominal 
price will remain fixed.
Nevertheless, the date 1971:4:11 is when metricfication is adopted in the quotation 
of the British Steel Corporation. There is thus a reason to suspect that the cost of 
changing price at this date is particularly low (i.e. without metricfication, the British Steel 
Corporation might have raised the price at a later date by a larger amount). If this is true, 
one should drop the observation at 1971:4:11 and look for the smallest non-zero On Pt -
In Pt) in the remaining sample. This implies the maximum likelihood estimate of y is
provided by the observation at 1977:7:10 which suggests that
y = 5.79%
Whatever one's preference 23, the magnitude of these two percentages suggest that it is 
much higher than can be reasonably explained by the simple menu cost of changing price.
23: It is also possible, because of some reason we do not know, that the cost of 
changing price on 1977:7:10 is lower than usual. As we would not have sufficient 
information about this, the estimation procedures described in section 4.3.2 become more 
appealing.
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This can be seen by calculating Ao, the percentage of discounted profit above variable cost 
over the future, with the above estimates. From equation(4.11), we know that 
y = m V A o/(l + m)
=> Ao = Y2 (1 + m)/m?
If m (the average profit margin above variable cost) is 50%, Ao will be 1.69% or 2.01%
for the above two estimates. If m is 30%, Ao will be 4.07% or 4.84%. Given the huge
tonnages of steel beams delivered, such shares of discounted profit would be equivalent 
to enormous amounts in sterling terms which could not reasonably be attributed to the 
presence of menu costs.
(BIW hen there is stochastic variations in the cost o f changing price
As explained in section 4.3.2, the estimate of y  reported in the previous section
may be biased downward if there are stochastic variations in the cost of changing price. 
For this reason, we propose to estimate also equation (4.26). [To allow for the possibility
that the cost of changing price may rise with inflation, we also assume Y ln Z t = Yo + Yi 
Aln(Pwte).] In table 4.2(a), we report results including the full sample. However, because
decision lags in raising price might also unreasonably raise the estimate of Yo and Yi> we
also estimate equation (4.26) by excluding those observations when there is suspicion of 
a decision lag.24 The result is reported in Table 4.2(b).
24: The following observations are excluded: 1974:2-1974:3; 1974:10-1974:12; 
and 1981:11-1982:1.
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Table 4.2(a) Table 4.2flrt
variable parameter s > ) .variable parameter
esumaiea ( ) 
coefficient# stat)
constant Po - 1.436 (-5.23) constant Po - 1.321 (-4.64)
In ct Pi 0.705(9.59) In ct Pi 0.772 (10.47)
In wt P2 0.296 (3.74) In wt P2 0.216 (2.67)
In oq p3 0.275 ( 4.92)
A
In a t P3 0.307 ( 5.94)
Aln(Pwte) P4 0.627 (7.93) Aln(Pwte) P4 0.670(7.73)
constant Yo 0.1308(3.03) constant Yo 0.0814 (3.43)
Aln(Pwte) Yi 0.301 ( 1.59) Aln(Pwrt Yi 0.200 (1.67)
Ou 0.0186 (5.02) Gu 0.0214(4.18)
Gy 0.0768 (3.24) Gv 0.0350 ( 2.66)
log likelihood = -0.731276 log likelihood = 5.52429
n = 146 n = 138
As we can see from the two tables, all estimated coefficients are of the right sign and 
satisfy the theoretical restrictions. For example, the sum of the coefficients of In c t and 
In wt are respectively 1.001 and 0.988, which are close to unity, the expected value of the 
power index of bt in the equation Pt =(l+mt)bt. The significant coefficients of expected 
inflation also suggest that there is preadjustment of price. Of great interest is the
significant coefficient of the expected demand In a t, which suggests that planned profit
mark up is an increasing function of expected demand (i.e. there is evidence against the 
normal cost hypothesis). The size of the estimates also suggest that 1% change in the 
expected demand will respectively cause 0.275% and 0.307% rise in the "desired" price.
Next, the magnitudes of (tfu , c v) are respectively (0.0186, 0.0768) and (0.0214,
0.0350). Noting that our assumption of non-stochastic variations in the cost of changing 
price in section(A) is equivalent to the assumption that v t is negligible when compared
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with u t. The relative size of Cu and Ov reported in both tables reject such an assumption 
and hence cast doubt on the validity of the estimates reported in section (A).
Let us now turn to the estimates of yo and yi. Although the t-statistic on yi are
strictly lower than the 95% critical values, they are still quite high at 1.59 and 1.67 and 
the coefficients are correctly signed. Thus, there is some weak evidence that the cost of 
changing price rises with expected inflation. Nevertheless, the existence of a relatively
A
large (and significant) constant term yo suggests that doubling the inflation rate will not
double the cost of changing price. This implies that price adjustments will be more 
frequent in the case of higher inflation 25. Next, for an expected inflation of (say) 10%, 
table 4.2(b) suggests that the cost of changing price will be equivalent to a 10.14% [= 
0.0814 + 0.200(10%)] rise in the "desired" price. This appears to be more reasonable 
than the 16.09% [= 0.1308 + 0.301(10%)] reported in Table 4.2(a), where the estimates 
are subjected to the problem of decision lags mentioned in section 4.4. Finally, the 
estimate of 10.14% 26 here is — as expected from previous discussions — higher than the 
5.31% or 5.79% reported in section (A), indicating that the estimates in section (A) may 
be subject to downward biasedness.
As the t-statistics on yi in tables 4.2(a) and (b) are less than the 95% significance 
level, we also extend the estimation of table 4.2(b) by dropping yi. This is reported in
25: As explained in the footnote of section 4.2.2, the frequency of price adjustment 
will be independent of inflation rate whenever yo is negligible so that yin Zt = yi Aln(Pwte).
A
26; The estimate of 10,14% suggests that Ao (the reputation cost expressed as the 
percentage of discounted profit above variable cost over the future) are respectively 
6.17% and 14.86% for m equal to 30% and 50%.
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Table 4.3:
Table 4.3
estimated /t. ctnt:ct:r \ 
variable parameter coefficient. I _
constant po - 1.341 (-4.75)
In ct Pi 0.722 (10.18)
In wt P2 0.220 ( 2.65)
In a t P3 0.308 (5.25)
Aln(Pwte) p4 0.607 (8.22)
constant y 0.1166 (4.83)
a u 0.0205 (4.21)
a v 0.0427 ( 2.47)
log likelihood = 4.20280 
n = 138
The results suggest that the size of the cost of changing price is equivalent to an 11.66% 
rise in the desired price 27. Such a size, is again far larger than can reasonably be 
accounted for by the "menu costs" emphasized in the recent literature.
4.6 Conclusions and Remarks
Unlike most empirical work on mark-up pricing, our estimation is based on 
disaggregate data. More importantly, because of the stronger theoretical foundation, we 
have shown that the mark-up equation will only hold for those observations in regime 1, 
and the planned profit margin was found to be an increasing function of expected 
demand. The latter result is an important challenge to the work of Godley and 
Nordhaus (1972).
The estimated cost of changing price was found to be at least equivalent to a
27: As the t-statistic of yi of table 4.2(b) still exceeds the 90% significance level. 
The result reported in table 4.2(b) is preferred.
5.31% change in price (and possibly as high as 10,14% for an expected inflation rate of 
10%). Since this implies a very large loss in discounted profits, it would seem 
unreasonable to assume that price stickiness is solely a result of menu cost.
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Chapter 5
5.1 In trodu ction
In section 1.2.4, we briefly reviewed the following striking result by Caplin and 
Spulber (1987):
If (i) monetary growth is monotonic; and (ii) the initial distribution of price 
deviations across firms is uniform, price stickiness will disappear on 
aggregation across firms. Thus, money will be neutral despite the presence 
of fixed cost of changing price and individual price stickiness.
As an attempt to justify their assumption on the initial distribution of price deviations 
across firms, Caplin and Spulber also showed that the distribution will survive with the 
specific monetary shocks they considered. Nevertheless, showing the survival of the 
distribution still does not explain where this initial distribution comes from. For example, 
if all price deviations in the Caplin and Spulber model are bunched to start with, they will 
remain bunched thereafter. In such case, price stickiness will not disappear on 
aggregation across firms, and Caplin and Spulber's explanation! of monetary neutrality 
will not apply. To extend the applicability of Caplin and Spulber's propositions to cases 
where the initial distribution of price deviations is not necessarily uniform, Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989) suggests that the addition of idiosyncratic shocks in the model will 
guarantee a uniform distribution of price deviations in the steady state. The idea was 
borrowed from Caplin (1985) which discusses the inventory decision, but the logic is 
similar:
" i f  f i r m s  fa c e  b o th  id io sy n c ra tic  a n d  a g g re g a te  s h o c k s  a n d  u se  o n e  s id e d  
(s ,S )  ru les , p r ic e  d e v ia tio n s  w il l  b e  in d e p e n d e n t a c ro s s  f i r m s ,  e v e n  i f  th e  
v a r ia n c e  in  th e  id io s y n c r a tic  s h o c k  is  a r b itr a r ily  s m a l l  (b u t n o t  z e r o ):
1: Note, we only say that Caplin & Spulber's explanation does not apply here. 
There can still be some other reasons that might preserve the neutrality result. We will 
return to this point later.
k n o w in g  th e  p r ic e  d e v ia tio n  o f  o n e  f i r m  w ill  b e  o f  n o  h e lp  in  p r e d ic tin g  th e  
p r ic e  d e v ia t io n  o f  a n o th e r . T h is  is  a n  im p o r ta n t r e s u l t  a s  i t  im p lie s  th a t  
u n d e r  o n e  s id e d  (s ,S ) ru le s , s ta g g e r in g  (u n ifo rm  d is tr ib u tio n )  is  a  n a tu ra l  
o u tc o m e ."[B la n c h a rd  a n d  F isc h er  (1989]
[Note, however, in stating the above result, Blanchard and Fischer have neglected an 
important assumption in Caplin(1985):
"d e m a n d s  a re  r e c e iv e d  in  a  w e ll-d e fin e d  o r d e r  s o  th a t  in v e n to r ie s  c a n n o t  
f a l l  f r o m  Sk+1 to  Sk -1 w ith o u t p a s s in g  th ro u g h  le v e l S k "  [C a p lin  (1985 )]
In analyzing the price decision, there may exist occasional and large common shocks 
(such as that in the oil crisis) whose occurrence will cause all the prices to be bunched at 
the optimal level. We will return to this point later.]
Despite the above extension, there were doubts in regards to the robustness of the 
Caplin and Spulber's result for more general monetary generation processes. The first 
one is the counter example given by Blanchard and Fischer (1989), where the steady 
state distribution is likely to have higher density at the return point. If their guess is right, 
one percentage change in money supply will cause less than one percentage change in 
price, then money will be non-neutral. The second doubt on the robustness of Caplin and 
Spulber's result is that an ergodic empirical distribution of price deviations may not exist 
for more general specifications. Bertola and Capallero (1990) have shown that this will 
happen whenever
(i) there exists ongoing large aggregate shocks
" I n  th e  a fte rm a th  o f  su c h  a  la rg e  sh o ck , id io sy n cra tic  sh ifts  w o u ld  sp re a d  
th e  s p ik e  ( o f  p r ic e  d e v ia tio n s )  a n d  th e  c ro ss  se c tio n  w o u ld  te n d  to w a rd s  
th e  u n ifo r m , s te a d y  s ta te  d is tr ib u tio n  -  b u t  f u r th e r  la r g e  s h o c k s  w o u ld  
u n d o  th e  g a in s  in  th a t d ir e c tio n  a n d  r e b u n c h  so m e  a g e n ts  a n e w . I n  th is  
s i tu a tio n , th e re  w o u ld  b e  a  c o n tin u o u s  te n s io n  b e tw e e n  th e  e n d o g e n o u s  
te n d e n c y  to w a r d s  u n ifo r m ity  ... a n d  r e la t iv e ly  in fr e q u e n t  s tr u c tu r a l
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c h a n g e s  th a t  p r e v e n t  th e  c ro s s  s e c tio n  f r o m  r e a c h in g  a  s te a d y  s ta te ."
[B erto la  a n d  C aba llero  (1 9 9 0 ) ] ; or
(ii) there exists exogenous events that can make adjustments in both directions desirable. 
If ergodic distribution does not exist, it follows that the empirical distribution will not be 
uniform at most of the time, and hence the Caplin and Spulber’s argument of neutrality 
will fail to apply in these cases.
It must, however, be emphasized that Caplin and Spulber's result (i.e. 
disappearance of price stickiness on aggregation across firms) is concerned about 
whether money is always neutral. Even without such kind of neutrality, money may still 
be "on average" neutral over time -  with which the authorities cannot exploit unless they 
know the distribution of price deviations 2»3. Therefore, from the policy point of view, 
we will be more interested in checking whether money or some particular types of 
monetary change (such as occasional reduction of money supply in an inflationary world) 
is neutral on average instead of checking whether Caplin and Spulber's result is robust in 
more general settings.
In what follows, we will first develop a small macro model suitable for stochastic 
simulation. The set of equations describing producer behaviour will be based on our 
discussion in Chapter 2. For a complete model, we need another set of equations
2: As an ergodic distribution does not appear to exist in the world, such an 
assumption seems to be quite reasonable. Indeed, if we ask whether the U.S. or U.K. 
Government know the empirical distribution of price deviations, the answer is likely to 
be no.
3: If the empirical distribution has a lower than average density at the margin of 
raising price, a small rise in money supply will raise the aggregate demand. On the other 
hand, if the distribution has a higher than average density at the margin of raising price, a 
small rise in money supply will cause a large reduction in aggregate demand (so that 
money is on average neutral). However, as the Government does not have perfect 
information about the empirical distribution, she would not be sure whether a rise in 
money supply will cause a rise or fall in aggregate demand.
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describing consumers. These are borrowed from Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)4. Thus, 
the small macro model originates from utility and profit maximizing behaviour. In 
deriving the macro model, effort is also made to allow comparison and linkage with the 
model in Caplin and Spulber. Idiosyncratic technological shocks are then introduced to 
generate the dispersion of price deviations endogenously 5. To concentrate on the effect 
of price stickiness, we assume that factor prices adjust instantaneously to clear the market 
6. Finally, we do various simulations with the model and check the correlation coefficient 
between changes in the money supply and changes in aggregate output. If the correlation 
coefficient is close to zero, the neutrality hypothesis is supported. Otherwise, the 
extension of Caplin and Spulber's result to the more general specifications is rejected.
4: It is also possible to use other sets of equations on consumer decisions. 
However, those in Blanchard and Kiyotaki are selected into the model because money 
will then be neutral whenever (i) the cost of changing price is zero; or (ii) monetary 
growth is monotonic. In other words, if non-neutrality result is ever obtained in the 
subsequent simulation, it must be due to the cost of changing price and the alternative 
monetary generation process.
5: Idiosyncratic technological shocks are use because it is the simplest way to 
produce the dispersion of price deviations in the subsequent model. It is true that many 
other idiosyncratic shocks (eg taste shocks) can generate the dispersion of price 
deviations, but the way they enter the model will be complicated.
6: As pointed out by Blanchard (1983), wage stickiness may be another reason for 
the non-neutrality of money. To make sure the non-neutrality result obtained is not due to 
wage strictness, we make the simplifying assumption that wage stickiness does not exist. 
If Caplin and Spulber's proposition is rejected, we can conclude that price stickiness 
alone can generate the non-neutrality of money. Of course, even if Caplin & Spulber’s 
result is supported by the simulation result, it may still be true that wage stickiness can be 
another reason for the non-neutrality of money.
5.2 Derivation of the Model
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5.2.1 The Demand for Goods and the Supply of Lahour
Following Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), we assume that there are / 
households, n goods and real balances enter the utility function to avoid Say's Law 7. 
Thus, the utility function of household j at any period t is specified as:
where (i) Ckjt is the consumption of goods k by household j at time t;
(ii) Cjt is the index of household j's consumption basket which is assumed to be 
a CES function of Ckjt;
(iii) Pkt is the price of goods k at time t;
(iv) Pwt is the aggregate price index;
(v) Njt is the labour supply by household j at t;
(vi) Mjt is the desired holding of money by household j at t;
(vii)0  is the elasticity of substitution between goods in the utility function;
7: As pointed out by Blanchard and Kiyotaki(1987):
" A  C lo w e r  c o n s tr a in t  w o u ld  le a d  to  s im i la r  r e s u lts . D e v e lo p in g  a n  
e x p lic i t  in te r te m p o ra l m o d e l to  ju s t i fy  w h y  m o n e y  is  p o s i t iv e ly  v a lu e d  
d id  n o t s e e m  to  w o rth  th e  a d d itio n a l c o m p le x ity  in  th is  c o n tex t."
-1/0 n i
with Cjt = [ n £  ( Ckjt)
(e-i)/e ey/(e-i)
(5.1)
I n  1-0 1/(1-0)
and Pw t-  [ — 2  ^ ( Pkt) ]n k=l
(5.2)
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(viii) y is a parameter showing household's preference between goods and real 
balance; and
(ix) p is a parameter related to the marginal disutility of labour.
We assume each household takes Pwt and Wt as given. We also assume households 
maximize utility subjected to a budget constraint. By assuming that labour supply is 
homogeneous, we specify the budget constraint of household j as
where Mjt is the initial endowment of money held by household j at the beginning of 
period t;
TCkjt is the share of profit from firm k to household j at t;
Wt is the wage rate at t.
Thus, household j's maximization problem at each time period t can be written as
n n
j^Pkt Ckjt + Mjt — Wt Njt + 2^7Ckjt +Mjt
{Ck
where Cjt and Pwl are as defined in equations (5.1) and (5.2).
The first order condition for the maximization problem implies that
) = UPkt (5.3)
Y , Mjt . -7
Cjt (1 - 7) ( — = H P W,
Pwt
(5.4)
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p N jf'1 = n W , (5.5)
After some simplification, it can be shown that the demand for goods k and the supply of 
labour by household j at time t are given by
Ckjt = - ^ ( - ^ - ) ' e 
n Pwt
1 y . Mjt - y Wt 
Njt C j . a - r X - j J —) ( - = - )
P * wt * wt
Taking the summation over j and defining the aggregate output index Yt as 
n
Yt (P^ Ckjt)/Pwt. we have the following demand for goods k and total supply of 
labour:
1 /  Pkt \-o , Y . , Mt x
Ckt = — (Yt) (  p— ) where Yt = ( T i - ) ( p - )  (5.6)n r wt i - y  *wt
1 Y 1-Y wt l/o-l)
Nt= y (1-Y) ( - R - ) ]  (5.7)
P * wt
We also assume that y  > 0.5 so that a shift of preference from money demand to
consumption of goods (i.e. reduction in y) will cause a rise or at least no change in labour 
supply.
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5.2.2 The Price Equation and Demand for Labour
On the production side, we assume there are n firms, each producing one 
product. For simplicity, labour is assumed to be the only factor of production and
efficiency units of labour are homogeneous. Each firm requires 8kt unit(s) of labour to
produce one unit of output. Thus, the demand for labour and the cost function of the 
firms are given by
Nfa = 5kt Ykt Vk, t  (5.8)
TQa = Wt Nft Vk, t  (5.9)
where Nfc is the demand for labour by firm k at time t;
Ykt is the output of firm k at time t;
TQa is the total cost of firm k at time t; and
8kt is the technological coefficient of firm k at time t
Combining equations (5.8) and (5.9). We have
TQa = (Wt6kt) Ykt (5.10)
We also assume that there is no inventory and a high cost of unsatisfied demand. Such 
assumptions imply output is demand determined:
Ykt = Ckt
Substituting equation (5.6) into the above equation implies
Yfc - l ( _ I _ ) ( J * k - ) ( I k _ ) - e (5.11)
n 1 - y  Pwt Pwt
We also assume each firm takes PWt > W t and aggregate demand as given. Thus, the 
producer's problem is to choose Pkt to maximize the expected sum of discounted profit 
over the future. Using our discussion in Chapter 2 for the three regimes case where the 
cost of raising price is assumed to be the same as the cost of reducing price, we have
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Sup PfrYn-TCfa _ Akt 
1 - p
-  -  —  
fict Ykt -  TQa 
1 - p
where Ykt, TCkt are the demand and total cost at the price Pkt; and
Akt is the cost of changing price.
Substituting equation (5.10) and (5.11) into the above equation implies
1 x J  x ✓ Mt x , Pkt N-e (p*- Sk. wb) - ( )  (-=p-) ( ■ £ - )
n l - y  * wt * wt
S u p ------------------------------------------------------------ Akt
1 - p
—
-  „ 1/  Y x / M t w I\ t  , -eO V - 8k. W*) -  ( -j-L- ) ( )
n i - Y *wt * wt
1 - p
Following the solution procedure described in Chapter 4, the following price equation is 
obtained
* 0 if In Pkt*-In Pkt > Vk
Pkt =  8w Wkt -“  e _ l  ^  “  or ln P ia * -b  Pk, < - V k
Pkt = max {
I\t otherwise
This equation is, however, only correct for the case of no expected inflation. For the case 
with constant expected inflation, the above equation should be replaced by 8
8: For simplicity, we will assume all producers have the same cost of changing
price so that V k=Vo+Vig» where \|/ig, reflect the effect of inflation on the cost of 
changing price. However, as g is assumed to be constant in the simulation exercise, we
can simply write \|/'k=Vo+Vi g=V-
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n *_  6 s « , if lnP k ,*-ln  l ^ >  y k
^  e _ l  SiaWtd+rg) OT inPk,*-ln P t a < - y k
Pkt = max |  (5.12)
l^t otherwise
where (1+Tg) is used to capture the preadjustment of price arising from the 
constant expected inflation g;
Pkt* is now defined as the price chosen whenever the condition of 
changing price is satisfied.
Finally, equation (5.8) and (5.11) implies the demand for labour by firm k can be written 
as:
s 1 t y \  I M> /  pta 'V -0
and the total demand for labour is given by:
n 1 v M t n Pkt -0
N- = i i N» = T ( ] (M 3)
5.2.3. Labour Market Equilibrium
As our aim is to check the effect of price stickiness on the neutrality of money, we 
assume that wage will adjust instantaneously to clear the labour market. Equating 
equation(5.7) and (5.13), we have the following wage equation:
p - = P Y  ( t ^ )  ( - * - )  [ £ A . ( - p - )  ] (5.14)r wt 1 " 7 r wt *wt
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5.2.4 Aggregate Output
n
Aggregate output Yt is defined by Yt = 2^ (Pkt Ckjt)/Pwt • Substituting equations 
(5.2) and (5.11) into the identity, we have
Y , - ( J L _ ) ( ^ - )  (5.15)
A “  Y  * W t
Thus, given the assumptions made above, equation (5.15) implies that aggregate output 
will be determined by aggregate demand which is proportional to aggregate real balances. 
The equation also relates the sluggishness of price to the neutrality of money: if the 
change in the aggregate price index does not lag behind the change in money supply, 
money will be neutral; otherwise, money will be non-neutral. The equation also implies a
shift in preferences from consumption to money demand (i.e. a fall in y) will cause a 
reduction in aggregate demand and hence a "long-run" 9 reduction in aggregate output.
5.2.5 The Whole Model
Combining equations (5.2), (5.11), (5.12), (5.14) and (5.15), we now have the 
small macro model for the simulations:
Y k i = i ( r 7 ) ( T L ) ( ? ^ ) ' e ( 5 - 1 6 )n 1 “ T r wt *wt
_ 0 s m / ,  \ if In Pkt*-In Pkt > Vk
^  6 - 1  kt t(  +xg) or lnPkt*-ln Pb < - V k
Pkt = max { _  (5.17)
P& otherwise
9: "Long run" here is defined as the state where Pkt is adjusted to Pkt*.
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I n  1-0 1/(1-  0)
Pwt = [ — Z ( P kt) ] 
n k=l
(5.19)
(5.20)
The model will be similar to that of Caplin and Spulber if we assume (i) Mt is 
monotonically and continuously growing; (ii) 8^  = constant Vk, t ; and (iii) the initial
thresholds 0 and -\j/. However, to enable the dispersion of price deviations ( In Pkt* -
In Pkt) 10 to be generated endogenously, we differ from Caplin and Spulber by assuming 
the following generation process of technological shock li;
where ekt is an intertemporally and cross-sectionally independent random variable. As
Caplin (1985), and Blanchard and Fischer (1989) have suggested, the existence of an 
arbitrarily small idiosyncratic shock will, in their case of continuous monotonic monetary
i°: With the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, it would be more appropriate to 
analyze in terms of the dispersion of price deviations In (PktVFk) instead of the 
dispersion of relative price In (Pwt/ Pkt)[c.f. that in Blanchard & Fischer (1989)].
ii: A more convincing specification is to allow a drift parameter \ i  in the
generation process (i.e. In 8kt = In 8k,t-i - M-+ £kt )• Nevertheless, such assumption will, 
in the absence of a sufficient monetary growth, cause a continuously declining Pkt*. To 
avoid further complications that would be arise from the drift parameter, we will rather 
work with the less realistic specification in equation(5 .21)
values of price deviations ( In Pko* -  In Pko ) are uniformly distributed between the
In 8kt = In 8k,t-i + ekt (5.21)
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growth, be sufficient to ensure a uniform distribution at the steady state, we will follow 
their suggestion by assuming the following specific generation process of e^:
£kt =
- X  with probability = 5%
0 with probability = 90%
X  with probability = 5%
where X  is assumed to take a very small value (i.e. 0.0005)
Finally, to check the robustness of Caplin and Spulber's result, we will consider 
a few alternative stochastic processes for the money supply:
(a) symmetric random walk
i . ,  f -Xco probability = 0.5example: mt = m u + a* with a \  .........
[ Xo) probability = 0.5
fb) monotonic monetary growth
i • u f “  Xu probability = 0.5example: mt = mt.i + g + ut with ut = j  *  n c and S  ^  XuXu probability = 0.5
(c) non-monotonic monetary growth
example: mt = m u + g + vt with vt = (  *v ^  ^  g < ^
I Xv probability = 0.5 5 A
(d) occasional large shocks to monetary growth 
example: mt = mt_i + g + ut + Zt Th
. . f -Xu probability = 0.5 , xwith ut = \  K *  /  and rit ~F(0,w)
L Xu probability = 0.5 Y
where (i) m t = In M t so that g is the average growth rate of money supply for case (b) 
and (c);
(ii) F(0,\|/) is a uniform distribution between 0 and \j/; and
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(iii) Zt is an indicator function with
r Prob. (Zt = 1) = q (say, 0.01)
«
„ Prob. (Zt = 0) = l - q
5.3 A statistic for the checking of neutrality of money
To check the neutrality of money in the simulation exercise, it is found more 
convenient to set up a suitable criterion statistic first. This can be done with the help of 
equation (5.20) which implies
Yt _ Mt /Mfi
Yt-i Pwt/  Pw,t-l
for a constant y. Taking the logarithm of the above equation we have
yt ~ yt-i ==(mt —nit-i) ■ (Pwt ■ Pw.t-i) 
where yt, m t and pwt are respectively the logarithm of Y t, Mt and Pw t . Writing the 
equation in difference form, we have
Ayt = Amt - Apwt (5.2.3a)
and Ay = Am - Apw (5.2.3b)
Consider the null hypothesis in Caplin and Spulber where price stickiness disappears on 
aggregation 12 so that the percentage change of Mt always equals the percentage change
of Pwt (i.e. Amt - Apwt). According to equations (5.2.3a) and (5.2.3b), we have Ayt = 
Ay = 0  V t, which implies that
I t  ___ ___
Cov (Amt,Ayt) = — £  (Amt - Am) (Ayt - Ay) = 0 (5.2.4)
T t=i
and thus money is definitely neutral.
12: Even if price stickiness does not disappear on aggregation across firms, we 
might still have the neutrality result as long as the effect of money on output is "on the 
average" zero over time.
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Next consider the case where price stickiness does not always disappear on 
aggregation across firms. This implies
Amt * Apw t for some t
and hence yt * y t-i for some t
In this case, money can still on average be neutral or non-neutral, depending on whether 
the mean of Apwt is equal to that of Amt or not. If it does, equation (5.23b) implies that
Ayt will have a mean zero. Thus, y t will have a steady means even if money is growing
continuously. In other words, money is still on average neutral and the covariance 
calculated according to formula (5.24) will have an expected value of zero 13. On the
other hand, if the mean of Apwt does not equal to that of Amt, money will be non-neutral 
and the covariance calculated according to formula (5.24) will be non-zero.
So far, we have been relying on the covariance defined in formula (5.24) to check 
the neutrality of money. The trouble with this is that the magnitude of the covariance will 
depend on the choice of the length of each time period, the growth rate of money supply 
and the size of parameters assumed in the model (5.16)-(5.20). To allow comparison for 
various specifications, we find it more convenient to rely on the correlation coefficient 
defined as follows:
T __  __
E  (Amt - Am) (Ayt - Ay)
t=i
P =  t --------------------- T-------------------172— (5.25)
{ [E (Amt - Am)2 ] [E (Ayt - A y )2 ]}
t=i t=i
[Note: In the Caplin and Spulber's case where yt = yt-i (or Ayt = Ay) Vt, p will
13: Of course, in case of finite sample, the actual value may be slightly different 
from zero. Such deviation will however approach zero as T approaches infinity.
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be taken as zero by convention.]
In general, p will be approximately zero if money is on average neutral. On the other 
hand, a significantly non-zero correlation coefficient will support the non-neutrality 
hypothesis. In the extreme case where price is perfectly sticky (i.e. Pwt = Pw,t-1 or Apwt
= 0 Vt), equation (5.23a) and (5.23b) would imply
Ayt = Amt Vt
and Ay = Am
Substituting these into equation (5.25) would imply p = 1.
5.4. The Sim ulation Procedures and R esults
5.4.1 The Procedures
In the subsequent series of simulations, we will assume the following parameter
values: \j/ = 0.1; 0 = 2.0; (3 = 2.0; y = 0.75; n = 100 i* Xu = 0.0005; %v = 0.0015; 
g = 0.0005; Mo = 1.0; and 8ko = 1-0.
With an appropriate assumption of the initial distribution of price deviations, we 
then (i) generate £& and ut; and (ii) calculate F^, Pkt, ykt. Mt, Pt and Pwt for t = 1 to
500,000. In those cases where an ergodic distribution exists, such a large number of 
iterations should be sufficient to ensure the steady state is reached. In many cases, 
however, we might have a steady set of asymptotically recurrent states instead of a single 
steady state. One simple example is where (i) producers are identical (ie no idiosyncratic 
shocks) so that the initial distribution of price deviations is bunched at some point; and
14: For the Blanchard and Fischer case, we will assume n = 200.
1 9 3
(ii) monetary growth is monotonic. In such case, the (degenerated) distribution of price 
deviations will repeat once whenever the cumulated rise in money supply has reached a 
multiple of the cost of changing price. For the case where there are idiosyncratic shocks, 
the reasoning will be slighdy more complicated. To see this, we first noted that equation
(5.17) implies that (In Pkt* -  In P^) will lie between -y  and y . Indeed, if monetary 
growth is monotonic and the magnitude of £kt is of second order, we will very 
often is have most of the (In Pkt* -  In P^) lying between 0 and y.
Thus, even if the dispersion of price deviations at one particular period has higher 
density at the middle of 0 and y , such as that shown in diagram (5.1a),
t—I--------M1I11II — i i—-------------  11111 lll| > 1111111J-------  —(
0 y  0 y  0 y
(a) (t>) (c)
where: one vertical line represents one firm. 
diagram (5.1)
subsequent rise in money supply will tend to raise Pk,t+i* (but not yet Pk,t+i) for some 
small i, making the dispersion of price deviadons in the subsequent periods similar to that 
shown in diagrams (5.1b) and (5.1c). When the cumulated rise of money supply has 
reached 10% (the cost of changing price), the dispersion of price deviations should
!5In a few cases where the starting price is close to the return point and there is 
some "significant" reduction in 5kt, we might have some (In Pkt* -  In P^) lying below 0. 
However, as long as the magnitude of is of ekt second order, these price deviations will 
still be very close to 0 within the range -y  and 0.
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"asymptotically" *6 return to that of diagram (5.1a). Having established the steady state 
or the steady set of "asymptotically" recurrent states with the first 500,000 iterations 17, 
we repeat the iterations for another 500,000 times and start calculating the correlation 
coefficient for t = 500,001 to 1,000,000. If the correlation coefficient is close to zero, the 
neutrality hypothesis is supported. Otherwise, the extension of Caplin and Spulber's 
result to more general specifications is rejected.
All the procedures outlined above are contained in the computer program reported 
in the Appendix. In general, the program is rather straight forward. The only exception is 
due to the existence of twojegimes in equation (5.17) which prevent an analytic solution 
to reduced form equations for Pkt and P wt i g. The reasoning is as follows. From 
equations (5.17) and (5.18), we can see that PWt has to be known before an individual
producer can decide whether to raise or maintain his price (i.e Pfe = Pkt* or Pkt = Pkt).
However, according to equation (5.19), Pwt will not be known unless Pkt is known 
before hand. Thus, even though we will know Pkt if Pwt is known or vice versa, we 
have the problem of not knowing Pkt or Pwt at the very beginning. Fortunately, we find 
the above problem can be circumvent by the following iteration procedure which will
i6There might be a little "realization" difference due to the difference in realized
5kt«
17: In the case where a steady state or a steady set of asymptotically recurrent 
steady state does not exist, the first 500,000 iterations would still allow the idiosyncratic 
shocks to reshuffle the distribution so that the correlation coefficient calculated in the next
500,000 iterations will be independent of the initial distribution assumed.
18; Such problem does not exist if there is zero cost of changing price so that there 
is only one regime in equation (5.17) (i.e. Pkt = Pkt* )• In such case, equation (5.17)- 
(5.19) can be solved simultaneously to give reduced form equations for Pkt, Wt and Pwt .
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search for Pkt and Pwt numerically:
StCP.l:
We first set the initial search values PWt° and Pkt0 to Pw,t-i and Pk,t-i respectively.
Then for any iteration i = 1 to 1,000,000, the search values Pwt1 and Pkti are calculated 
according to the following formula:
~ -1 y  B - y  Mr B-i n  Pkt1'1 -e B-l ^
w‘i = ^  (l V  (T ^ } 1 p - *
0  Pkt* Pkt*
Pto* = -Q r y  5ktWt‘ (1+xg) i f ln (  — ) > v o r l n (  — ) < - Y
Pit' = max {  _
F^ t otherwise
I n  1-0 1/(1-©)
Pwt1 = [ —  2  ( Pk  ^ ) ]n k=l
Step 2:
Then we check whether Pwt* = Pwt*'1* If yes> we have already search out the
solution of Pwt and Pkt and we can set Pwt = Pwt1'1 and Pkt = Pkt1 • If Pwt1 *  Pwt1'1, we
proceed the iteration to i + 1 and so on until convergence. Indeed, for the model assumed 
in our simulation exercise, convergence is usually achieved within 3 iterations.
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5.4.2 The simulation Result
(A) No idiosyncratic shocks
Our first simulation exercise is to show the correspondence between the special 
case of model (5.16)-(5.20) mentioned in section 5.25 and that of Caplin and Spulber. 
This is done by first examining the specific case where (i) money is growing
monotonically [i.e. case(b) in section (5.25)] (ii) there is no idiosyncratic shock (i.e.ln 5tt
= 1.0 Vk, t ); and (iii) the initial distribution of price deviations is uniformly distributed
between 0 and y . To allow our discrete time model to have an approximately continuous
monetary growth [as required in Caplin and Spulber (1987)], we also define t as a very
short period so that g, %u» Xv take correspondingly small values such as those assumed in
section 5.4.1. As reported in column 1 of Table 5.1, despite of the continuous and 
monotonic monetary growth, aggregate output always remains at the same level for all t
(i.e. y t = yt-i or Ayt = 0 V t ). As Ayt is no longer stochastic here, p will be taken as 
zero here. Thus, the Caplin and Spulber's result is preserved here.
Next, let us see what happen if we drop assumption (iii) and assume the initial 
distribution of price deviations is bunched at 0. As reported in column 2 of Table 5.1, the 
correlation coefficient is close to zero (i.e. 0.5365 x 10-5) indicating that money is still on 
average neutral. However, when we plot the distribution of price deviations, we found 
that -  as predicted in section 5.4.1 -  it enters a steady set of asymptotically recurrent 
states in which the bunch of price deviations will keep rising with the monetary growth
until they reach the margin of raising price, y , where the bunch will jump back to 0 and 
everything proceed as before 19. Thus, unlike that expected by Caplin and Spulber(1987)
19; Along with the movement of the bunch of price deviations, aggregate output is 
also rising with the monetary growth until the margin of raising price where aggregate 
output will jump back to the lower bound and everything will proceed as before.
Table 5.1: The Simulation Result
Without idiosyncratic shocks 0) With idiosyncratic shocks (2)
correlation
coefficient
money supply monotonic money supply non-montonic
monotonic monetary growth (3) follows symmetric monetary follows symmetric monetary
random walk (4) growth random walk growth
initial distribution initial distribution initial distribution no large with large case of effect of
of price deviations of price deviations of price deviatioons
uniformly all bunched at all bunched at common common Blanchard & reduction in
distributed the return the return
between 0  and y point 0 point 0 shocks (3) shocks (5) Fischer (1989) (6) money supply (7)
0.0 (8) 0.5366 x 10-5 1.000 0.0390 -0.0388 0.9505 0.9767 (9)
Note: (1) In 8^  = 1.0 V k,t
(2) f -  0.0005 with probability = 5%
In 6ja = In 5k,t-i + ekt where Ekt = ] 0 with probability = 90%
 ^ 0.0005 with probability = 5%
As idiosyncratic shocks will tend to reshuffle the distribution, the result obtained in column (4) -  (7) will be independent of the initial 
distribution assumed. However, to check the Blanchard and Fischer case (column 6), we will assume the initial distribution is uniformly
distributed between - y  and y , and see whether the distribution after the 500,000 iterations will have a higher density at the return point. 
For all other cases (particularly in checking the neutrality result of column 4), we will assume the initial distribution has a higher density 
at the return point (i.e. ~ triangularly distributed between 0 and y).
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(3) f -0.0005 probability = 0.5
mt — mt_i + g + ut with ut = |  0.0005 probability = 0.5 an<^  8 = 0.0005
(4) mt = mt.i + st with st =
-  0.00001 probability = 0.5 
0.00001 probability = 0.5
(5) r -0.0001 probability = 0.5 f Prob(Zt= l) = 1%
mt = m,.i + gj + 0)t + Z, Tit where 0)i = |  o.OOOl probability = 0.5 : gl = 0  0001; T' t ~ F(0 -V) and |  p r o ^ ^ Q )  = 99%
(6) f -0.01 probability = 0.5
m, = m,.1 + n , where O, = (  0  01 probability = 0.5
If the step size of the random walk is 0.001, the correlation coefficient will be 0.9927.
(7) f - 0.0015 probability = 0.5
m, = mt . i+g  + v, wherev, = |  00015  probability = 0.5 and g = 0.0005
(8) As Ayt =0 t and Cov(Amt,Ayt) = 0, the correlation here is set to zero by convention.
(9) The correlation coefficient in column 7 refers only to those observations with a reduction of money supply.
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or Blanchard and Fischer (1989), the neutrality is not due to the disappearance of price 
stickiness on aggregation across firms. Instead, money is "on average" neutral over time 
(i.e. the cumulated small rise of output is cancelled by the occasionally large reduction in 
output when the bunch of firms raise their price).
To check the importance of monotonic monetary growth to the "on average" 
neutrality, we also report -  in column 3 -  the case where money supply is assumed to 
follow a symmetric random walk instead of growing monotonically. Such a case has a 
close resemblance with that presumed in the menu cost hypothesis [such as Akerlof and 
Yellen(1985a,b) and Mankiw(1985)], which implicitly or explicitly conclude the non­
neutrality of money by showing the price stickiness of a representative firm. As 
expected, the correlation coefficient for the assumed size of random walk is 1.0 20, 
indicating that the non-neutrality result presumed in the menu cost hypothesis will be 
right as long as there is no monetary growth. The result will however be weakened with 
the growing importance of monetary growth. When the relative importance of monetary 
growth reaches the point that money supply is growing monotonically, money will -  as 
indicated by the result in column 2 -  be on average neutral.
(B) With idiosyncratic technological shock
To generate the distribution of price deviations endogenously, we now introduce 
the idiosyncratic shock into Caplin and Spulber's variant by assuming that £kt is
20: If we assume the step size of the random walk is larger (say, 0.01 instead of 
0 .00001), cumulated changes in money supply might occasionally push the bunch of 
price deviations to the two threshold points where there will be a bunch revision of 
prices. If this ever happens, the associated correlation coefficient will be less than 1. 
Nevertheless, as long as the step size is not too large so that the touching of the 
thresholds remain occasional, the associated correlation coefficient should still be 
significantly different from zero. This is confirmed by our supplementary exercise which 
give a correlation coefficient of 0.6679 when the step size of the random walk is 0.01 
instead of 0.00001
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generated from the process described in section 5.2.5 21. Again, the close to zero (i.e.
0.0390) correlation coefficient indicates that money is approximately neutral. This is so 
because the asymptotic distribution of price deviations is uniform (with occasionally 
small, but "on average" zero, skewing in the realized distribution) 22
What happens if there is something that stops the idiosyncratic shocks from 
reshuffling the distribution of price deviations towards the uniform distribution so that 
Caplin and Spulber's explanation of neutrality does not apply (i.e. price stickiness does 
not disappear on aggregation across firms)? Does it -  as along the line of thinking of the 
usual criticism of Caplin and Spulber (1987) 23 -  imply that money must be non-neutral? 
Our answer is that it all depends. Examples of these are reported in column 5 and column 
6 .
In the case of column 5 [i.e. one of the case in Bertola and Cabellero (1990)], the 
distribution of price deviations is prevented from converging to the uniform distribution 
by assuming the existence of ongoing (but occasional) large common shocks whose 
occurrence will bunch the price deviations to 0. Despite the fact that price stickiness does 
not necessarily disappear on aggregation across firms, the correlation coefficient reported 
in column 5 (= -  0.0388) indicates that monotonic monetary change is still "on average" 
neutral over time. This is so because, although a rise in the money supply at t may cause 
a change in output whenever the distribution of price deviations is not uniform, the 
change in the money supply also changes the distribution of price deviations. When the
21: The result will still be the same for some more general generation process of
22Monetary growth is still assumed to be monotonic and (approximately) 
continuous. With idiosyncratic shock, it does not matter whether the initial distribution of 
price deviation is bunched or uniform. The result is reported in Column 4 of Table 5.1.
23: Such as Blanchard & Fischer(1989).
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cumulated rise of money supply has reached a multiple of the cost of changing price, the 
distribution of price deviations (and hence output) will "on average" be the same as those 
at t. The fact that the expected distribution of price deviations will return to the original 
one when the cumulated rise of the money supply reaches a multiple of the cost of 
changing price is important. It implies that money is neutral in the sense that one cannot 
keep raising output by indefinite increase in the money supply. Sooner or later, as long 
as money is growing monotonically, prices will be raised so that output can only 
fluctuate within some bounds allowed by the size of the cost of changing price.
In column 6 , we have Blanchard and Fischer's counter example mentioned in 
section 1.2.4. Unlike the monotonic growth in Caplin and Spulber (1987), money 
supply here is assumed to follow a symmetric random walk. A plot of the price 
deviations for the few periods after the first 500,000 iterations suggest that the empirical 
distribution of price deviations -  as expected by Blanchard and Fischer (1989) -  has a 
higher density around the return point. Thus, as similar to column 5, neither do we have 
an ergodic uniform distribution here24. However, unlike that in column 5, the correlation 
coefficient here (0.9505) suggests that money is non-neutral. Why is there such a 
difference? This is so because, in the case of column 5, the monotonically growing 
money supply is "on average" neutral over time (i.e. the growing money supply will 
ensure that any skewing of the distribution of price deviations towards one threshold will 
be reversed in some subsequent period(s), thus the rise (fall) in output with the rise (fall) 
in money supply at t will be cancelled by the fall (rise) in output in some subsequent 
period(s). In the case of column 6, there is however no trend monetary growth. Instead, 
money supply follows a symmetric random walk so that the steady state distribution of 
price deviations has a higher density around the return point. With such kind of
24; Note also the difference between column 5 and 6 : in column 5, no ergodic 
distribution exists; while in column 6 , an ergodic distribution exists although it is not 
uniform.
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distribution, a small rise in the money supply will, of course, cause a less than 
proportionate rise 25 in the aggregate price index, (and hence a rise in aggregate output), 
giving the result that the small rise in the money supply is non-neutral. As it is assumed 
to follow a symmetric random walk, the money supply -  unlike the case with monetary 
growth -  may fall back in some future period. Suppose this happens in the next period, 
the small reduction in the money supply will also cause a less than proportionate 
reduction in price and hence a reduction in aggregate output, giving the result that a small 
reduction in money supply is non-neutral.
From the cases in column 5 and column 6 , we can see that monotonic monetary 
growth is an important reason for the "on average" neutrality of money over time. As a 
cross check of this, we can add an underlying trend growth of money supply to the case 
of column 6 (i.e. Blanchard and Fischer's counter example). This would imply two 
different sub-cases. The first is where the trend growth of the money supply exceeds the 
variations arising from the symmetric random walk. In such a case, monetary growth is 
monotonic. Indeed, one of these is already analyzed in column 4
Thus, the close to zero correlation coefficient reported in column 4 supports this 
hypothesis. The second case is where trend growth is less than the variations arising 
from the symmetric random walk so that monetary growth is non-monotonic. Here, we
money stock and calculate the associated correlation coefficient. The result is reported in 
column 7. The close to unity correlation coefficient (=  0.9767) suggests that a reduction
i.e. ■ Xu probability = 0.5Xu probability = 0.5
suggest that any occasional reduction of the money stock in an "inflationary world" will 
be non-neutral. We can do so by selecting only those observations with a reduction in
25: In case the steady state distribution has very high density around the return 
point, the rise in aggregate price index will be close to zero.
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of the money supply in an " inflationary world" will be non-neutral. The reasoning is as 
follows. With underlying monetary growth, most of the price deviations -  after the first
500,000 iterations -  will lie between 0 and \j/, with only a few that might lie slightly
below 0 (and well above -y, if we assume the variations in £& is of second order). Thus
prices will remain unchanged so that aggregate output falls with a small reduction in 
money supply.
As a supplement, we repeat the above exercise for a "deflationary world" by 
writing the money supply equation as
- Xv probability = 0.5
Xv probability = 0.5
example: mt = nit.i - g + vt with C0t
and calculate the correlation coefficient for only those observations with a rise in money 
supply. Again, the correlation coefficient is close to unity. Thus, a rise in money supply 
in a deflationary world will also be non-neutral.
204
5.5 C onclusions and R em arks
Having gone through the simulation exercises, we summarize our view about the 
neutrality of money as follows:
(A  ^Money is neutral in the sense that one cannot keep raising (reducing) aggregate
output bv indefinite increases (reduction) of the money supply. The most simple case 
is where (i) all producers are identical so that price deviations are always bunched 
within - v  and \\r such as that in diagram (5.2); and (ii) there is no idiosyncratic 
technological shock.
- y  0 V
diagran^5j2^
If the bunch of producers are not at the margin of raising price, rise in money supply 
will, at the very beginning, cause some rise in output. However, the dispersion of
price deviations will also shift towards the upper threshold \\f with the rise of money
supply 26. By the time the cumulated rise in the money supply has shifted the bunch
of price deviations to \y, prices will be raised by \j/xl00%. Thus, the bunch of price
deviations jump to 0 and aggregate output falls. With further rises in money supply, 
prices will remain sticky and aggregate output will rise until the price deviations
reach y  again. Thus aggregate output will be fluctuating between a lower bound Yl 
and an upper bound Yh such as that shown in diagram (5.3).
26; This is so because a rise in money supply will cause a rise in P^* and hence a 
rise of (In Pkt* -  In P^)
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aggregate
output
t,
diagram  (5 .3)
For the case where price deviations are somewhat more dispersed, the logic will be 
similar and the only difference is a smaller gap between Y l and Yh . In the limiting
case where the price deviations are evenly distributed between 1 and l/(l-y ), Yl and
Yh will be the same and output will always stay at that level. Introduction of 
idiosyncratic technological shocks does not change the conclusion as long as money 
is growing. This is so because, although the rise of the money supply might cause a 
rise in output at this moment, it also shifts the dispersion of price deviations towards 
the upper threshold, which will soon reverse the rise in output with further monetary 
increases. Indeed, as discussed in section 5.4.1, as long as money is growing 
(which is a reasonable assumption), the dispersion of price deviations will enter a 
steady set of asymptotically recurrent states. As a result, aggregate output will still 
fluctuate between two bounds 27 and the continuous rise in the money supply cannot
27: Or more correctly, two variable bounds which will rise or fall, depending on 
the realized 5^. Nevertheless, such variations in the bounds are small because of the 
assumption of small variations in 5kt.
206
cause a continuous rise in aggregate output.
(B1 Money is non-neutral in the sense that a moderate reduction in the money supply in 
an inflationary world will cause reduction in aggregate output. To see this, assume 
that the money stock has been rising before t+1 and then comes a reduction in money 
supply. As explained in the simulation exercise, most of the price deviations
(In * -  In Pb) will lie between 0 and y , with at most a few slightly below 0. This
implies that most In Pkt will lie between (In Pkt* -  y )  and In Pkt*, with only a few 
slightly above In Pkt*:
The moderate 28 reduction of the money supply at t+1 will cause a moderate 
reduction in thresholds such as that shown in diagram (5.4). As all In Pk,t+i (=ln Pkt)
still lie within the new thresholds (In Pk,t+i * - y ) and (In Pk,t+i * + y), all producers
will keep their price unchanged. According to equation (5.20), this implies aggregate 
output will fall with the moderate reduction in money supply.
28; In case of large reduction in money supply, producers may reduce their price 
and aggregate output will only fall by a small amount. Such reduction of output
arises because most producers have the starting price Pk,t+i less than Pkt* which 
implies aggregate price index will fall by a smaller percentage than the reduction in 
money supply.
0 I— —
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(C) The reduction of aggregate output mentioned in (B) will vanish with any subsequent 
rise of the money stock to the level prevailing at t. After that, everything will be the 
same as if there were no reduction (and the subsequent recovery) of money supply.
(D) Suppose at t+1, instead of having a reduction in the money supply, we have a
moderate reduction in y (i.e. a shift of preferences from the consumption of goods to
money balances which causes a "long run" reduction in the bounds within which 
output is fluctuating 29. Although changing the money supply has no effect on the 
expected values of the bounds of output, it is usually 30 possible to alleviate the initial 
reduction of output by increasing the money supply so as to push output at t+1 
towards the upper threshold. The policy will be particularly useful when the
29: This happens when y £ 0.5 which is what we have assumed. The proof can be 
done by first finding Pwt* and Yt*, which are respectively defined as the aggregate
price and output when P^t = Pfc* Vk, and then showing the thresholds do change
with y. Thus, replacing equation (5.17) by the following equation for P t^*
* 0  c
Pk. = - 0 T j -  SktWk,
and solving the small macro model, it can be shown that
and Yt*
!r 0 ,, e-d/OM) 1 6 kl l-9 e + l/(p-l) l akt e-l -1 
where K, = -p[ _ a + Tg)] ( ^ ( — ) )} ( [nZ ( 5 ^  H
It can also be shown that Yt* will rise and fall with y when y ^  0.5. As the expected 
thresholds of Pwt and Yt will be lying to both sides of Pwt* and Y t*, and the range
between these thresholds is independent of y, we conclude that the thresholds of
output will rise and fall with y, for the case y > 0.5
30: The only impossible case is when output at t + 1 is at the upper threshold.
reduction in y or aggregate demand is temporary. Thus, even if monetary policy
cannot affect the expected bounds of output or average output in the "long run", it 
can still be use to fine-tune exogenous variations in aggregate demand.
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Y L AG = Y ( 1 )
S L K L A G ( 1 ) = S L M C 1 )
DO 3 6 9  K = 1 /  N
RM1 ( K ) = G 0 5 0 A F ( 0 . 0 / 0 . 1  )
I F C R M 1 ( K ) . L T . 0 . 0 0 5 ) N E G T A K ( K ) = - 0 . 0 0 0 5  
I FCRM1 ( K ) . G T . 0 . 0 9 5 ) NEGTAK ( K ) = 0 . 0 0 0 5
I F ( R M 1 ( K ) . G S . 0 . Q 0  5 . A N D . R M 1 ( K ) . L E . 0 . 0 9 5 ) NE GT AK( K ) = 0 . 0  
SEGTAK( K. )  = S E G T A K ( K ) * E X P ( N c G T A K ( K ) )
E ( 1 ) = G 0 5 0 A F ( - 0 . 0 0 1 5 / 0 . 0 0 1 5 )
S L M ( 1 ) = S L ML A G ( 1 ) + 0 . 0 0 0 5 + 6 ( 1 )
S M ( 1 ) = E X P ( S L M ( 1 ) )
P PH A T = W P I ( 1 )
DO 3 3 0  K = 1 / N
P K H A T ( K ) = P ( K / 1 )
DO 3 3 1  I J = 1 / 1 0 0 0 0  
P P HAT L = P P HAT  
S S E G P K = 0 . 0  
DO 3 3 2  K = 1 / N
S S E G P K = S S S G P K + S E G T A K ( K ) * ( P K H A T ( K ) / P P H A T ) * * ( - T H E T A )  
F I I J = 3 E T A *  ( S S E G P K / ( N * 1 . 0 ) ) * * ( 8 E T A - 1 ) * G A M G A M  
DO 3 3 3  K = 1 / N
P K S H A T ( K ) = T H E T H E * S E G T A K ( K ) * F I I J * S M ( 1 ) * E X P ( 0 . 5 * C O S T D P 1 )  
R P K S H A T ( K ) = P K S H A T ( K ) / P ( * / 1 )
I F ( R P K S H A T  ( K )  . G E . C O S T U . O R . R P K S H A T  ( K )  . L E . C O S T D T H E N  
PKHAT ( < )  = P K S H A T ( K )
ELSE
P K H A T ( K ) = P ( K / 1 )
END I F  
CONT I NUE 
S P K r t A T = 0 . 0  
0 0  3 34  K = 1 / N
3 6 9
3 3 0
3 3 2
3 3 3
3 3 4  S P K H 4 T = S P K H A T + ( P K H A T ( K ) * * ( 1 . 0 - T H E T A ) ) / ( N * 1 . 0 )
P P H A T = S P K H A T * * ( 1 . 0 / ( 1 . 0 - T H E T A > )  
O P P H A T = ( P P H A T - P P H A T L ) / P P H A T L  
I F ( 0 P P H A T . L E . 0 . C G 0 3 0 0 0 0 ) G O  TO 9 9 9 9  
I F C I J . E 3 . 1 0 0 0 0 . A N D . D P P H A T . G T . O . O G O O O O O O ) G O  TO 9 9 9  
3 3 1  CONTI NUE  
9 9 9 9  CONTI NUE
I F ( J . G E . 5 0 0 0 0 0 . A N D . J . L E . 5 0 0 0 1 0 ) THEN 
0 0  1 3 3 2  K = 1 , N  
1 3 3 2  L R P K S H A T ( K ) = LOG ( RPKSHAT ( K) )
WRI TE ( 3 / 1  3 3 3 )  ( LRP KS HAT ( K)  ✓ .< = 1 ✓ N )
1 3 3 3  FORMAT( / ( 1 C G 1 2 . 5 ) )
ENDI F
0 0  3 4 0  K = 1 / N 
5 4 0  P ( K / 1 ) = P K H A T ( K )
WPI ( 1 ) = P P r  n T
y ( 1 ) = ( g a m m a / ( 1 . o - g a m m a ) ) * ( s m < 1 ) / w p i ( 1 ) )
DM( 1 ) = S L M ( 1 J - S L M L A G C 1 )
DY ( 1 ) =LCG ( Y ( 1 ) ) - L O G ( YLa G)
I F ( J . G T .  5 0 0 0 0 0  . A N D . S L M ( 1 ) . L T . S LMLAG( 1 ) ) T H E N  
J J = J J + 1
S 0 M S C C 1 ) = S 0 M S Q ( 1 ) + D M ( 1 ) * * 2 . 0  
S D Y S C ( 1 ) = S D Y S Q ( 1 ) + D Y ( 1 ) * * 2 . 0  
S D M D Y ( 1 ) = S C M 0 Y ( 1 ) + 0 M ( 1 ) * D Y ( 1 )
S D M ( 1 ) = S D M ( 1 ) + DM( 1  )
S D Y ( 1 ) =  5 D Y ( 1 ) +0Y ( 1 )
E N D I F
I F C J . L E . 1 G 5 . 0 k . J . G T . 9 9 9 8 9 0 ) T H 5 N
W R I T E ( 3 / 1 2 4 ) J , S L M ( 1 ) , S M ( 1 ) , P P H A T , F I I J , Y ( 1 ) , D Y ( 1 ) ,
1 DM ( 1  ) / £  ( 1 ) f l  J / S E G T A K ( 1  ) / - NEGTAK ( 1  ) / NEGTAK ( 2 )
1 2 4  F O R M A T ( / I 7 / 3 G 1 2 . 5 , 2 3 1 2 . 5 , 3 F 3 . 5 , I 5 , 3 F 9 . 5 )
E ND I F  
1 0 0  CONTI NUE
WRI TI NG OUTPUT
S D Y ( 1 ) = S D Y ( 1 ) / ( J J * 1 . 0 )
S D M ( 1 ) - S D M ( 1 ) / (  J J * 1 . 0 )  
C 0 V A R = 5 0 M D Y ( 1 ) / ( J J * 1 . 0 ) ~ S D M ( 1 ) * S D Y ( 1 )  
N R I T E ( 3 , 1 1 0 ) ' C O V A R : ' , C D V A R  
W R I T E ( 3 / 1 1 C )  ' S D Y C 1 ) ' ,  S D Y ( 1 )
W R I T E ( 3 , 1 1 C )  # S DM( 1 )  ' , S 0 M ( 1 )
SSSDM = S D M S C ( 1 ) / <  J J * 1 . 0 ) “ S 0 M ( 1 ) * * 2 .  0  
S S S D Y = S D Y S C ( 1 ) / ( J J * 1 . 0 ) - S J Y ( 1 ) * * 2 . 0  
W R I T E C 3 / 1 1 C )  ' S S S O Y :  ' , S S S D Y  
W R I T E ( 3 , 1 1 C ) ' S S S D M : ' ,  S S S D M
C 0 R R E = C 0 V A R / ( ( S D M S w ( 1 ) / ( J J * 1 . 0 ) - S u M < 1 ) * * 2 . 0 ) *
1 ( S 0 Y S i C 1 ) / ( J J * 1 . 0 ) - S D Y ( 1 ) * * 2 . 0 ) ) * * 0 . 5
W R I T E ( 3 , 1 1 G ) ' CORR5 : ' , COR R E 
1 1 0  F O R M A T ( / X , A 6 , G 2 Q . 9 )
9 9 9  CONTI NUE
I F ( I J . E Q . 1 0 0 0 0 . A N D . Q P P H A T . G T . 0 . 0 0 Q 0 0 0 0 0 ) T H E N  
W R I T E ( 3 , 5 6 7 ) ' I J = 1 0 0 0 0  AND DPPH AT> 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' , ' I J : ' , I J ,  J
5 6 7  F 0 R M A T ( / X , A 3 0 , 3 X , A 3 , I 5 , 3 X , A 2 , I 5 )
ELSE
W R I T E C 3 , 5 6 8 ) ' C O N V E R G E N T  P P H A T
5 6 8  F O R M A T ( / X / A 1 6 )
END I F
STOP
END
Chapter 6
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With the recent development of microfoundations, it has become apparent that 
neither the Keynesian nor the various Classical Schools are entirely right in their 
description of behaviour in the product and labour markets. The limitation of the 
Classical Schools is that: because of customer-supplier and worker-employer 
relationships, prices and wages are unlikely to be fully flexible in the short run so that 
any assumption of instantaneous market equilibrium in the product and labour market 
would be unrealistic. However, as the recommendation of a non-activist policy in the 
various Classical Schools (particularly those in the New Classical School such as Sargent 
and Wallace (1975,1976)) is based on a model assuming instantaneous market-clearing, 
a rejection of this assumption implies that the policy ineffectiveness proposition of these 
schools should be reconsidered more carefully 1. On the other hand, the assumption of an 
institutionally fixed wage (and possibly fixed price) in some of the Keynesian models has 
seriously limited their relevance to long run analysis where market forces do appear to 
act.
Indeed, both product and labour markets behave in a manner in some ways 
similar but in other ways different from that depicted by the Keynesian and Classical 
Schools. Perhaps the following statements in Schultz (1985) 2 will give a good idea of
iThis is not to say that all the works by the New Classical School are without 
insight. For one contribution that should never be overlooked is their emphasis on the 
importance of expectation formulation (i.e. rational expectation instead of adaptive 
expectation) in macroeconomic modelling. Indeed, rational expectations has already been 
included in many types of Keynesian models. Taylor(1977), Fischer(1977), and Buiter 
and Miller(1981,1982) are a few examples of these. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized 
that the New Classical contribution to expectation formulation should be separated from 
those results related to the assumption of instantaneous market equilibrium.
2While Schultz's discussion is on the wage decision, a similar type of logic also 
applies to the price decision.
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what a satisfactory model should be capable of explaining:
"W ith in  th e  co n stra in ts  im p o se d  b y  im p lic it c o n tra c ts , w a g e s  (a n d  p r ic e s )  
in  in d iv id u a l f i r m s  h a v e  to  b e  a d ju s te d  to  d e a l w ith  c h a n g in g  c o n d itio n ."
[P -12]
" S in c e  w a g e  (a n d  p r ic e ) ch a n g es  a re  d iffic u lt  a n d  im p o se  s tra in s  o n  lo n g ­
te rm  re la tio n sh ip s , th e  w a g e  (a n d  p r ic e )  o n c e  s e t  h a s  to  la s t  f o r  a  w h ile ,  
typ ica lly  a t  le a s t a  y e a r ..." [P .12]
" . . .e x p e c ta t io n s .. .w il l . . .e x e r t  a n  im p o r ta n t  in f lu e n c e  o v e r  th e  c u r r e n t  
w a g e  ( a n d p r ic e )  d e c is io n ...B u t w h a t is  c e n tr a l to  m y  m e ss a g e  is  th a t th e  
re le v a n t fo r e c a s t  d o es  n o t a ssu m e  p r o m p t a d ju s tm e n t to  a  n e w  e q u ilib r iu m  
w a g e  (a n d  p r ic e )  b u t  r a th e r  th e  m o r e  h e s i ta n t  a n d  g r a d u a l  p r o c e s s  
d e sc r ib e d  a b o v e ."  [P .12]
Here, the first statement refers to the Classical requirement that prices and wages should 
be flexible and market forces would exert their influence in the long run. The second 
requirement is Keynesian in the sense that there should be some kind of price and wage 
rigidity in the short run. The third statement is related to the signal extraction problems 
and the cost of changing price discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, our model is capable of 
explaining that, before the cumulated change in costs and demand exceeds the thresholds, 
prices will remain sticky in the short run. The effect of these changes in costs and 
demand will however be revealed once the threshold is exceeded. This is why we believe 
that the Classical Schools are right in claiming that market forces will exert their influence 
in the long run.
The models built in Chapter 2 and 3 also illustrated that both the Keynesian and 
Classical Schools -  after appropriate refinement -  can be integrated under a general 
framework. Indeed, we regard this as a more important message than the mere 
identification of the necessary refinements in the two schools of thought. We believe that 
one of the most important items for future research is to explain how planned excess
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capacity, cost oriented pricing, sticky price with respect to demand shocks, long run 
Neoclassical maximization, customer-supplier relationships, worker-employer 
relationships, wage rigidity, involuntary unemployment, cyclical variations of output and 
employments, implicit guarantee of wage and employment, labour hoarding, procyclical 
productivity and so on can be made consistent with each other.
Before returning to the philosophy or perception behind the thesis, let us first 
summarize the results obtained in Chapters 2-5 and the potential areas of further research.
6.1 Pricing Decision
6.1.1 Summary of Results
Well before any formal development of the microfoundations of sticky price, 
proponents of mark-up pricing had long suspected that the mark-up formula P=(l+m)AC 
-  albeit being an average cost pricing rule -  could indeed be superior to the 
instantaneously marginal cost pricing rule of Neoclassical theory. Their suspicions 
concerning the stickiness/sluggishness of price with respect to demand shocks were then 
partially supported by the development of the B-M-R models (remember the limitations 
of these models discussed in Chapter 1). The aim of Chapter 2 was to build a more 
satisfactory model so as to explain the extensive degree of observed price stickiness (with 
respect to demand shocks) and to check the other hypotheses implicit in the usual average 
cost pricing rule P=(l+m)AC. Unlike the Menu Cost Hypothesis, we believe that the 
observed degree of price stickiness is far more extensive than can be explained by a small 
menu cost. Instead, we emphasize the role of a large reputation cost of changing price, 
the significance of signal extraction problems and their interaction in generating the 
observed degree of price stickiness. This view of the world is supported by the empirical 
work in Chapter 4. Our model also demonstrated that some of the assumptions implicit in 
the Menu Cost Hypothesis are unjustified. On the whole, we believe our model does help
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to account for the observed degree of price stickiness something which cannot be 
satisfactorily explained within the existing literature.
We then argued that the three sources of price stickiness will be much weaker for 
the case of cost shocks, therefore justifying the asymmetric treatment of cost shocks and 
demand shocks by proponents of mark-up pricing. The argument here also provides 
some hints about the evolution of cost-oriented pricing: the fact that most of the cost 
shocks are general and persistent (especially in an inflationary environment) is likely to 
be one of the main reasons for producers developed the practice of raising price with 
cost. Once such a practice or rule of thumb is developed, customers will find it "normal" 
and "fair" for price to rise with cost [ie they still find their rule of inter-temporal 
comparison of price reliable], and each producer's expectation of an eventual rise in 
competitors' prices in the face of a general and persistent cost shocks will be justified by 
experience. These further reduce each producer's cost of changing price with respect to 
cost shocks, and hence make price more responsive to cost shocks than demand shocks 
of the same size 3. Nevertheless, the asymmetry between cost shocks and demand shocks 
should not be carried too far. This is so because:
(a) as long as Ac > 0, prices will not be adjusted with every small change in cost 
[Indeed, the fact that most suppliers have chosen to pledge the constancy of price for 
some reasonably long period (eg one year) suggests that Ac (the fixed cost of 
changing price with respect to cost shocks) would not be too small, albeit smaller 
than that with respect to demand shocks.]; and
(b) when prices are changed, the change will take into account the permanent change in 
demand as well as the change in cost.
With regard to the third hypothesis of P=(l+m)AC, we have also explained that
3"Same size" here refers to shocks that will give the same %  change in the desired 
level of price P*.
216
the unitary elasticity of price with respect to AC will be justified as long as general cost 
shocks (instead of specific shocks) dominate. This was supported by the empirical work 
in Chapter 4 4 where the sum of the coefficients on wage and material costs is unity.
6.1.2 Further Remarks
A. Debates within the theory of mark-up pricing
Our model here also sheds light on the debates within the theory of mark-up 
pricing. As discussed in Chapter 1, even within the theory, there are disagreements on 
whether (i) the mark-up is fixed 5 or variable 6; and (ii) the mark-up is based on full cost 7 
or variable costs.
The model in Chapter 2 and the empirical work in Chapter 4 suggest that the 
planned profit mark-up will be a complicated (stepwise) but increasing function of 
expected demand. Thus, strictly speaking, neither of the two sides in the debate is right. 
We will come back to this in section 6.3. With regard to the second issue, the model in 
Chapter 2 suggests that, in the absence of inflation, the mark-up will be based on variable 
cost but subject to the condition that the full cost is covered by revenue. However, with a 
moderate inflation rate, both the fixed cost and the variable cost will be moving closely 
with each other, and the distinction between the full cost principle and the "variable cost 
principle" will be blurred.
4Note that there had been some kind of approximations in the derivation of the 
pricing decision.
5Such as Nordhaus & Godley (1972).
6Such as Gordon(1975).
7Such as Hall & Hitch (1939).
8Such as Kalecki (1939).
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B. Importance to Macroeconomics
The microfoundations of price stickiness are important because different 
definitions of stickiness may give different macroeconomic predictions. As explained in 
Chapter 1, while the Lucas-Sargent proposition would still be preserved with 
McCallum's definition of price stickiness (defined as the difference between the 
anticipated and the market clearing prices), there is no sufficient foundation for 
McCallum's definition and a replacement by the correct definition (defined as the 
difference between the current and the previous price level) will give the Keynesian non- 
neutrality result.
6.1.3 Areas of further research
While it yields some interesting results, our model in Chapter 2 is also subject to 
many limitations, and further research in this area is necessary. Firstly, our specification 
of the cost of changing price is only a short cut and a more satisfactory way of modelling 
is to include an explicit specification of the customer's response to price changes. Two 
further extensions therefore are: the formal modelling of such customer response; and the 
integration of the customer's decision and supplier's decision into a general model 9.
Next, even within our "short-cut" analysis with its "ad hoc" specification of the 
cost of changing price, solution for a few more complex cases might provide a better 
understanding of pricing behaviour. For example, while the discussion in section 6.1.1 
tends to suggest that the existence of a moderate inflation rate will ensure that mark-up 
pricing is a good approximation to profit maximizing behaviour in a customer market, a 
formal proof is not yet available and a solution procedure for the case with expected
9That is, how the shopping/search cost provide incentives for the suppliers to 
pledge some kind of constancy of price on one hand and the customers to rely on 
intertemporal comparison of prices on the other; and how a price change affect a 
customer's decisions between sticking with the original supplier and making new 
searches.
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inflation 10 should be developed. Moreover, instead of having the cost of changing price 
fixed for the whole year, the cost might well exhibit a seasonal pattern. For example, it 
may be less costly to raise price at the beginning of the year, or when new models are 
introduced, than any other period. In that case, price adjustment might also exhibit a 
seasonal pattern. A formal analysis (with an expected sequence of the cost of changing 
price) of this might also be worthwhile. Besides, most of our discussion in Chapter 2 
focused on the special cases of either a pure demand shock or a pure cost shock. Even in 
checking the normal cost hypothesis , we only considered the special case where the 
combined effect of the cost and demand shocks is large enough so that the threshold is 
exceeded and any independent effect of demand on price will be revealed in the current 
change of price. We have not analyzed the more general (and possibly more realistic) 
case where demand and cost shocks coexist. Analysis of this general case is clearly 
worthwhile.
Finally, although the model in Chapter 2 is particularly helpful in explaining the 
extensive degree of price stickiness with respect to positive demand shocks, this may not 
be the case for negative demand shocks. If one were to believe a single reduction of price 
would only cause a gain (or negligible cost of changing price), neither the simple model 
in Chapter 2 nor those in Barro (1972), Mussa (1981), Rotemberg (1982a,b), Akerlof 
and Yellen (1985a,b), and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) would be able to explain the 
extensive degree of price stickiness with respect to negative demand shocks. More 
satisfactory explanation is to use Okun’s argument for a kink demand curve at the 
existing price Po (see section 3.2.1(A)(a)). The argument will be stronger if we extend 
the analysis with the fact that demand shocks in recession are usually temporary, as 
contrast to the permanent shocks assumed in the model in Chapter 2. Thus, an extension 
to the case of Okun's kink demand curve and temporary demand shocks are necessary
10See section 2.6.
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for a satisfactory explanation of price stickiness with respect to temporary negative 
demand shocks.
6.2 E m ploym ent D ecision
6.2.1 Summary of Results
The work of Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) is useful because it explains the widely 
observed phenomenon of insured employment to those within the firms. It also implies 
that employment cannot be an entirely free variable so that the Keynesian version of 
Quantity Adjustment is unlikely to apply to the labour market. Nevertheless, Akerlof and 
Miyazaki were a bit hasty in going towards the conclusion of full employment 
equilibrium. In Chapter 1, we have seen how the efficiency wages, shirking, and 
turnover cost models can explain the existence of a pool of involuntary unemployment in 
the economy despite the insured employment within the firms. Our model in Chapter 3 
provides another explanation of unemployment. It was shown that:
(a) Massive layoffs can occur in the face of a very adverse demand shock
[This result appears to be in accordance with what happens in periods of great 
recessions, such as that in U.K. in 1980-82 n .];
(b) In the case of a moderate demand shock, there will be labour hoarding. Production 
effort -  instead of wages and employment -  will be the variable of adjustment. Our 
model also explains procyclical productivity, and implies that the Keynesian and 
efficiency wage models can be refined to incorporate this. The model also implies that 
previous empirical work on productivity should be refined to distinguish the regimes 
of layoff and no layoff; and
(c) In the case of a very adverse demand shock, it is always better -  from the point of 
view of avoiding unemployment -  to stimulate the economy before rather than after
iiNote, we have only shown the result for the case of a permanent reduction in 
demand. Strictly speaking, this is different from that of recession where the reduction is 
temporary (no matter how large and prolonged). While we have not formally shown this, 
we believe the logic will apply as long as the reduction is large and long enough.
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employers start laying off workers. Mild stimulation policies after the retrenchment 
will have no effect on employment.
With these results in mind, the Remarks in section 2.7.1 have briefly discussed how 
cyclical unemployment can evolve even in the cases of mild demand shocks.
Our results also point out the limitation of relationships such as Okun's Law or 
the (Short Run) Phillip Curve in which a stable one-to-one relationship between 
unemployment rate and the level of aggregate demand is explicitly or implicitly assumed. 
According to our analysis, the employment response for the case where cumulated 
demand changes exceeds the threshold will be very different from the case where the 
threshold is not exceeded. Even with a mild demand shock, the effect will still depend on 
the initial cross-sectional distribution of employment between the hiring point and layoff 
point. Thus, unless the cross distribution always stays the same, there will not be any 
stable relationship between unemployment and aggregate demand. However, Bertola and 
Caballero (1990) have shown that such an ergodic distribution will not exist whenever 
there are occasional but ongoing large demand shocks. Since the latter is quite a 
reasonable assumption, it will be misleading to assume that the effect of aggregate 
demand policies on the unemployment rate will be the same at all times 12.
Before leaving for the potential areas of further research, it would be interesting to 
compare the type of unemployment analyzed in our model and that in the efficiency 
wage, shirking and labour turnover models. In the latter, the pool of unemployment is 
static. Also, a small amount of such unemployment has the desirable effect of 
discouraging shirking, reducing turnover and raising efficiency; and the Government is 
incapable of eliminating all such unemployment by means of macroeconomic policies. On
i2In other words, the Phillip Curve, being a function of the initial cross 
distribution of employment, will be shifting instead of being a single non-shifting well 
defined curve at all time.
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the other hand, the unemployment arising in our model is strictly undesirable and it pays 
for the Government to use stabilization policies to eliminate such unemployment.
6.2.2 Areas of Further Research
For the sake of simplicity, the model in Chapter 3 assumed that producers were 
only allowed to change either (i) production effort; or (ii) employment in the face of 
demand shocks. In reality, there are more options available. For example, in view of the 
cost of layoff or the cost of hoarding excessive labour in the case of adverse demand 
shocks, employers (particularly those with erratic demand) may find it worthwhile to 
establish the practice of
(i) employing casual labour with higher wages but no guarantee of employment; or/and
(ii) subcontracting part of the production out.
Although these practices may involve a higher cost at periods of high demand, they have 
the advantage of reducing the burden on employers (in terms of the cost of layoff or the 
cost of hoarding excessive labour) in the case of an adverse demand shock. It would be 
interesting to formulate this idea explicitly and show that those employers with erratic 
demand may choose to follow such practices.
Besides, if the negative demand shock is expected to be temporary, employers may 
also have the choice of
(i) building up inventory;
(ii) asking the workers to do maintenance work such as painting, repairing etc.; or
(iii) slowing down new recruitment (for the replacement of retirements or quits).
We conjecture that the addition of these options could raise the stickiness of employment 
(and possibly the stickiness of price) with respect to demand shocks. We expect 
employers to establish the above practices up to the level where no layoff is required for 
normal variations in demand. Only in the case of very adverse demand shocks will 
employers consider breaking the implicit guarantee of employment.
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Yet, even if it is necessary to reduce employment, there may still be ways to 
reduce the associated cost. For example, instead of laying off the workers 
indiscriminately, the employers can adopt the practice of
(i) laying off the new or the least productive workers; and/or
(ii) closing a whole plant, with the plants in other geographic areas being unaffected. 
Alternatively, some employers might find it less costly to introduce part-time working 
schedule ( a model similar to that of Chapter 3 can be easily formulated to give the bang- 
bang decision characteristic of a part-time working schedule). Thus, despite the insightful 
result we have obtained with the simplified model in Chapter 3, the presence of other 
options to the firm implies that further research on this area is needed.
Another potentially fruitful line of research is the wage decision. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, it appears that wages are usually
(i) fixed in nominal terms for some periods; and
(ii) revised periodically with the real wage being guaranteed within a narrow range.
This kind of phenomenon can be explained by the following intuition. In addition to the 
reputation cost of having a real wage that deviates from the norm, there is another 
important cost: the cost of bargaining between the employers and workers. To reduce 
such a cost, both parties may find it worthwhile to establish the practice of reviewing the 
wage periodically. When such a period comes, the employer will revise the wage. If the 
employer decides to raise the wage below the norm, efficiency and worker's attachment 
may be reduced (the second is part of the reputation cost). If the employer decides to 
raise the wage above the norm, efficiency and worker's attachment are raised but the 
payroll is also raised. An explicit model on this analysis would be fruitful to clarify the 
relationship between nominal and real wage rigidity.
Bearing in mind the result of insured employment in the employment decision, the
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above intuition of wage decisions suggests that both the wage and employment will be 
sticky in the short run. This suggests that the traditional debate on Price versus Quantity 
Adjustment is not applicable to the labour market. To formalize this idea we need to 
integrate the above intuition regarding the wage decision into the model of employment 
decisions discussed in Chapter 3.
6.3 Em pirical W ork
In the empirical work reported in Chapter 4, the cost of changing price is found to 
be at least equivalent to 5.31% of the change in the "desired" level of price. For an 
average profit margin of (say) 30%, this is equivalent to a 4.07% loss of discounted 
profit (above the variable cost) over the future. Given the huge tonnage of steel beams 
delivered, this is equivalent to enormous amounts in sterling which could not be 
reasonably attributed to the mere presence of menu costs. On the other hand, the estimate 
is not incompatible with the presence of important reputation costs. Moreover, the menu 
cost interpretation has the disadvantage of predicting more frequent price change for 
products with a large market, since the fixed menu cost is relatively less important. On 
the contrary, our emphasis of a significant reputation and a negligible menu cost will 
imply that the total cost of changing price will be roughly proportional to the size of the 
market and hence predict that the frequency of price change is independent of the size of 
firm.
While our lowest estimate of the cost of changing price is found to be equivalent 
to a 5.31% change in the "desired" level of price, we also explained in Chapter 4 that this 
estimate may be subject to downward biasedness. By allowing stochastic variations in 
the threshold, our preferred equation suggests that, for a 10% inflation rate, the cost of 
changing price could be as much as a 10.14% change in the "desired" level of price. Our
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estimates also suggest that there is weak evidence that the cost of changing price will rise 
with expected inflation. Nevertheless, the significant constant term (and the weak
inflation term) in the threshold (yo + Yi Aln(Pwte)) implies that price adjustments will be 
more frequent in the case of higher inflation.
In addition to the aim of estimating the cost of changing price, we also attempted to 
test the Normal Cost Hypothesis (ie whether the planned profit mark-up is a fixed or an 
increasing function of demand) in Chapter 4. Unlike previous empirical work, the 
theoretical foundation here is stronger and the data set is more suitable. First, the 
estimation is based on individual data instead of aggregate data. With the help of a more 
elaborate theoretical foundation in Chapter 2, we also derive a two-regime price equation 
where the mark-up equation [P=(l+m)AC] will only hold in the raised price regime (i.e.
P = P for the sticky price regime). Moreover, expected demand instead of current
demand is used as one of the explanatory variables. A significant demand effect was 
found. Thus, unlike Godley and Nordhaus (1972), our estimation implies a rejection of 
the simple Normal Cost Hypothesis. Moreover, the sum of the wage cost and material 
cost is found to be close to the value of unity. This is also more satisfactory than the 
coefficient of 0.6 reported by Godley and Nordhaus [c.f. our review of Laidler and 
Parkin's criticism on Godley and Nordhaus (1972) in section 1.2.4]. While rejecting the 
Normal Cost Hypothesis, our results are also at odds with the previous empirical work 
on the determination of the mark-up. While this earlier work generally assumes that price 
is a continuously increasing function of demand, our two-regime equation suggests that 
price will only be a stepwise increasing function of demand (ie demand will only exert its 
effect on price when the conditions for raising price are satisfied).
In addition to the above, our results also suggest that:
(i) with expected inflation, there will be some pre-adjustment of price (if the condition for
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raising price is satisfied); and
(ii) a 1% change in expected demand will cause an approximately 0.3% change in the 
"desired” level of price.
6.4 The Sim ulation R esult
Although the simulation exercises in Chapter 5 were only carried out for specific 
values of the parameters, they help to place some of the apparently contradictory results 
on the neutrality of money, such as those in Caplin and Spulber (1985) and Blanchard 
and Fischer (1989), into context.
In the basic Menu Cost model, it was implicitly assumed that producers are 
bunched at the neighbourhood of the optimal price so that a small change in the money 
supply, and hence also nominal demand, will leave all prices unchanged and therefore 
impinge entirely on output. With such an implicit assumption, we are effectively ignoring 
the possibility that some producers are just at the margin of raising price so that a small 
rise in the money supply will cause them to make a large change in price. If there are 
enough producers in this position then the previous effect of monetary increment on 
output could be reversed. The case that producers are bunched at the margin of raising 
price is not as unlikely as Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b) suggest. Indeed, as long as 
money is growing monotonically, our simulation exercise suggests that they are 
sufficiently frequent to guarantee that money is "on average" neutral.
The case of neutrality considered by Caplin and Spulber is also a very special one 
where, at any point of time, the rise of output in some firms arising from a monetary 
expansion is just cancelled by the reduction of others. While Caplin and Spulber's case is 
certainly an interesting example where money is perfectly neutral, we do not require such
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strong conditions to produce a result that is strikingly different from the menu cost 
hypothesis. Indeed, as long as money is growing monotonically, our simulation 
exercises illustrate that money will be on average neutral over time. This is true even if 
there were occasional but ongoing large common shocks which prevent the idiosyncratic 
shocks from reshuffling the distribution of price deviations towards a uniform 
distribution at the steady state.
Following Caplin and Spulber, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) tried to re-establish 
the non-neutrality result by considering the case where the ergodic distribution may not 
be uniform. Nevertheless, their case of a symmetric random walk in the money supply is 
not very realistic in view of the observed upward trend of the money supply in most 
countries. With the addition of an underlying trend, their conclusions are changed 
significantly (e.g. a very strong underlying trend will imply monotonic monetary growth 
and hence neutrality of money over time).
On the whole, we think that the discussion of neutrality versus non-neutrality in 
the above papers is not general enough. Instead, with the result from the simulation 
exercises in mind, we propose the following hypotheses:
(a) As long as money is growing (falling) in one direction, any change of money supply 
in the same direction will be on average neutral over time.
The reasoning is that: even if the distribution of price deviations is skewed away from the 
return points at this moment, subsequent change in money supply will reverse the 
skewing at a later point of time. As a result, the cumulative small changes in output 
associated with the monetary change around this moment will be cancelled by a large but 
opposite change in output at a later point of time. Thus, output is approximately 
fluctuating between an upper and a lower bound. A corollary of this is that one cannot 
keep raising demand (and output) by means of indefinite increases in money supply. Of 
course, this does not mean that every type of monetary change will be neutral. Indeed,
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(b) if the money supply has been going in one direction, a change in the money supply in 
the opposite direction will be non-neutral.
Thus, if there is an underlying growing trend in money supply, a reduction in money 
supply will cause a reduction in output. The policy implication of this is very Keynesian: 
In a generally inflationary economy, the government should avoid any reduction in 
money supply. Moreover, if there were any exogenous reduction in aggregate demand, a 
rise in money would usually alleviate the initial reduction of demand (provided that the 
price deviations are not skewed at the upper thresholds). Nevertheless, it must be 
emphasized that the rise in money supply will have no "long run" effect on demand (i.e. 
no effect on the bounds of output) so that the policy will be more effective for temporary 
instead of permanent reductions in demand.
6.5 Final Remark
We end the thesis with an important message for further research: our belief that 
many of the practices or rules of thumb established in the economy may not be as 
suboptimal as commonly supposed. On the contrary, they are actually cost saving 
devices, with at least one party of the market recognizing the possibility of a substantial 
gain and hence offering such a scheme that will induce the other party’s participation for 
a share of the possible gain.
In this thesis, we have encountered a few examples of these cost saving devices. 
The first example with significant macroeconomic implications is the suppliers' tendency 
to pledge a stable pricing policy. Such practice is welcomed by both parties because it 
reduces the customers' shopping cost on one hand and ensure the suppliers more stable 
demand on the other. The implicit guarantee of employment is another important example 
which has the effects of (i) reducing the risk of the worker being unemployed and 
enables the employer to offer a lower wage; and (ii) allowing the non-transferable surplus
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arising from worker's acquisition of firm specific skill/knowledge through on-the-job 
training to be shared by both parties. Parallel to the second example is the implicit 
guarantee of a wage which allows the exploitation of a surplus arising from the difference 
in risk aversion between the employer and the worker. Moreover, the agreement to 
review the wages periodically; and the implicit understanding of charging a price on a 
mark-up basis of cost (i.e. cost-oriented pricing) are also devices to reduce the bargaining 
cost between the two parties.
Yet, the list of these practices, even just in the case of product and labour 
markets, is much longer than that listed above. The announcement of sales as a package 
of a fall and then a rise of price (instead of two separate announcements of price 
changes); and the inclusion of all seasonal price variations in one single price menu are 
devices to reduce uncertainty to customers and the reputation cost of changing price to 
suppliers arising from an otherwise non-preannounced irregular price change. In the 
labour market, the practices of hoarding labour; building up inventories; asking the 
workers to undertake maintenance; and stopping recruitment are also cost saving devices 
in the face of temporary negative demand shocks.
The implication of the above message is that Neoclassical economists should be 
prepared to look more closely at what is actually happening in the economy; and that 
Keynesian economists should perhaps spend more effort in explaining how the observed 
phenomena originate. The fact that many of the Keynesian results appeared to be in better 
accordance with reality may just be a reflection of a second best approach: they have 
spent more effort in observing the phenomena/characteristics in the economy and are 
therefore more often capable of producing a realistic result. Nevertheless, they do not 
have a monopoly in truth. As we have seen in this thesis: employment is not as flexible 
as their theory of Quantity Adjustment supposes, and mark-up pricing is only an 
approximation to true profit maximization. This is why good microfoundations for the
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Keynesian approach are so necessary. Indeed, the common criticism of the Keynesian 
approach as an essentially short run analysis is a reflection of this very weakness.
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